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INTRODUCTION
Our children embody the enduring wonder of life. They hold our hopes
for the future. We want them to be happy, to succeed in whatever they do
both in work and in play. We want them to contribute to our country and the
world in constructive ways.
But for these hopes to be realized our children must be educated-they
must possess the requisite skills and knowledge to function well in this ever-
changing world. Yet, are we, as a society, meeting our responsibility to
educate our children? What do we expect of our public schools? How
important are these schools to us? Is a public education fit for the times
guaranteed as a constitutional matter?
These questions loomed large in the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
decisions in Claremont I and Claremont II, issued respectively in 1993 and
1997.1 Constituting New Hampshire's core education rulings, they are
among the Court's most controversial exercises of constitutional
jurisprudence.2
*John M. Lewis served as an Associate Justice of the New Hampshire Superior Court from
2001 to 2013, and also served as Chair of New Hampshire's State Board of Education from
1997 to 2001. Stephen E. Borofsky is the managing director of the law firm of Borofsky,
Amodeo-Vickery & Bandazian P.A. He grew up and went to school in Claremont, New
Hampshire. Both authors attended Dartmouth College and Columbia Law School, and they
worked together as partners in the law from 1982 to 2001. Today, they continue to work
together. The authors wish to particularly thank Sandra Cabrera, Esq. for her research and
editing assistance. Special thanks goes also to Mary S. Searles, Law Librarian of the John W.
King New Hampshire Law Library, the Clerk's Office of the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
and Alma Alvarado, Esq.
1 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1), 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); Claremont
Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont Il), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997).
2 Claremont I and Claremont II were followed by a number of other decisions going into
2008, though many of these were not directly related to the actual Claremont litigation. See,
e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont Ill), 712 A.2d 612 (N.H. 1998) (dismissing
challenge to Justice Batchelder's participation in Claremont II); Opinion of the Justices
(School Financing) (Claremont I), 712 A.2d 1080 (N.H. 1998) (declaring that the proffered
"ABC" funding plan did not pass constitutional muster); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont V), 725 A.2d 648 (N.H. 1998) (denying the State's request for an extension of
time to enact a constitutional funding scheme); Opinion of the Justices (Tax Plan Referendum)
(Claremont VI), 725 A.2d 1082 (N.H. 1999) (declaring a proposed tax plan referendum to be
inappropriate); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont VII), 744 A.2d 1107 (N.H. 1999)
(declining to sustain a "phase-in" for a state property tax scheme); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, (Claremont VIll), 761 A.2d 389 (N.H. 1999) (granting attorney's fees to
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Instituted in 1991 in the Merrimack County New Hampshire Superior
Court by five "property poor" school districts, five students, and eight
taxpayers and parents, the Claremont litigation broadly challenged, on
several state constitutional grounds, New Hampshire's funding of public
education.3 The Superior Court (Manias, J.) initially dismissed the litigation,
holding that it failed to present claims for which relief could be granted under
State constitutional law.
In Claremont I, however, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
unanimously reversed this dismissal.5 It construed Part II, Article 83 (Article
83) of the State Constitution as reposing duties upon the State, enforceable in
court, to provide "a constitutionally adequate education to every educable
child in the public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee adequate
funding."6  Article 83, the education provision of the State Constitution,
provides in pertinent part:
Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a
community, being essential to the preservation of a free
government; and spreading the opportunities and advantages
of education through the various parts of the country, being
highly conducive to promote this end; it shall be the duty of
the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this
government, to cherish the interest of literature and the
sciences, and all seminaries and public schools.7
The Supreme Court declined in Claremont I to define the specifics of a
constitutionally adequate education or the means to provide for it, deferring
petitioners); Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing System) (Claremont
IX), 765 A.2d 673 (N.H. 2000) (declaring that a proposed targeted aid plan did not pass
constitutional muster); Sirrell v. State (Claremont X), 780 A.2d 494 (N.H. 2001) (rejecting
challenge to 1999 state property tax); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (ClaremontXI), 794
A.2d 744 (N.H. 2002) (declaring accountability to be a component of the State's duty to
provide a constitutionally adequate education); Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State
(Claremont XII), 907 A.2d 988 (N.H. 2006) (declaring that the State still had not developed
"distinct substantive content" to what constitutes "adequacy" so cost thereof may be isolated;
retaining jurisdiction; and threatening to impose remedies if "the political branches" fail, per a
deadline, to "define with specificity the components of a constitutionally adequate
education"); Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State (Claremont XIll), 958 A2d 930
(N.H. 2008) (dismissing case as moot).
3 Claremontl, 635 A.2d at 1377.
4 Id. at 1376-77.
5 Id. at 1382.
6 Id. at 1376.
7 N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII.
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"in the first instance" to the Legislature and Governor, though it declared that
a free public education is at least an important, substantive right," one "held
by the public to enforce the State's duty."" Further, Claremont I barely
discussed the petitioners' contention-one that would prove critical in
Claremont II-that the education funding system's reliance on local property
taxes, with varying tax rates, violated State Constitution Part II, Article 5's
(Article 5) requirement that taxes be imposed and levied so that they are
"proportional and reasonable." 9 The Court remanded the case to the Superior
Court for further proceedings.' 0
A trial took place in mid-1996 and extended over six weeks. The
Superior Court again ruled for the State. In a detailed decision, with many
findings of fact, the Superior Court concluded that the petitioners had not
proven:
* that the education system failed to provide in the petitioner
school districts constitutionally adequate education;
* that the education system failed to provide in those districts
constitutionally adequate funding;
* that the education system violated equal protection rights; or
* that the education system, despite its heavy reliance on local
property taxes for funding, failed to pass muster under Article 5.
In Claremont II, however, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior
Court's decision based only in regard to the lower court's tax ruling, the
fourth bullet above." It held that the locally levied property tax that
supported education constituted a form of "State tax," and this "State tax,"
with its "varying property tax rates," impermissibly impacted taxpayers in a
disproportionate and unreasonable manner, contrary to Article 5.12
Although the Claremont II Court did not squarely consider whether the
Superior Court had otherwise erred in sustaining as constitutional the State's
system of education, it nonetheless elaborated on the nature of the right to an
"adequate" education beyond what the Superior Court had done, and it
classified "a State funded, constitutionally adequate public education" as a
"fundamental right" reviewable pursuant to "a standard of strict judicial
scrutiny.""3 It also expressly declared the Superior Court's reliance on an
8 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont l), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
9 Id. at 1377; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. V.
1oId. at 1382.
" Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremontl), 703 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.H. 1997).
12 Id. at 1357.
13 Id. at 1358-59.
CLAREMONT IAND II
education adequacy definition created by the State Board of Education to be
inappropriate, thus suggesting that an incorrect legal measuring rod for
"adequacy" had been applied.' 4  Moreover, contrary to certain of the
Superior Court's core findings and conclusions against the petitioners, it
described the record, "[r]egardless of . .. [the measure used to] meet the test
for constitutional adequacy, [as] demonstrat[ing] that a number of plaintiff
communities are unable to meet existing standards despite assessing
disproportionate and unreasonable taxes." 5  As to a remedy, the Court
directed the other two branches of Government, subject to a deadline, to
make education and finance reforms so that the State would provide a
constitutionally adequate public education through taxes that met the dictates
of Article 5. 6
Some commentators decry these decisions as exemplifying judicial
activism at its worst. They accuse the New Hampshire Supreme Court of
failing to stay within proper judicial bounds, acting in disregard of
constitutionally derived doctrines such as separation of powers and
avoidance of political questions, and irresponsibly embroiling itself in
education issues beyond its authority and its ability to craft a remedy.
Others, however, vigorously defend the decisions. They see them as
beacons of judicial statesmanship, which, if anything, did not go far enough
to confront the State's longstanding failure to provide New Hampshire
school children with the education the Constitution mandates.' 8
14 Id. at 1357-58.
15 Id. at 1357. Though the Court made this quoted statement in the context of reaching its tax
ruling, the statement certainly suggests that the Court had serious questions concerning the
findings underlying the Superior Court's other rulings. Id.
16 Id. at 1360-61.
17 See, e.g., Eugene Van Loan III as "Rasputin," Letters to the Educators, The Case for a
Constitutional Amendment (1998), reprinted in A CLAREMONT READER 215, 215-376 (Gregory
M. Sorg ed., 2007), http://www.nhhra.org/sites/default/files/cr.pdf [hereinafter Van Loan
Letters]; Edward C. Mosca, New Hampshire's Claremont Case and the Separation ofPowers,
4 PIERCE L. REv. 409 (2006) [hereinafter Mosca, NH's Claremont Case]. In his first letter,
Van Loan castigated Claremont II as an opinion where "[t]he Court violated every canon of
judicial restraint when it reached out to lecture our duly elected officials on social policy and
undertook to elevate its own views to constitutional stature." Van Loan Letters, supra, at 217.
18 See, e.g., Andru H. Volinsky, New Hampshire 's Education-Funding Litigation: Claremont
School District v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993), Modified, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H.
1997), 83 NEB. L. REv. 836, 855 (2005) ("[T]he court must not falter under legislative and
executive attack. Our New Hampshire Constitution is the repository of important rights, and
those rights cannot be protected absent faith in the viability of our courts as an equal branch of
government"); Thomas P. Connair, Preface to The Claremont Education Lawsuit, CLAREMONT
LAWSUIT COALITION (1998) http://www.claremontlawsuit.org/infobook/preface.html ("Born
out of a concern for our children and their education, this case is a tribute to the vision of our
Founding Fathers that education was essential to the preservation of a free government, and a
2015
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This article concludes that the New Hampshire Supreme Court correctly
determined in Claremont I that Article 83 established enforceable positive
constitutional rights for the provision and funding of an adequate public
education. The Court acted properly in recognizing that the judiciary had an
important role to play to assure these important constitutional rights.
Claremont I properly upheld the State's constitutional obligation to accord
the State's public school children with access to an education that would at
all times enable them to be good citizens productive in their work. The
decision also reflected proper regard for the prerogatives of the elected
branches by leaving to them, at least initially, the development of an
operational definition of "adequacy" in education, along with the
responsibility to fashion "the appropriate means" to provide for it.19
The Claremont II decision, however, does not earn like approbation. It
fails to stand up strongly as a tax ruling. It does not constitute a good
appellate review of the other Superior Court rulings against the petitioners.
The Court majority, after issuing its decision, deferred to the elected
branches to give them time to fashion a remedy. Its decision, however, was
not well received, or easily accepted, by many in the Legislature. Only after
much resistance and much delay did the elected branches manage to put in
place certain educational "adequacy"/funding reforms.
Whatever their merits or flaws, this article sees these two decisions as
having importantly and positively impacted New Hampshire's public
education system. The decisions had a good deal to do with ushering in
needed reforms, so that the education system now operates with a specific
definition for a constitutionally adequate education, regular assessment and
accountability tools, and a "costing out" of "adequacy" linked to associated
funding. The decisions have thus better positioned the public education
system to meet the challenges of the future.
In critically revisiting Claremont I and Claremont II, this article proceeds
in three parts. Part I reviews the background of the Claremont litigation in
New Hampshire; its place among like litigation across the country; the issues
the suit initially raised; the manner in which the case proceeded, including
the Superior Court rulings; and the issues the Supreme Court actually
confronted and those it avoided in the two decisions.
Part II analyzes the defensibility of both Claremont I and Claremont II.
It considers whether the Supreme Court correctly construed the pertinent
state constitutional provisions, whether it should have entered the education
tribute to the New Hampshire Supreme Court for boldly decrying the government's
desecration of that vision.").
19 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont l), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
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adequacy/funding fray, and whether the Court properly carried out its
appellate role in Claremont II.
Part III addresses the enduring legacy of the decisions, whether they
were rightly or wrongly decided, and, in particular, whether the response to
these decisions has left New Hampshire with a better system of public
education.
I. CLAREMONT I AND CLAREMONT II
1. Background
a. In New Hampshire: The History Leading Up to the Filing of
the Litigation
New Hampshire has insisted upon the provision of public education in
some form since colonial times.20  Indeed, Article 83 of the State's 1784
Constitution explicitly enshrined the obligation to "cherish" education.2 1
However, many considered, as the Claremont litigation itself reflects, that the
Legislature and Executive failed over the years to effectively meet the
constitutional duty to offer and fund public school education throughout the
State.
The Legislature early on, in 1789, created a state tax on polls and estates
for education with the revenues to be raised and spent locally.22  It also
20 See Claremont I, 635 A.2d at 1379; Brief for the Ralph Degnan Hough, President of the
New Hampshire Senate at 21-39, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 138 N.H. 183 (1993)
(No. 92-711) [hereinafter Hough Brief] (describing education in New Hampshire going back
to the colonial period, and seeking to show the State's commitment to the provision of public
education over time). See generally EUGENE A. BISHOP, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STATE
SCHOOL SYSTEM IN NEW HAMPSHIRE (N.Y.C., Teacher's Col., Columbia Univ., 1930). But see
Edward C. Mosca, The Original Understanding of the New Hampshire Constitution 's
Education Clause, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 209, 235-36 (2007) [hereinafter Mosca, Original
Understanding] ("In sum, to the extent that New Hampshire's pre-1784 education laws reflect
what the voters who adopted the constitution understood Article 83's 'duty to cherish the
interest of public schools' to mean, they certainly did not understand it to require the sort of
'adequate education' fashioned by the Claremont decision. Indeed, they would not have
understood it to require universal public education.").
21 N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII.
22 The tax worked as follows: "The legislature set the total amount of spending [for education]
for the year. In 1790, it set the amount at approximately the pound equivalent of $16,500. ...
Each town was required to collect from its taxpayers a percentage of the total spending
amount that was equivalent to the town's percentage of the state's tax base. For example, if a
town's taxable wealth comprised two percent of the taxable wealth in the state in 1790, the
law required that town to collect from its taxpayers an amount equivalent to two percent of
$16,500." Mosca, Original Understanding, supra note 20, at 229-30. While the tax reflected
2015 7
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required local communities of a certain size to maintain certain types of
schools and meet certain curriculum standards. 23  The State acted over the
years and into the twentieth century to increase the tax for education funding,
and to exercise, in various ways and degrees, oversight and control of the
localities' education efforts.24
Nonetheless, the actual support the State provided, or required, to assure
good public education in all its areas or regions never matched the expressed
constitutional imperative or its underlying ideals. Such was the condition of
public education in New Hampshire as of 1900 that one commentator
described it as "not a pleasing one." 25
With the exception of larger towns where education was
taken seriously, most of the teachers were not only untried
but had limited education, school houses left much to be
desired in terms of sanitation, neatness, and comfort, the
school boards were more concerned with the local tax rate
than they were with the welfare of children, supplies and text
were severely limited, and there was little evidence of
the acceptance by the State of responsibility for public education, it resulted in markedly
different amounts being raised by different towns in a manner not related to actual school
needs. Id. See also Walter A. Backhoven, Claremont's Achilles Heel: The Unrecognized
Mandatory School-Tax Law of 1789, 43 N.H.B.J. 26, 26-27 n.16 (2002).
23 The law required that all towns provide "English Grammar School or Schools for teaching
reading, writing and arithmetic," though "shire towns," or "half shire towns" had to offer "a
grammar school for the purpose of teaching the Latin and Greek languages as well as reading,
writing, and arithmetic." Douglas E. Hall, Lessons from New Hampshire: What We Can
Learn from the History of the State's Role in School Finance 1642-1998, NEW HAMPSHIRE
CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES 3 (1998)
http://www.nhpolicy.org/UploadedFiles/Reports/history 1.html.
24 Though the original amount allocated for education under the Law of 1789 equaled the
approximate equivalent of $16,500, by 1905 this had been increased to $750,000, with the
property subject to taxation expanded over time to include improved and unimproved land and
buildings of non-residents, and with the towns and districts allowed to raise additional sums
for education by further taxation. See Backhoven, supra note 22, at 27; Hall, supra note 23, at
4. In 1828, moreover, the State, through a "Literacy Fund" started to distribute monies to the
towns. See GEORGE G. BUSH, HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 17 (Washington
D.C. Government Printing Office 1893); WILLIAM H. MANDREY, A SUMMARY OF THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 1900-1965 1 (N.H.
Dep't of Educ., 1968); BISHOP, supra note 20, at 43; Holbart Pillsbury & Huntley H.
Spaulding, Resources, Attractions, and its People, A History, in A CLAREMONT READER supra
note 17, at 21. The State's actual control and oversight of the education effort of the localities
also proceeded, with school districts established in the early 1800s, and various forms of
local/state superintendence utilized throughout the nineteenth century and going into the early
twentieth century. See generally Pillsbury, supra, at 20-25; MANDREY, supra, at 1-8.
25 See MANDREY, supra note 24, at 2.
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professional supervision. Transportation, where furnished,
was poor, there was no requirement for the number of school
days to be in session and compulsory attendance was
unknown .... [Though] ... the high schools were frequently
well treated . . . [m]any towns refused to pay tuition and so
parents were forced to provide both the funds and the
transportation to the schools. Many able youngsters were
deprived of a high school education because their families
couldn't afford to pay nor solve transportation problems.26
In 1919, the evident deficiencies of the education system triggered major
reforms. The Legislature, with the strong prodding and backing of then
Governor John H. Bartlett, enacted "the Great School Law of 1919." This
aimed at greatly strengthening the State's role in education and making the
supporting funding scheme more equitable with a better measure of direct
state support.
The reform measures included a new State Board of Education, a
centralized authority to work to achieve, among other things, equalization of
educational opportunity; a Commissioner of Education to be employed by
the State Board to act as its chief executive officer; the establishment of
minimum standards, including a minimum school year of thirty-six weeks,
for defined "standard schools"; the creation of a state-wide supervisory
system for schools; and a new finance system.2 7  This new finance system
featured the local property tax as the principal revenue source, capped and
floored, however, as to tax rates, with a form of equalization/foundation aid
26 See MANDREY, supra note 24, at 2-3. In regard to the tax system of that time, the State
opined in its Claremont II brief: "By the early 1900's the [tax] system had become entirely
unworkable. Whatever multiplier the State set [that is, its steps to increase the required tax]
resulted in some towns raising far too little and others raising far too much." Brief for the
State at 82-83, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997)
(No. 97-001) [hereinafter Brief for the State]. Further, the tax system's equity problems were
worsened by the manner of distribution of the tax revenues by the towns to the school districts
that from 1805 until 1885 were allowed by law to exist as subdivisions of towns and had
become quite numerous (indeed at one point exceeding 2000). Id. Poorer school districts
within a town did not fare well in the division of revenues. Id. See also BISHOP, supra note
20, at 39 (describing the bad impact of the 1805 "districting law" as follows: "the dividing and
subdividing into districts increased until the school units, in a great number of cases, were so
small as to make effective support absolutely impossible"). Overall, the system resulted in
"the village school provid[ing] an education far superior to that available in rural areas." Brief
for the State, supra, at 83.
27 See BISHOP, supra note 20, at 102-10; Hall, supra note 23, at 11-15; MANDREY, supra note
24, at 8-13.
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coming directly from the State. 28 The Great School Law of 1919 established
the core structural framework for education and funding that was still
essentially in place at the time of the institution of the Claremont litigation.
State funding for education, however, remained a major concern. In
1947, another major education reform effort took place. This included a large
but temporary increase of direct State support, accompanied by measures
that, among other things, called upon the State to provide more direct
funding both through a "general aid" program and through a reformed
foundation aid program. 29 The money was meant to assist school districts
that could not finance cost-defined education programs for elementary and
middle school students and also, for the first time, high school students, with
a local property tax capped at $6.00 per thousand of equalized valuation of
the district.30  Yet, the Legislature soon failed to appropriate monies
contemplated by these measures.3
In 1971, the Laconia Board of Education pursued litigation that, among
other issues, sought to challenge the constitutionality of the State's education
funding system as violative of equal protection guarantees under the Federal
Constitution.3 2 The New Hampshire Supreme Court, however, "declined to
decide the constitutional question in part because its resolution 'would
require . . . a financial and statistical background which is not available in
this case or in this record. "'33
In the 1980s, education proponents continued to seek to decrease the
State's reliance on local property taxes and to increase state funding. These
efforts centered on attempts to increase State foundation aid. In 1982, along
these lines, several school districts, and a number of students and taxpayers
28 Simply put, foundation aid programs generally sought to meet a defined or determined
education cost per student in a district through local property tax contributions, supplemented
where needed, and to assure the defined or determined foundation education cost, by extra
funds coming particularly from the state. BISHOP, supra note 20, at 102-10; Hall, supra note
23, at 6, 11-15; MANDREY, supra note 24, at 8-13.
29 Paul R. Fillion, The State System of School Finance in New Hampshire 1919-1982, An
Historical Study 78-87 (1983) (Ed.D. Thesis, Ann Arbor, Mich. Univ. Microfilms Int'l);
Hough Brief supra note 20, at 37-40; Hall, supra note 23, at 7-8; MANDREY, supra note 24,
at 27-28.
30 Fillion, supra note 29, at 78-87; Hough Brief supra note 20, at 37-40; Hall, supra note 23,
at 7-8; MANDREY, supra note 24, at 27-28.
31 Drew Dunphy, Moving Mountains in the Granite State: Reforming School Finance and
Defining Adequacy in New Hampshire, 2 STUD. IN JUD. REMEDIES AND PUB. ENGAGEMENT, No.
4, 2001, at 5; Hall, supra note 23, at 8; MANDREY, supra note 24, at 28.
32 Laconia Bd. of Educ. v. Laconia, 285 A.2d 793, 796 (N.H. 1971).
33 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont V/), 725 A.2d 648, 649 (N.H. 1998) (quoting
Laconia Bd. Of Educ., 285 A.2d at 796). Yet another constitutional challenge to school
funding never was brought to trial. See Birch v. State, Civ. No. 72-13 (D.N.H. 1972).
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instituted a funding equity suit in the Merrimack Superior Court known as
Jesseman v. State of New Hampshire.34  This suit invoked Article 83, and
contended that the State's system of school finance, with its heavy reliance
on local property taxes, failed to enable the proper realization of education in
all districts for all children.3 5 The suit ended inconclusively, however, in
1985 when the State integrated a new needs-based targeted Foundation Aid
program into the education funding mix, known as the "Augenblick
formula."3 6
Though some saw the "Augenblick formula" program as establishing the
general goal of having the State cover at least eight percent of overall
educational expenditures through foundation aid, the program did not obtain
the funding to accomplish this.37 Its perceived under-funding, coupled with
the view that it in any event did not go far enough to reform the education
financing system, had much to do with bringing about the Claremont
litigation.3 8
By the early to mid-1990s, about the time the Claremont litigation was
being pursued, the State was exercising significant responsibility both in the
funding and the delivery of public education. It provided direct funding
primarily through Foundation Aid, Building Aid, and Catastrophic Aid (aid
for special education); 39 it had in place Minimum Standards for School
Approval that included comprehensive requirements concerning a large
range of matters;4 0 it had developed curricular frameworks to serve as guides
for effective curriculum development;i and it had begun to offer a state-wide
testing program, known as the Education Improvement and Assessment
Program, to provide a measure of student competency and achievement. 4 2
The State's Department of Education (NHDOE), headed by the
Commissioner of Education and working with the State Board of Education
(State Board), was tasked with providing regulatory direction, monitoring,
34 Jessemanv. State, No. 82-E-038 (Merrimack County, N.H. Super. Ct 1982).
3 5 d
36 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 198:27-33 (1989) (repealed 1999); Claremont V, 725 A.2d at
649 (discussing Jesseman); Volinsky, supra note 18, at 839-40.
37 Dunphy, supra note 31, at 5; Hall, supra note 23, at 10; Volinsky, supra note 18, at 840. In
Claremont V, the Court observed that the State's Attorney General had acknowledged in oral
argument that "the funds anticipated to be distributed under the Augenblick Formula were
never appropriated." Claremont V, 725 A.2d at 649.
38 Dunphy, supra note 31, at 5.
39 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C:18-JJ (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 198:15-a(J)-(IV)
(2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 198:27-37 (repealed 1999).
40 N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. Ed. 306.01(a)-(c) (2014).
41 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-E:2-a (2014).
42 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-C:1(I)-(VI) (2013).
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evaluative oversight, and instructional assistance to schools (including
handling compliance with Minimum Standards for School Approval and
administration of the state-wide testing program). 4 3  Among its other
responsibilities, the NHDOE acted to administer and channel federal aid
through various programs to school districts, to administer the teacher
certification rules adopted by the State Board, and to play a major role in the
creation and administration of a number of vocational technical centers
throughout the State-centers that enjoyed substantial state financial
support. The State Board served to manage the whole education system,
with power to hear and resolve certain education disputes, and develop and
issue regulations.4 5
Yet, it remained the case that the school districts (operating through
SAUs or School Administrative Units) continued to bear the major
responsibility for providing public education, largely without, even in the
minds of certain NHDOE officials, sufficient state oversight or
involvement.4 6 The localities often seemed to strain-and arguably failed-
to obtain the needed funding for their schools. The undisputed reality was
that since 1919 local revenues in the form of local property taxes provided a
very large portion-up to about ninety percent-of total school revenue, and
New Hampshire regularly placed last in the country in direct State aid to
education.
By 1989, the Claremont School District had initiated major cuts in its
education programs. It also failed to make needed building repairs and
indeed came to lose its high school accreditation. 49 The Claremont School
43 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-N:1-11 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186:40-a (2015); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-C:3 (2013).
44 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-N:1-11 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186:40-a (2015); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 188-E:1 (2015).
45 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-N:11 (2007). See generally N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 186:1-11 (2015).
46 See, e.g., Transcript of Record Vol. 1 at 81-85, 172-77, Vol. 28 at 92-96, Claremont Sch.
Dist. v. Governor, No. 91-E-0306 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996) (testimony of retired
NHDOE Commissioner Charles Marston and William Ewert, NHDOE Administrator of
Policy Development Initiatives and Director of the New Hampshire Education Improvement
and Assessment Program).
47 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1354-56 (N.H. 1997).
The tax structure for New Hampshire itself posed a major hurdle to the raising of substantial
sums at the state level for education. The State had no state income tax or sales tax. The
prevailing ethos: keep state government small and confined, with education, among other
services, left to the localities largely to finance.
48 Volinsky, supra note 18, at 840.
491 Id. at 841.
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Board, led by its chairperson, Thomas Connair, himself an attorney, began to
explore a litigation strategy to obtain more State funding.50
Mr. Connair convinced Arpiar Saunders, Esq., then a professor of
constitutional law at the Franklin Pierce School of Law in Concord, New
Hampshire, to institute school funding litigation.5 ' Two other attorneys,
Andru H. Volinsky, Esq., and John Burwell Garvey, Esq., agreed to work
with Professor Saunders. 52  Four additional school districts (Allenstown,
Franklin, Lisbon Regional, and Pittsfield), eight taxpayers and parents, and
five students joined the litigation as petitioners, and the case was filed "with
some fanfare" in June, 1991.53
b. Elsewhere
While the Claremont case was prompted by what many saw as the
State's long-term failure to meet its constitutional duty to "cherish" the
public education of its school children, it also stands as one of a number of
law suits across the country that commentators have classified as the "third
wave" of education quality/education funding litigation. These "third wave"
suits are based on the education clauses in state constitutions, and they
generally seek to have the state courts recognize and enforce constitutional
provisions positively imposing upon the states the duty to provide an
education often described by the term "adequate." 54
50 Id. at 839.
51 Id.
52 id
53 Id. at 841.
54 See, e.g., Christopher E. Adams, Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School
Finance Litigation, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1619-22 (2007) (discussing the three "waves" of
litigation); Kelly Thompson Cochran, Beyond School Funding: Defining the Constitutional
Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L.REv. 399, 413-17 (2000); Amy L. Moore, When
Enough Isn't Enough: Qualitative and Quantitative Assessments of Adequate Education in
State Constitutions by State Supreme Courts, 41 U. TOL. L. REv. 545, 555-56, 560 (2010);
Mosca, NH's Claremont Case, supra note 17, at 411-13.
The first of the above-referenced three "waves" of litigation started in the late 1960s and
was based on Fourteenth Amendment claims under the federal Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection. This "wave," however, was essentially broken in 1973 by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In
that case, involving an equal protection class action challenge to Texas' significant reliance on
local property taxes to fund education, the United States Supreme Court manifested strong
reluctance to expand the reach of federal equal protection and involve the courts in education
funding disputes. Id at 17-18. It deemed the asserted wealth-based discrimination and
improper infringement on educational opportunity stemming from local property tax usage to
call for no more than "rational basis" equal protection review, not the "strict scrutiny" review
generally undertaken when "fundamental rights" were implicated. Id. at 37-3 9. On that basis,
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The "adequacy" suits trace their roots to the seminal, indeed epochal,
decision of Brown v. Board of Education, where the United States Supreme
Court, in abandoning the notion that "separate but equal" race-divided
education passed constitutional muster, firmly recognized that our nation's
continued democratic vitality depended on the offering of equal opportunity
to good education." As the Court then pointedly stated: "[Education] is the
very foundation of good citizenship . . . it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. ,6
the Court concluded that the challenged tax system passed constitutional muster as it could be
seen as legitimately promoting local control of education. Id. at 49-51. The Court majority
(Rodriquez was a 5-4 decision) did not entirely close the door to relief under the federal
Constitution to assure at least some level of public education-indeed in a later case in 1986,
the Court expressly noted that it had still not "definitively settled the questions whether a
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to
discriminatorily infringe that right should be accorded heightened equal protection review."
See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986); see also Kadramas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch.,
487 U.S. 450, 466 n.1 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (stating that the question "remains open
today"); cf Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (applying an intermediate level of equal
protection scrutiny in regard to a challenge to a state's denial of education access to children
of undocumented aliens). Nonetheless, Rodriquez worked effectively to hamper the utilization
of the federal equal protection clause as the linchpin for education quality/education funding
litigation challenges. Adams, supra, at 1619; Moore, supra, at 558.
After Rodriquez, a second "wave" of litigation ensued which invoked state constitutional
equal protection rights, and sought "equity" in education. Adams, supra, at 1619-20; Moore,
supra, at 560. A strong focus remained on tax base and spending/resources differences among
school districts and equalizing per-student funding. Adams, supra, at 1619-20; Moore, supra,
at 560. These education "equity" cases achieved some major successes-e.g. the Supreme
Courts in California, Connecticut, and Wyoming each deemed education to be a fundamental
right for purposes of state equal protection in decisions invalidating state education finance
systems. See Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980);
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P. 2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
Yet this "wave" stalled going into the late 1980s with many state courts increasingly
manifesting unwillingness to invalidate state education finance systems, or take on the task of
crafting remedies for them, squarely on the basis of an educational equity approach. See
generally MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS & KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH
THE COURTS 16-17, 133-34 n.11 (2009). Beginning in about 1989, a third "wave" of
litigation emerged, the Claremont case among them. Mosca, NH's Claremont Case, supra
note 17, at 411-12.
While perhaps helpful in describing legal developments, the "wave" metaphor, particularly
in regard to the second and third "waves" of suits, is far too simplistic. Cases in the time
frames of the "waves" often blended equity and adequacy concerns, and adequacy
determinations certainly have a strong equity dimension. The Claremont litigation had
adequacy and equity aspects, in regard to both students and taxpayers.
5 Brownv. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56 Id. at 493.
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To be sure, "adequacy" suits do not focus on achieving school
desegregation. Rather, they seek to assure that all children, whether located
in poor or rich areas, are offered a proper education. They challenge funding
practices, but they look beyond the funding issues to the quality of the
education itself.
All of the post-Brown education quality/funding cases, no matter the
"wave" with which they have been associated, gained impetus from the
nation's failure to achieve the goal of desegregated schools. All of them
sought to confront and eradicate the continued enormous disparities in
education opportunity based on socio-economic and race/ethnic status.
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District,58
the United States Supreme Court markedly curtailed voluntary school
desegregation plans. In so doing, the Court strengthened the withdrawal of
the federal courts from the school desegregation struggle-something that
had been occurring since the early 1970s.59 As this withdrawal proceeded,
the nation experienced "a clear trend of rising resegregation." 6 0  The result
was that black and Latino students attended predominantly minority schools
in markedly higher percentages, and schools in high-poverty areas became
overwhelmingly populated by minority students.62 The persisting education
gap today is stark and threatens our national wellbeing.6 3
57 See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
58 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
REBELL, supra note 54, at 1-2, 126 nn.1-10 (describing this retreat, which included
decisions, like Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), that moved federal district courts to
terminate desegregation decrees).
60 Id. at 2.
61 Id. Rebell underscores Justice Breyer's dissent in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District, where it was "noted that in 2000, over 70 percent of all black and
Latino students attended predominantly minority schools, a higher percentage than thirty years
earlier . . . [and] between 1980 and 2003, the percentage of white students in schools attended
by the average black student fell from 45 to 29 percent." 551 U.S. at 803-69 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
62 REBELL, supra note 54, at 2, 126-27 n.11 (citing data indicating that "black and Latino
students make up 80 percent of the student population in high poverty areas," with high
poverty schools defined as having 90-100 percent of the student population as poor).
63 As was stated in the 2013 report "For Each and Every Child":
While some young Americans-most of them white and affluent-are
getting a truly world-class education, those who attend schools in high
poverty neighborhoods are getting an education that more closely
approximates school in developing nations. In reading, for example,
although U.S. children in low-poverty schools rank at the top of the world,
those in our highest-poverty schools are performing on a par with children
in the world's lowest-achieving countries. With the highest poverty rate in
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Shortly prior to Claremont, similar litigation in certain other states
(Kentucky, Texas, and Montana) had been successful. Moreover, as the
Claremont litigation proceeded through the 1990s, school-funding litigation
in both Massachusetts and Vermont was also being pursued, and these cases
resulted in favorable rulings for the plaintiffs.6' The times thus seemed to
favor a renewed "adequacy-equity" litigation challenge in New Hampshire.
2. The Early Proceedings
a. The Issues and Relief Sought
Initially, the Claremont petitioners advanced six counts in their "Petition
for Declarative and Injunctive Relief." They claimed:
* Count I: New Hampshire's system of financing education "failed
to spread the opportunities and advantages of education
equitably" among students, thereby failing "to diffuse knowledge
and learning generally throughout the State" in violation of
Article 83.
* Count II: the State "failed to adequately and equitably fund
public elementary and secondary schools" at levels consistent
with the education duty owed by virtue of Article 83.
* Count III: the State's foundation aid statutes, RSA 198:27-33,
worked to unconstitutionally cap or restrain state aid to public
education at eight percent "in direct violation of the
constitutional requirement that education be adequately funded
and that the opportunity and advantage be spread equitably
among all New Hampshire students attending elementary and
secondary public schools."
the developed world, amplified by the inadequate education received by
many children in low-income schools, the United States is threatening its
own future.
THE EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE COMM'N, FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A STRATEGY FOR
EDUCATION EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 12 (U.S. Dep't of Educ., D.C. 2013).
64 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W. 2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W. 2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
65 Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Educ.,
615 N.E. 2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
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* Count IV: the State's system of financing education violated "the
equal protection requirements of the New Hampshire State
Constitution.
* Count V: the foundation aid statutes (see Count III) also
constituted an equal protection violation.
* Count VI: the State's heavy reliance on local property taxes to
finance schools violated State Constitution Article 5 as it
constituted an "unreasonable, disproportionate, and burdensome"
tax.66
The Petition highlighted what the petitioners claimed were large
disparities among the State's school districts in ability to finance education
through local property taxation, and the low level of the State's direct
contribution to education funding. As described by one of the petitioners'
attorneys, the petitioner school districts were "failed mill towns that lacked a
ski hill or lakefront property and were not located on the state's two interstate
highways."6 " These districts, it was claimed, did not come close to having
the same fiscal ability to raise taxes as the property-rich districts, and did not
offer at all a comparable education.69
The individual petitioners looked to obtain class-action status to
represent students and taxpayers in the petitioner school districts. 70 For
relief, the petitioners sought a declaration that the State's system of education
finance was unconstitutional and appropriate injunctive relief absent prompt
constitutional compliance by the State.
b. Motion to Dismiss and Superior Court Order
The State, through the New Hampshire Attorney General, moved to
dismiss all of the petitioners' counts. It asserted that the petition failed to
advance "justiciable" claims,72 was barred by the doctrines of official,
66 Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 47-52., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor,
No. 91-E-0306-B (N.H. Super. Ct. June 12, 1991) [hereinafter Petition].
67 Id. ¶¶ 17-31.
68 Volinsky, supra note 18, at 847 n.44.
69 Petition, supra note 66, ¶¶ 17-41.
70 Id. ¶1 5-8.
71 Id. at pt. V Relief Requested.
72 A non-justiciable dispute is one that is not amenable to judicial resolution. This may be
because a dispute lacks "ripeness" (or proper readiness for resolution), a complaining person
lacks "standing" or personal interest in the litigation, or a claim constitutes a "political
question."
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legislative and sovereign immunity, and did not offer any proper substantive
grounds for the granting of any relief.7
The case had been specially assigned to Superior Court Associate
Justice, George L. Manias, an experienced jurist.7 4 By order dated August
13, 1992, Judge Manias granted the State's motion, not because of any
justiciability concern, but on the ground that the petitioners had failed to state
a substantive claim for which relief could be granted.
Judge Manias characterized the State's justiciability arguments as
"meritless."7 6 He gave short shrift to the State's argument that the political
question doctrine7 7 rendered the case nonjusticiable "due to the 'lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it [and] the
impossibility of deciding it without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion."'"7  Judge Manias underscored that "[t]he
courts have the duty to interpret constitutional provisions," and observed that
"[t]he issues raised in the plaintiffs' petition are no more political questions
than any other constitutional challenges."79
Nor was Judge Manias persuaded by the State's argument that "this
matter is nonjusticiable because the Court is incapable of fashioning an
adequate remedy with regard to the plaintiffs' equal protection claims," that
''courts generally lack the institutional ability to assess the constitutionality
or the 'equity' of expenditure differences by reference to individual pupils'
educational needs."o He noted that "[o]nce again [the State] ignore[s] the
fact that the interpretation of constitutional provisions is the Court's duty
[and] . . . [t]he Court is certainly capable of determining the existence of any
constitutional rights or obligations between the parties and leaving the
legislature to enact laws in compliance with the standards determined by the
Court.""' He also rejected the State's immunity contentions, noting that the
State was not immune from suit in "a declaratory judgment action
73 Order on Mot. to Dismiss (Manias Order), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1),
No. 91-E-0306-B at 1 (Merrimack Cty. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1992).
74 Judge Manias was appointed to the bench in 1985 by Republican Governor John Sununu,
and retired in 2005.
7 See Manias Order.
761 Id. at 2.
Put simply, under this doctrine the Courts stay away from deciding matters that too much
implicate the political workings and responsibilities of the other branches of government.
78 Manias Order, at 3-4.
7 Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
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challenging the constitutionality of State action," and that the defendant
officials were being sued in their official capacities.8 2
Judge Manias went on, however, to rule that the petitioners' claims were
not reasonably susceptible to a construction that would permit recovery.
With respect to Counts I and II of the Petition that alleged violations of
Article 83, Judge Manias observed that this Article did not "set forth any
standards by which the court may identify . . . a duty [owed to the
petitioners] and determine whether [the State has] breached that duty."83 He
explained:
[The] . . . clause contains no language regarding equity,
uniformity, or even adequacy of education. Thus, the New
Hampshire Constitution imposes no qualitative standard of
education which must be met. Likewise, the New
Hampshire Constitution imposes no quantifiable financial
duty regarding education; there is no mention of funding or
even of "providing" or "maintaining" education. The only
"duty" set forth is the amorphous duty "to cherish . .. public
schools" and "to encourage private and public institutions."
The language of pt. 2, art. 83 is hortatory, not mandatory.8 4
Judge Manias also ruled that the petitioners did not raise a viable claim
in Count III in regard to the foundation aid statutes. This count, in his view,
relied "on a nonexistent constitutional 'duty' to adequately finance and
equitably spread educational opportunity," and he did not see these statutes,
in any event, as imposing an eight percent aid cap as the petitioners
claimed. 5 He further determined that the petitioners' equal protection counts
(Counts IV and V) failed. 6  For him, Article 83 neither explicitly nor
implicitly established a fundamental right to "equal educational
opportunity," 7 and he ruled that New Hampshire's statutory education
scheme passed muster under equal protection using both "a rational basis
test" and the "middle tier scrutiny of the substantial relationship test."8 8
82 Id at 5-6 (citation omitted).
83 Id at 8.
84 Order on Mot. to Dismiss (Manias Order), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1),
No. 91-E-0306-B at 10 (Merrimack Cty. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1992).
5 Id. at 11-12.
86 Id. at 12-17.
7 Id. at 13-14.
A court may apply the particularly exacting test of "strict scrutiny" in an equal protection
challenge where a "suspect" classification, such as one based on race, is involved, or where
the challenge concerns a recognized "fundamental right."
2015 19
20 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 14, No. 1
Finally, as to the petitioners' contention that the State's system of school
finance violated the strictures of Article 5 by imposing an unreasonable,
disproportionate and burdensome tax for education, Judge Manias concluded
that this also failed to set forth a proper claim. Judge Manias saw the "ad
valorem property taxes levied at the local level" as not needing to meet any
constitutional uniformity requirement on a statewide basis."
After Judge Manias denied the petitioners' motion to reconsider, they
appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
c. The Claremont I Decision
While the case was on appeal, the petitioners not only continued their
efforts to have the public informed of the litigation and its public policy
implications,90 they also enlisted the support of many of the "senior, best-
known lawyers in [the] State." 91 So it was that, at the oral argument on
appeal, it was noted that Chief Justice David A. Brock, 92 upon entering the
courtroom to hear the arguments, "did a double-take at [the] assemblage" of
about "a dozen senior co-counsel shoe-homed into the small area around [the
mid-career attorneys] who were [actually] arguing the case." 93
The oral argument itself contained a revealing exchange between the
Justices and Assistant Attorney General Leslie J. Ludke during which
Attorney Ludke conceded that the State could not pass laws making public
school education no more than a local option, perhaps not offered at all-that
a constitutional duty existed "to educate the children of the towns and cities
of the State."94 Attorney Ludke insisted, however, that this obligation arose
by virtue of the dictates of State Constitution, Article 5 and Part I, Article
Alfanias Order, at 17-18.
90 The petitioners' public relations efforts continued throughout the litigation. Indeed, one of
the assisting lawyers, Thomas F. Hersey, Esq., handled "press operations" during the later
trial, and was instrumental in obtaining regular and extended news coverage. See Volinsky,
supra note 18, at 847. The case impacted New Hampshire's political scene in a major way.
For some it offered the promise of a better, more equitable society, with a better tax structure;
for others, it constituted a threat to New Hampshire's traditional way of limited government
and limited taxation.
91 Volinsky, supra note 18, at 844.
92 Former Chief Justice Brock served in that capacity from October 6, 1986 through December
31, 2003. He was first appointed to the Supreme Court as an Associate Justice on June 9,
1978. He thus served on the Court for twenty-five years. His appointments were made by
Republican Governors.
93 Volinsky, supra note 18, at 844.
94 Recording of Oral Argument, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1), 635 A.2d
1375 (N.H. 1993) (No. 92-711).
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3g,95 requiring the Legislature to make only "wholesome and reasonable"
laws, and only act in a manner consistent with the fundamental public good
or benefit. 96 She did not concede to the existence of constitutional duties,
enforceable in court, requiring the State to provide and support "adequacy"
in public education. 9 7
In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Brock,98 and issued on
December 30, 1993, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed Judge
Manias's dismissal of the case, holding that "part II article 83 imposes a duty
on the State to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every
educable child in the public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee
adequate funding." 99
In its decision, the Court barely discussed the petitioners' Article 5 Tax
Count, saying only that "because petitioners have not had an opportunity to
develop a record in support of their claim," it was being remanded along with
the rest of the case. oo As to the other Counts in the case, however, the Court
deemed "the trial court's determination that the State had no duty to support
public education [to] so permeate[] its decision to dismiss [that] . . . [its]
narrow task [came down] to determin[ing] whether the trial court committed
legal error when it concluded that no duty [as to education] exists."toi
In construing Article 83, the Court employed an "originalist"
approach.1 0 2 Consistent with New Hampshire precedent, the Court sought to
9 N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. V; pt. 1, art. XXXVIII.
96 Recording of Oral Argument, 635 A.2d 1375 (No. 92-711). Article 5 accords to the
General Court or Legislature the power "to make . . . all manner of wholesome and
reasonable ... laws ... so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution." N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, art. V. Part I, Article 38 states, among other things, that the "people ... have a
right to require of their lawgivers and magistrates, an exact and constant observance
of ... [the fundamental principles of the constitution] in the formation and execution of the
laws necessary for the good administration of government." N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XXXVIII.
9 Recording of Oral Argument, 635 A.2d 1375 (No. 92-711).
98 The Justices who joined the Chief Justice were: former Chief Justice William A. Grimes
sitting by special assignment; and Associate Justices William F. Batchelder, William R.
Johnson, and Sherman D. Horton. Two of these Justices had been appointed by Republican
Governors and two by Democrats.
9 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1), 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993).
According to Justice Horton, unanimity was achieved-that is, he and former Chief Justice
Grimes joined the decision-because the Court at that time declined to define what a
"constitutionally adequate education" was, and agreed to describe the State's funding duty to
be that of a "guarantor." Interview with Sherman D. Horton, Retired Justice, (July 9, 2014).
100 ClaremontI, 635 A.2d at 1377.
101 Id.
102 STEPHEN G. BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 76 (2011) ("The judges who follow
this [originalist or historical] approach look to history to discover what those who wrote the
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"give the words [used] the same meaning that they must have had to the
electorate on the date the vote [to approve the article] was
cast . . .gather[ing] [that] intention from the language used, viewed in the
light of the surrounding circumstances." 103
The Court began its analysis by indicating that weight would be given to
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's recent interpretation in McDuffy
v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education of a provision in
Massachusetts' Constitution that was "nearly identical" to Article 83.104 The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had held in McDuffy that the
Commonwealth's Constitution required it to "provide an education for all its
children . . . to prepare them to participate as free citizens of a free State" and
"to do so today, and in the future."10 New Hampshire's Article 83 was
modeled on the education provision in the Massachusetts Constitution,
adopted only four years earlier.1 0 6 The Massachusetts provision flowed from
the hand of John Adams, a strong proponent (as discussed infra at Part II. l.a.
with accompanying notes) of the importance of education in assuring the
continuation of our democracy. That the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court had ruled as it did plainly had an enormous impact on the Claremont I
Court.
Like the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court examined the meaning of the words of the pertinent
education provision, utilizing dictionaries of the 1784 period.10 7 It concluded
that these words expressed and imposed an actual duty-a "command" that
New Hampshire's "legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this
government .. . support[] all public schools."10 The Court agreed with the
analysis in the McDuffy decision that "'[t]he breadth of the meaning
of ... [the 'duty . . . to cherish' term] together with the articulated ends for
which this duty to cherish is established, strongly support . . . that . . . [it]
Constitution most likely thought about the content and scope of a constitutional phrase, and
they interpret the phrase accordingly.").
103 ClaremontI, 635 A.2d 1377-78 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
104 Id at 1378 (citing McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E. 2d 516 (Mass.
1993)). The Court invoked the proposition stated in Warburton v. Thomas, 616 A.2d 495, 500
(N.H. 1992) that "weight" should be afforded "to the language of comparable clauses in
[other] state constitutions upon which the framers [of the New Hampshire constitution]
relied." Id
105 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 548, 555.
106 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1), 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993). See
also MASS. CONST. pt. 2, cl. 5, § 2.
107 ClaremontI, 635 A.2d at 1378.
108 Id. (quotations omitted).
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encompasses . . . a duty to ensure that the public schools achieve their object
and educate the people.""1
0 9
The Court cited past New Hampshire decisions which had discussed the
meaning of Article 83.110 These decisions recognized, in their respective
contexts, that Article 83 established an actual obligation, a duty "of
paramount importance" to educate "in comprehensive terms.""
In reviewing the "'surrounding circumstances' at the time the [1784]
constitution was adopted," the Court found "that the framers and the general
populace understood the language contained in part II, article 83 to impose a
duty on the State to educate its citizens and support the public schools."112
Surveying early New Hampshire history, it found a deep commitment to
public education." 3 While it acknowledged that the early State laws required
the localities to fund schooling (with no actual State funding for schools
provided "in the first fifty years after ratification of the [1784] constitution"),
the Court highlighted statements by such leaders as Governor Wentworth in
the late colonial period and Governor Gilman in 1795 that evinced an
understanding "that the duty to educate remained with the State.""4  The
Court quoted extensively from a "reply" the State's Senate and House
members made in 1795 to Governor Gilman in regard to the importance of
education. "' In that "reply," they described "[t]he encouragement of
Literature [as being] a sacred and incumbent Duty upon the Legislature,"
necessary for the preservation of our republican form of government." 6 The
Court quoted the Massachusetts McDuffy opinion as support for the
conclusion that "[though] local control and fiscal support has been placed in
greater or lesser measure through our history on local governments [this]
does not dilute the validity of the conclusion that the duty to support the
public schools lies with the State."" 7
With the duty to provide and support education thus recognized as a
State constitutional imperative, the Court then "emphasize[d] the
corresponding right of the citizens to its enforcement.""" It described "a free
109 Id. (quoting McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 526).
110 Id. at 1378-79.
n1 Id. See In re Davis, 318 A.2d 151 (N.H. 1974); Fogg v. Board of Educ. of Union Sch. Dist.
of Littleton, 82 A. 173 (N.H. 1912); State v. Jackson, 53 A. 1021 (N.H. 1902); Farnum's
Petition, 51 N.H. 376 (1871).
112 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont l), 635 A.2d 1375, 1379 (N.H. 1993).
113 Id. at 1379-80.
114 Id. at 1380-81
115 Id. at 1380.
116 Id. at 1381 (quotations omitted).
117 Id. (quotations omitted).
"" Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont l), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
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public education as at least an important substantive right," one "not based
on the exclusive needs of a particular individual, but rather a right held by the
public to enforce the State's duty, [with] [a]ny citizen ha[ving] standing to
enforce this right.""l 9
The Court reposed upon the legislature and governor, "in the first
instance," the task of "defin[ing] the parameters of the education mandated
by the constitution.,120 It declared, however, that "the State's constitutional
duty extends beyond mere reading, writing, and arithmetic, [and] includes
broad educational opportunities needed in today's society to prepare citizens
for their role as participants and as potential competitors in today's
marketplace of ideas."' 2 ' It concluded, remanding the case to the Superior
Court for further proceedings:
We are confident that the legislature and the Governor will
fulfill their responsibility with respect to defining the
specifics of, and the appropriate means to provide through
public education, the knowledge and learning essential to the
preservation of a free government. 122
3. The Superior Court Trial and Decision
a. The Claims
After the case was remanded, the petitioners amended their pleadings.1 23
They abandoned their challenges to the State's foundation aid statutes (their
original Counts III and V) and instead proceeded with four counts. They
claimed:
Count I (Education Equity/Adequacy Count): failure by the
legislature and the Governor "to spread the opportunities and
advantages of education equitably and adequately among all
educable New Hampshire students . . . hav[ing] thereby failed to
diffuse knowledge and learning generally throughout the State"





123 See Conformed Amended Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Claremont Sch.
Dist. v. Governor (Claremontl), No. 91-E-306-B (N.H. Super. Ct. May 23, 1995) [hereinafter
Amended Petition].
CLAREMONT IANDII
* Count II (Equity/Adequacy Funding Count): failure "to
adequately and equitably fund the public elementary and
secondary schools of the State," also in violation of Article 83;
* Count III (Equal Protection Count): breach of the State's equal
protection guarantees to "the Petitioner student class," arising
from the operation of the State's "school finance system;" and
* Count IV (Tax Count): violation of the Article 5 rights of "the
class of petitioner taxpayers" as "the New Hampshire school
finance system results in unreasonable, disproportionate and
burdensome taxation." 24
The petitioners continued to seek to pursue the case as a class action,1 25 and
continued to seek as relief the restructuring of the education funding system
away from the local property tax.126
The petitioners' legal team had by this time lost some of its members,1 27
and the legal effort suffered from lack of strong financial support. 28  The
petitioners found themselves in "dire [financial] straits." 2 9 It reached the
point that Attorney Volinsky, who had become the "informal leader" of the
litigation effort, seriously considered dropping all but the Tax Count because
of the crisis in resources. 30 As to this count, Attorney Volinsky felt "that the
Supreme Court had telegraphed its ultimate decision in Claremont I- [that
because] the court had already reached the key legal conclusion that
provision of a constitutionally adequate education was a state duty . . . then
the taxes to pay for that duty had to be state taxes . . . [and] if nothing else,
124 Id. at ¶¶ 47-50.
125 Id ¶¶ 5-8. The case, however, did not obtain class action status. Judge Manias granted the
State's Motion to Strike the class action allegations, and he proceeded to decide the case
without deeming the petitioner districts to be "representative of property poor districts in this
state [or that] the comparison districts [the petitioners utilized to seek to show the existence of
education disparities and the impact of limited funding were] representative of the property
rich districts in this state." See Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion),
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), No. 91-E-306-B at 57 n.5 (N.H. Super. Ct.
Dec. 6, 1996). The comparison districts were: Lebanon for Claremont; Rye for Allenstown;
Moultonborough for Pittsfield; Gilford for Franklin; and Lincoln-Woodstock for Lisbon. Id.
126 Amended Petition, supra note 123, at Part V (Relief Requested).
127 Attorney Garvey left, and Professor Saunders suspended his participation to later return to
assist with the trial. Attorney Volinsky's law firm had broken up. Volinsky, supra note 18, at
845-46.
128 id
129 Id. at 846.
130 Id. at 845; Interview with Andru H. Volinsky, Attorney for Petitioner (May 11, 2015).
(according to Attorney Volinsky, he discussed with his colleagues dropping the suit
altogether).
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we could prove that the local school districts levied taxes at wildly varying
rates and that this violated the [Article 5] Tax Clause."' 3 ' The Claremont
petitioners did not, however, drop the other counts. 3 2 The case kept its focus
largely on children and not taxes. 133
b. The Trial
After Judge Manias took a one-week view of pertinent schools, the
Claremont trial commenced on May 6, 1996, and extended through June 20,
1996, a period of six weeks.1 34 Forty-eight witnesses testified and hundreds
of exhibits were received.1 3 5 The petitioners proceeded without significant
expert assistance in making their challenge to the State's school finance
system.1 36 They presented no statistically-based expert testimony regarding
the question of whether the system's heavy reliance on local property taxes,
somewhat tempered by state aid of various forms, caused inequities or
failings in educational opportunities of a constitutional dimension.
131 Volinsky, supra note 18, at 846.
132 Attorney Volinsky succeeded in keeping the whole case going by enlisting the assistance of
other lawyers and organizations, and by obtaining the particular assistance of a former New
Hampshire Commissioner of Education, Charles Marston. Volinsky, supra note 18, at 846-
47; Interview with Andru H. Volinsky, Attorney for Petitioner (May 11, 2015).
133 Volinsky, supra note 18, at 845-47. The petitioners did seek, however, to have the Tax
Count decided apart from the rest of the case, but Judge Manias denied their Motion to
Bifurcate this Count, and their later Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for
Interlocutory Transfer. See State's App., C-i at 53-56, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) (No. 97-001); see also State's App., C-2 at 527-
531, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) (No. 97-
001).
134 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremontl), No. 91-E-306-B at 1 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
135 Id. at 44.
136 Id. at 32.
137 About three months before the trial was scheduled to begin, the experts the petitioners had
retained to study the New Hampshire financial system "withdrew from the litigation." Id at
32. Judge Manias agreed to a one-month delay of the trial, but did not allow the petitioners
"to hire new experts and generate new expert reports." Id at 32-33. Instead, and with the
State's accord, he ruled that the "existing report" the departed experts had generated would be
allowed into evidence, but the petitioners declined to offer this report. Id. at 33. The Report,
entitled "The New Hampshire System of School Finance: A Model of Disparity, July 1995,"
prepared by Kern Alexander, Richard Salmon, Deborah Strickland, and Richard Hiller,
concluded, based upon a statistical study of school funding and expenditures, that New
Hampshire's system of education finance resulted in substantial inequity and disadvantage for
students in property poor school districts. According to Attorney Volinsky, who provided to
the authors a copy of the report, the petitioners did not present it because it needed the
testimony of the experts themselves to be helpful. Interview with Andru H. Volinsky,
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The parties differed as to the working definition of "adequate" education
that Judge Manias should utilize in his treatment of the petitioners' first three
counts. 38 Though directed to do so by the Supreme Court in Claremont I,
the legislature and governor had not fashioned a definition of "the specifics
of' an "adequate" education.' 3 9 As a consequence, Judge Manias did not
have any definition from the legislature before him. Instead, he received
from the State a definition the State's Board of Education had crafted
specifically for the litigation, and another from the petitioners, prepared by a
retained expert, Dr. Robert Fried, an educator and former member of the
Concord, New Hampshire School Board.1 40
The State's proffered definition had been written by the State's Board of
Education chair, Ovide Lamontagne, and had been endorsed by a majority of
the State Board.' 4 ' It had not, however, gone through any rule-making
process.142 The defnition described an "integrated system of shared
responsibility between state and local government," essentially
corresponding to what the State saw as its then-existing system, and asserted
that such a system contained "the appropriate means to provide an adequate
education." 43
Attorney for Petitioner (May 11, 2015). According to Attorney Ludke, however, the report
was flawed in its design, methodology and computations, and did not in any event present
strong statistical evidence supportive of the petitioners' positions. Interview with Leslie J.
Ludke, Attorney (Apr. 29, 2015). See also State's Proposed Findings of Fact and Rulings of
Law at XXIII No. 33-34, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), No. 91-E-306-B
(N.H. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 1996) (criticizing the work of these experts and asserting "[b]ecause
of the multitude of errors in design, methodology and computation, . . . [their report] will not
assist the Court in resolving any question raised in the litigation;" and "[t]he results of
the . . . [experts'] study show an extremely weak association between tax base and spending
[on education]").
138 Alanias Opinion, at 25, 27.
139 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont l), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
140 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont Il), No. 91-E-306-B at 25-28 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
141 Transcript of Record Vol. 23 at 144-46, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II),
No. 91-E-306-B (N.H. Super. Ct. 1996) (Testimony of Ovide Lamontagne).
142 Id. at 166-69.
143 Judge Manias's Opinion sets forth the entire definition:
An adequate public elementary and secondary education in New
Hampshire is one which provides each educable child with an opportunity
to acquire the knowledge and learning necessary to participate intelligently
in the American political, economic, and social systems of a free
govenment. The components of an adequate public elementary and
secondary education are as follows:
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1. Broad and well-balanced curricula to equip students with
basic knowledge and skills in language arts and reading,
mathematics, science, social studies, arts, health, physical
education, computers, and consumers and workplace
technology and to allow students the opportunity to learn a
foreign language;
2. Programs and activities to promote the development of
character and citizenship;
3. Legally qualified administrative and teaching professionals
who focus on student achievement and on implementing the
state's educational program;
4. Safe and orderly facilities for educating students;
5. Evaluation and assessment of the effectiveness of the
educational program, teachers, instructional methods, and
organizational structure; and
6. Evaluation of student academic performance to determine
what students have learned and what skills they have
acquired
The appropriate means to provide an adequate education is through an
integrated educational system of shared responsibility between state and
local government. An integrated system of shared responsibility allows
local districts to implement diverse approaches tailored to meet changing
student needs, and also allows the State Board of Education to establish
policies which respond to the evolving demands of the American political,
economic, and social systems.
Within this integrated system of shared responsibility, the State establishes
the framework for the delivery of educational services at the local level.
Effective management of education requires delegation of authority to
local school districts. Comprehensive state laws and rules, including laws
and rules pertaining to the financing of education, laws dividing the state
into governmental units for the financing and delivery of educational
services, laws and rules setting minimum educational standards, and laws
and rules generally regulating the manner in which local districts deliver
educational services, comprise the framework of New Hampshire's
integrated system of shared responsibility.
Under the auspices of the State Board of Education and the Department of
Education, the State establishes standards and curriculum frameworks,
attendance and graduation requirements, facilities requirements, and
minimum standards for school approval; establishes legal qualifications
for teachers and administrators, and approves in-state professional
preparation programs for both; organizes school districts into
administrative units, and authorizes other organizations of operating
school districts in whole or in part; administers federal programs such as
special education and vocational education; and provides technical,
financial and administrative support for the delivery of educational
services.
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For his part, Dr. Fried presented four "Cornerstones" as a definition for
an adequate education which, among other things, focused on seeking to
address the particular needs of each child, whatever his or her background
(often termed "vertical equity" in education).1 44
The petitioners, through their team of lawyers,1 45 sought to prove the
allegations in their first three counts by evidence that:
The effectiveness of this integrated educational system in achieving
educational adequacy is measured in many ways both by the State and the
local districts. State rules require districts to develop programs for
assessing and evaluating the educational services delivered in their district.
Standardized tests are administered and the results evaluated at both the
state and local levels. In addition, the Department of Education oversees
the local districts' delivery of educational services through the school
approval process, the collection and compilation of financial and statistical
data, and the New Hampshire Educational Improvement and Assessment
Program. For local school districts which voluntarily participate in the
school accreditation program administered by the New England
Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC), the State reviews the
accreditation status of the schools within these districts.
Alanias Opinion, at 26-27.
144 Judge Manias's Opinion also sets forth these in their entirety:
Cornerstone One. An "Adequate Education" is one that provides the
physical, personnel, curricular, and material resources necessary for
children to acquire the skills, knowledge, and values necessary to develop
as responsible and productive citizens and to continue formal and informal
learning as adults.
Cornerstone Two. An "adequate education" recognizes and responds
appropriately to conditions that children possess when they enter school
that affect their ability to acquire the skills, knowledge, and values
necessary to develop as responsible and productive citizens and to
continue formal and informal learning as adults.
Cornerstone Three. An "adequate education" is managed at the district
and building level to provide efficient and effective organization and
utilization of resources for the benefit of student educational achievement.
Cornerstone Four. An "adequate education" is one that results in a level
of student educational achievement that meets the standards necessary for
the acquisition of skills, knowledge, and values required for responsible
and productive citizens and to continue formal and informal learning as
adults.
Id. at 27-28.
145 The legal team of attorneys then included, besides Attorney Volinsky, John E. Tobin, Jr.
Esq. of New Hampshire Legal Assistance, Theodore E. Comstock, Esq., general counsel for
the State School Boards Association, Jed Z. Callen, Esq., Patricia B. Quigley, Esq., Richard
Esty, Esq., and Thomas F. Hersey, Esq. A then legal intern, Scott F. Johnson, also provided
assistance, as did Professor Richard A. Hesse of the Franklin Pierce School of Law and Dean
Michener of the State School Boards Association.
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* The education offered in the petitioner districts was markedly
inferior in many important ways to the education provided in
certain comparable, more property-rich districts and did not
measure up to a constitutionally adequate education;
* the students in the poorer districts performed markedly worse
than students in the richer districts on tests designed to determine
whether the education effort was succeeding, and did not go on
to post-secondary experiences in a like manner or in like
numbers; and
* the State's education finance system, with its heavy reliance on
local property taxes, deprived the petitioner districts of the
funding ability requisite to provide an "adequate" education.
As to their Tax Count, the petitioners presented evidence to support their
contentions that the local property tax scheme for education financing
implicated the State in all its aspects, operated to achieve a state purpose,
worked to fulfill state-mandated minimum education standards, and, overall,
constituted a state tax which did not meet constitutional dictates.
The petitioners' case consisted of testimony and exhibits coming from a
number of different sources. It began with two former NHDOE
Commissioners, a former Deputy Commissioner, and the Commissioner of
the Department of Revenue Administration ("DRA"). 4 6  Testimony
involving "paired-district presentations,"147 or comparisons presented by a
number of teachers and school administrators, who had worked in the
petitioner districts and/or in the proffered comparison property-richer
districts constituted a major feature of the case." The petitioners presented
Dr. Fried as an expert to discuss his definition of "adequacy." They offered,
as well, two other retained experts, Professors Van Mueller and Terry
Schultz of the University of Minnesota, concerning their "qualitative study of
the educational offerings" in the five petitioner districts and in selected five
"paired" property-rich districts, which, they claimed, showed in detail glaring
educational disparities between the petitioner district's provision of
education and that provided by the richer districts.149
The petitioners presented many exhibits and charts, going to, among
other matters, the markedly different tax rates that existed among the State's
146 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremontll), No. 91-E-306-B at 32 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
147 See Volinsky, supra note 18, at 848.
148 id
149 Id. at 848.
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districts. They ended their case by showing many slides that Professor
Schultz had prepared: "The slides were shown on two projectors that placed
side by side the programmatic offerings and physical facilities in the poor
and wealthy schools in New Hampshire."o5 0  This presentation, it was
claimed, "skewered the notion that we had a single school system." 5 '
For its part, the State, through Assistant Attorneys General Ludtke and
Patrick E. Donovan, presented its case through several outside experts (some
with national reputations in economics and public policy), certain NHDOE
and DRA officials, an official from the New England Association of Schools
and Colleges ("NEASC") an independent accreditation organization, and the
Chair of the State's Board of Education.1 5 2
The State contended:
* The education provided in the petitioner districts through the
existing system passed muster when properly evaluated utilizing
the State's proffered "adequacy" definition;
* any deficiencies or failings at any time in a particular petitioner
district, or in connection with a particular school or particular
students, stemmed from local failings, not anything fairly
attributable to the State or its system;
* the system's mechanism for funding education, though it
involved differential local property tax rates, still succeeded in
fairly enabling, without undue tax burdens within any petitioner
district, the raising of sufficient funding for schools;
* the use of local property taxes did not result in any constitutional
problems but was beneficial; and
* the local tax scheme for education funding did not violate Article
5.
A major feature of the State's case was to extol the claimed virtues of the
local property tax as a means for funding education in New Hampshire. The
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Among the State's expert witnesses were: Prof. Colin Campbell, Emeritus Professor of
Economics, Dartmouth College; Prof. William A. Fischell, Professor of Economics,
Dartmouth College; Prof. Caroline Hoxby, Assistant Professor of Economics, Harvard
University; Prof. Eric A. Hanusek, Professor of Economics and Public Policy, University of
Rochester; and Dr. Paul Snow, a statistician who had done considerable work in regard to
education funding in New Hampshire.
20 15 3 1
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State's experts generally opined that funding via local property taxes,
coupled with the direct aid the State provided, resulted in a fair, efficient, and
effective system that, despite varying district tax rates, did not overly burden
any taxpayers within the petitioner districts, and allowed for significant local
control.
c. The Superior Court Decision
On December 6, 1996, Judge Manias issued a 190-page decision,
including many findings of fact and rulings of law.' 53 He decided that the
petitioners had not proved their case.
Judge Manias treated each of the petitioners' counts separately, and
concluded that while there were marked differences in local property tax
rates, and while the educational conditions and resources in the poorer
petitioner districts did not meet those of the richer comparable districts, it had
not been shown that the system operated to offer less than "adequate"
education in the petitioner districts. Judge Manias found no "adequacy"
violation, no funding problem of a constitutional dimension, no equal
protection abridgment, and no violation of Article 5.
i. The Education Equity/Adequacy Count
Judge Manias approached the merits of the petitioners' Education
Equity/Adequacy Count by first addressing what "adequacy" definition he
would use. He opted for the definition proffered by the State: one developed
by the Board of Education, "part of the executive branch;" one which
required schools to offer "broad and well-balanced curricula including arts,
humanities, health, and computer and consumer education, and programs to
promote the development of character and citizenship. "'5 4  The definition
"encompass[ed] important state programs necessary to educational adequacy,
such as the Educational Improvement and Assessment Plan and the
Minimum Standards for School Approval."5 5
In contrast, Judge Manias did not credit Dr. Fried's definition. He
deemed Dr. Fried's definition to have been developed without sufficient
regard for, or research into, New Hampshire's and other states' education
efforts, and to wrongly call for "rais[ing] the concept of 'vertical equity' [as
153 See Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Afanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor (Claremont 1l), No. 91-E-306-B (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
154 Id. at 28-29.
155 Id. at 29.
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expressed in Cornerstone Two] to a constitutional mandate." 56 For him, the
Fried definition did not provide, as did the State's definition, manageable
criteria to assess the "adequacy" of the education New Hampshire offered. 57
In evaluating the evidence concerning educational "adequacy" against
the "adequacy" definition he had accepted, Judge Manias first considered the
petitioners' expert offerings. 5" These consisted of the presentations of Drs.
Mueller and Schultz, which were based upon a study they had done matching
each of the petitioner school districts with a paired selected property-rich
district.1 59  "[T]he purpose of this comparison approach [according to Dr.
Mueller] was to examine whether the structure of education finance allowed
achievement of educational adequacy in the petitioner districts."o6 0 Though
he found both Drs. Mueller and Schultz qualified to testify as experts, Judge
Manias strongly criticized their methodology, and questioned their bias.' 6 '
He concluded that their study, with accompanying testimony, merited little
156 See Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor (Claremont II), No. 91-E-306-B at 29-32 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996). Judge
Manias defined vertical equity as "the unequal treatment of unequals, meaning that students
receive different educational services depending upon their individualized needs." Id. at 30.
Judge Manias's rejection of "vertical equity" for purposes of assessing constitutionally
required adequacy, however, seems to run counter to the Supreme Court's Claremont I
holding that "each educable child" is entitled to an "adequate" education, which is "adequately
"funded. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1), 635 A.2d 1375, 1376 (N.H. 1993).
Certainly, as discussed in Part 111.3. infra, the State presently incorporates notions of "vertical
equity" in its "costing out" and funding for an "adequate" education.
157 Alanias Opinion, at 31-32. Judge Manias found that "[tihe state Board of Education's
definition of educational adequacy sets forth the essential components of an adequate
education and refers to objective criteria by which adequacy may be assessed." Id. at 160
(dealing with the State's Proposed Finding, Part XII, "Educational Adequacy," No. 2,
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), No. 91-E-306-B at 42-43 (N.H. Super. Ct.
Dec. 6, 1996)). As to Dr. Fried's definition, Judge Manias granted a proposed State finding of
fact as follows: "The statement of educational adequacy prepared by Dr. Robert Fried is not
judicially manageable because it is based upon unidentified individual student needs. Dr.
Fried's definition of educational adequacy does not contain manageable standards which this
Court could apply to determine compliance with the New Hampshire Constitution." Id. at 161
(dealing with the State's Proposed Finding, Part XII, "Educational Adequacy," No. 12,
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), No. 91-E-306-B at 42-43 (N.H. Super. Ct.
Dec. 6, 1996)).
15s Id. at 32.
159 Id. at 35.
160 id
161 Id. at 41-43.
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weight.1 62 Their evidence constituted, for him, a slanted and rushed effort to
support, unscientifically, a "predetermined hypothesis." 63
Judge Manias then reviewed the petitioners' "non-expert evidence." 6 4
He acknowledged that it indicated that the educational opportunities offered
in the petitioner districts (which had larger percentages of poorer "at-risk"
children) compared unfavorably to those offered in the comparison property-
rich districts. 6
Yet, for Judge Manias, "the fact that disparities exist (which the State
concedes) does not necessarily impact the determination of adequacy." 6  He
did not see the legal issue before him as one of equity, or determining
whether "substantially uniform" education was being offered throughout the
State. 6 7 He did not consider the duties arising from Article 83 to encompass
a uniformity or equity component." ,i" Nor did he see the petitioners
prevailing merely because they were able to show that one student, or a
grouping of students attending a particular school, had not received an
"adequate" education opportunity at some point in time.1 6 9 Rather, he opined
that for the petitioners to prevail on their Education Equity/Adequacy Count,
proceeding not as representatives of other districts or persons, they needed to
prove "that constitutional inadequacies exist in the petitioner school districts
and that those inadequacies are attributable to defects in the education system
itself, . . . [that] the inadequacy resulted from the system devised and
enforced by the legislative and executive branches.",i7o It would not suffice if
the inadequacy stemmed from failures of the petitioner districts themselves,
162 Id. at 41.
163 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremontl), No. 91-E-306-B at 42-43 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
164 Id. at 43.
165 Id at 87. As to "educational inputs," a good deal less money was being spent per pupil;
larger student-teacher ratios existed; less access persisted in regard to state-of-the-art
technology; less time and resources were being devoted to curriculum development;
troublesome facilities issues remained less apt to be timely dealt with; and less resources
generally were being made available for "enrichment programs," foreign language study, arts
and music, and advanced placement and honors courses. Id. at 44-51. As to "educational
outputs," students in the petitioner districts went on to attend four year colleges in lesser
numbers, and appeared to do less well generally on assessment tests. Id. at 52-53.
166 Id. at 62-63.
167 Id. at 54-56, 58, 62-63.
168 Id. at 55, 62-63.
169 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremontl), No. 91-E-306-B at 60 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
170 Id. at 61-62.
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who, "[u]nder any interpretation of [Claremont I's pertinent language, bore]
some responsibility for education delivery after lawful delegation." 7 '
In considering the evidence, Judge Manias did not deem the "education
input" disparities in regard to per-pupil spending and student-teacher ratios to
be overly concerning.1 7 2 Nor did he consider that the evidence going to other
"education inputs" established any constitutional inadequacy in the provision
of education that could be attributed to the State.1 73
Judge Manias highlighted that the testimony he had received from school
officials was often contradicted or undermined by "prior inconsistent
statements" they had made to the State in the course of minimum standards
reviews, or to NEASC in regard to accreditation reviews, or to the public
concerning such matters as the state of technology, curriculum development,
and facilities.1 4  He was not impressed by the petitioners' proffered
explanation in regard to facilities that such prior inconsistent statements were
often made to avoid adverse consequences such as loss of funding or loss of
accreditation. 175
Though he recognized that the State may not "abdicate the [education]
obligation imposed . . . by the Constitution," Judge Manias stated: "The local
districts may not abdicate their obligations either.",7 6 He opined specifically
171 Id. at 61. This important issue-whether the State may be deemed to lack responsibility for
the failings of the districts-was not later addressed by the Supreme Court in Claremont II.
172 Manias Opinion, at 62-65. Among other things, Judge Manias pointed out that two of the
petitioner districts (Lisbon and Claremont) spent more than the state average cost per pupil for
1993/94 of $5109.00, and three (Franklin, Allenstown and Pittsfield) spent less, with the
biggest disparity being Franklin in an amount of $1568.00. Id. at 63. As to Franklin and
Allenstown, however, Judge Manias noted that, due to accounting particularities, their cost per
pupil numbers did not include the federal aid they received for their schools. Id at 64. He
underscored that teacher salaries, which "account for up to two-thirds of a district's budget"
also "can range considerably depending on factors which are not necessarily related to teacher
competence." Id. at 64-65. As to student-teacher ratios, he found that the petitioner districts'
"hover[ed] around the state average, and none of the deviations present[ed] a cause for
concern." Id. at 65.
173 Id. at 65-72, 77-87. As to at-risk students, Judge Manias observed that all of the petitioner
districts had "programs designed to address the needs of their at-risk student populations" and
"that none of the evidence concerning at-risk population issues demonstrates constitutional
inadequacy." Id. at 71. As to "enrichment activities, art, language and music programs, and
advanced placement and honors courses," Judge Manias concluded that while "some
disparities exist," programs of this type are available in the petitioner districts, and it had not
been shown that the petitioner districts' programs "violated any minimum standards or were
otherwise constitutionally inadequate." Id at 72.
174 Id. at 67, 69-70, 81-87.
175 Id. at 83-84.
176 Id. at 86.
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in regard to poor facilities and the petitioners' evidence that certain of their
districts' structures failed to meet State Minimum Standards:
Under the definition of educational adequacy, the
appropriate means of providing education is through an
integrated system of shared responsibility between state and
local government. This requires the state and local school
districts to work together within the statutory framework to
ensure that all Minimum Standards for School Approval are
satisfied. The petitioner districts may not represent, via
signed documents, that their school facilities meet all
minimum standards, and then blame the state for
noncompliance. i77
Judge Manias also was not swayed by the evidence the petitioners had
presented concerning differential "education outputs.",iTS He found that
students in the petitioner districts broadly went on to "forms of post-
secondary education" in percentages somewhat in line with the property-rich
districts, and that factors other than school funding and school offerings, such
as "demographic and socio-economic circumstances, may cause students to
delay, rather than forgo, their commencement of post-secondary pursuits at
higher rates than comparison district students."i17 9 He pointed out also that
New Hampshire students did comparatively very well on the National
Assessment of Educational Progress ("NAEP") test, which served as a
nation-wide measure of student performance, and that New Hampshire
177 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont II), No. 91-E-306-B at 86 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996). Judge Manias observed
as well in regard to facilities: "the contrast between the testimony adduced at trial and prior
statements makes it difficult for the Court to determine the actual state of facilities in the
petitioner districts." Id. at 81. He also later stated: "While the Court accepts the petitioners'
contention that there are [facilities] problems, wholesale acceptance of the petitioners' position
would require the Court to conclude that . . . [petitioner] personnel misrepresented the state of
their facilities, and that the NEASC visiting . . . [personnel] did not notice glaring
inadequacies or chose to ignore them. A record full of prior inconsistent statements and
contrary information does not provide a basis for a constitutional decision." Id. at 84. He saw
facilities issues as not fairly attributable to the State. Id. at 84-87. In this regard, he offered a
number of instances where a petitioner district, Allenstown, though financially able to do so,
did not cure facilities issues, and he opined that the evidence showed that the petitioner
districts had good success in obtaining voter approval of bonds for facilities improvement. Id.
at 84-86.
178 See id at 73-89.
179 Id. at 73-74.
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students ranked well in regard to Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") results.' 0
As to the State's recently implemented NHEIAP tests, he stated, among other
things, that it was hard to draw reliable conclusions, as "access to at least
several years of scores from all grades is necessary."
Judge Manias observed that "[t]he witnesses from the petitioner
districts, most notably the teachers, were impressive in their
dedication . . . [and that] despite all evidence concerning inadequacies, the
petitioner school district teachers are doing an exceptional job of educating
their students." 82 He acknowledged: "The petitioners have demonstrated
that educational funding realities can present more difficult decisions for the
petitioner districts than for the comparison districts." 83 However, and
though he also expressly noted that "nothing in [his] Order should be seen as
an endorsement of the current system or the Department of Education [and
that] clearly, education in this State is in need of attention and, perhaps,
significant reform," he ruled that the petitioners had failed to show that the
system itself violated the dictates of "adequacy" imposed by Article 83; that
is, they failed to show "that (1) constitutional inadequacies exist and (2)
those inadequacies are the result of the State['s] 'excessive reliance on local
property revenues."'
ii. The Equity/Adequacy Funding Count
Turning to the petitioners' Equity/Adequacy Funding Count, Judge
Manias defined the issue to be "whether the [State's] financing system meets
the . . . constitutional obligation to guarantee adequate funding for primary
and secondary education."is 5  The focus here was on the impact of local
property taxes which had constituted, "on average [since 1919] from
[seventy-four] to [eighty-nine] percent of total school revenue," with State
aid making up only about eight percent, thereby placing "New Hampshire
last in the nation in terms of percentage of state support.,i" 6 Nationally, the
states on average covered about fifty percent of the costs of education. i87
180 Id. at 74-75.
181 Id. at 75-77. The NHEIAP tests were those tests used as part of the State's Education
Improvement and Assessment Program to measure student competency and achievement. Id
182 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremontl), No. 91-E-306-B at 87 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
183 Id at 88.
184 See id at 89.
185 Id at 90. Here too, Judge Manias did not read Claremont I as requiring "the State to
guarantee equitable or uniform funding for education." Id.
18 Id at 91-92.
187 Id at 106.
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Indisputably, property-poor districts like the petitioner districts had to
impose higher tax rates than comparable property-rich districts to raise
money for education-in some instances many times higher.'8 8 Though
Judge Manias "accept[ed] the petitioners' contention that petitioner district
residents face higher tax rates, and thus may have more difficulty raising the
local funds necessary to support their schools," he went on to opine: "Tax
rate, standing alone, is not an accurate measure of tax burden; other factors,
such as income level, partially determine the 'burden' a tax actually
imposes. . . . [H]igher tax rates do not necessarily generate higher tax
burdens."'8 9
He then referenced evidence presented by the State that focused on
school taxes as a percentage of median income.190 This showed that in 1993,
the residents of two of the petitioner districts (Pittsfield and Allenstown) paid
school taxes less than a percentage point above the state average, as
measured as a percentage of median income (6.35% and 6.24% compared to
the state average of 5.69%); the residents in two of the districts (Franklin and
Lisbon) actually paid less than the state average (5.24% in both cases); and
the residents of Claremont paid only slightly more than the state average
(5.81%).191 He observed that though these numbers do not "resolve the
issues presented by . . . [the Equity/Adequacy Funding Count, they] provide
some context to the petitioners' contention that the system of school
financing is unconstitutional because the school tax rates in the petitioner
districts significantly exceed those in the comparison districts. ,92
Judge Manias, however, saw "the main thrust of the petitioners'
argument . . . [to be] that the eight percent average annual state contribution,
the bulk of which is distributed through the Foundation Aid program, is not
sufficient to meet that program's stated purpose of sharing educational costs
to the end that more needy school districts are assisted in providing adequate
188 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremontl), No. 91-E-306-B at 107 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
189 Id
190 Id. at 107-13.
191 Id. at 108.
192 Id On appeal, the petitioners sharply criticized these statistics as "misleading and
disingenuous." They argued that "the income calculations exclude all the incomes of the
second homeowners who live on the lake in Moultonborough, the ocean in Rye or near the ski
areas in Gilford and Lincoln . . . [and, further, the evidence's] focus on residential property
also excludes from consideration the extensive business development in Lebanon. As a result,
the earnings of full time residents are compared in the poor and wealthy communities as if
schools were supported equally by those residents alone." See Appellants' Brief at 74,
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) (No. 97-00 1)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellants]. It is noted also that the mere use of "median" income values
may not fairly reflect the actual earnings dispersion that existed in the pertinent districts.
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educational programs and education throughout New Hampshire is
improved." 93 As to this, and with his focus on the actual financing of the
petitioner districts, Judge Manias credited State evidence showing that the
petitioner districts received considerable state aid, including considerable
Foundation Aid, so that "in fiscal year 1994, the petitioner districts funded
[no more than] between [fifty-five] and [sixty-eight] percent of their budgets
through local taxation." 94
Judge Manias concluded that the petitioners had not established "that
school districts lack the local resources necessary to provide an adequate
education under the present financing structure. To the contrary, the
evidence suggests that the towns and cities which comprise each of the
petitioner school districts have sufficient resources to educate their
students." 9 5 While he acknowledged that the financing system posed certain
"hardships and difficulties" for residents in property-poor districts, "that Rye,
with its several miles of beach front property, has greater property values
than Allenstown . . . [and] that Lebanon, with its significant industrial
development, has a higher tax base than Claremont," he deemed that "the
petitioners have not demonstrated that the way in which the state system
funds and assists the petitioner school districts does not guarantee that those
districts have adequate funding." 9 6
iii. The Equal Protection Count
In dealing with the petitioners' Equal Protection Count, Judge Manias
saw "the petitioners' real challenge" to be directed at the State's laws calling
for local school districts predominantly to support schools through local
property taxes.1 97  He treated this challenge as "directed at the impact or
193 Alanias Opinion, at 108-09.
194 Id. at 109-11. The petitioners also claimed that this evidence presented an erroneous and
misleading picture, "based upon mythical tax rates that . . . [Dr. Snow, one of the State's
experts] . . . computed." Brief of Appellants, supra note 192, at 73. The State countered that
Dr. Snow had performed his analysis in a scientifically acceptable manner, and "[t]he record
supports the trial court's acceptance . . . of the results of his analysis." Brief of the State,
supra note 26, at 54.
195 Manias Opinion, at 111-12.
196 Id. at 113. In regard to State funding, Judge Manias referenced an Alternative Foundation
Aid Program enacted after Claremont , which established a definite minimum expenditure per
"weighted pupil" of $4,700.00, and prescribed that if a district is determined to be not fairly
able to raise that amount, it is "entitled to receive an amount of aid sufficient to bring ... [its]
fiscal capacity up to this level." Id. at 95-96 (reviewing then N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §198:36,
III and IV).
197 Id. at 125.
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effect of facially neutral and evenhandedly applied school financing statutes"
which created "a division of the state into districts which have unequal
property bases." 98
Though he deemed that the petitioners failed "to allege a [necessary]
discriminatory purpose [and failed] to prove that any disparities [with regard
to education were] attributable to the challenged local tax statutes," Judge
Manias nonetheless proceeded to determine whether the complained-of
disparate impact on the petitioners' students, arising from the operation of
the State's local property tax education system, passed equal protection
"middle-tier" level scrutiny-that is, whether the scheme was "reasonable,
not arbitrary, . . . rest[ing] upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relationship to the object of the legislation." 99 In this regard, he
had earlier determined that it was not for him, but for the Supreme Court to
deem "a right as fundamental under the New Hampshire Constitution," and
"for purposes of [that] order, education [was] be regarded as an important
substantive right" not requiring "strict scrutiny" equal protection review, but
the "fair and substantial relationship," "middle-tier" review just described.200
Judge Manias found that the challenged statutory funding structure
passed constitutional muster. 2 01 He saw it as reasonable, not arbitrary: not
imposing unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners' rights (indeed he had
earlier found that the petitioners had failed to prove that the financing system
did not allow for the provision of an adequate education).202 It offered the
benefit of being based upon "a stable and expandable revenue
source . . . [which also vested] significant local control . . . in local school
districts." 203
Though he agreed that some districts were better able, due to their
property wealth, to exercise local control options, he still concluded that the
"evidence [did] not show that the petitioner districts [did] not exert local
control."204 He stated that "accepting local control as a valid state objective
and justification does not require that the State prove that local control exists
to the same extent in all districts," and he noted, in that regard, that "[i]n
order to ensure a uniform minimum expenditure, the legislature [through its
Foundation Aid Statutes] has provided for state supplementation of local
198 Id. at 128-29.
199 Id. at 121, 129-30 (quotation omitted).
200 Id. at 119-22.
201 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremontll), No. 91-E-306-B at 133 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
202 Id. at 111, 130.
203 Id. at 130.
204 Id. at 107, 132.
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revenues, according to a formula designed to measure the need of the
districts."205 He strongly highlighted his view that the pertinent financing
legislation's reliance on local property taxes beneficially resulted in the usage
of a good revenue source which had allowed spending on education to
"increase[] dramatically during the course of the century."206
iv. The Tax Count
Lastly, Judge Manias turned to the petitioners' Tax Count, and their
contention that usage of the local property tax as the main means to finance
education violated the dictates of Article 5. He observed that he needed first
to determine whether the tax at issue constituted a "state tax or a municipal
tax," as any questions related to reasonableness or proportionality depended
on that issue being first resolved.207 He stated that "[t]he determination of
the character of the school tax has never been directly addressed by the
Supreme Court," though in past cases "the Supreme Court appears to have
treated the school tax as a local tax." 2 08
Though he recognized that Claremont I established a state duty to
provide an adequate education, and that "the duty pursuant to which a tax is
raised may bear on the characterization of the tax as a state or local tax," he
went on to say:
Under New Hampshire law, the determination of whether a
tax is a state tax or a local tax does not depend solely upon
the duty pursuant to which the tax is raised . . . [r]ather the
test is a factual one: the Court must identify the entity that
controls the mechanics of assessment and
collection, . . . inquire into the disposition of the tax revenues
after their collection . . . [and] inquire into the legislative
history and origins of the tax." 209
Judge Manias found that "municipalities control[led] the mechanics of
assessment and collection of local property taxes," and that the local school
205 Id. at 132.
206 Id. at 133.
207 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(ClaremontII), No. 91-E-306-B at 135 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
208 Id. at 135 n.18 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 287 A.2d 756, 758 (N.H. 1972); Monadnock
Sch. Dist. v. Fitzwilliam, 203 A.2d 46, 51-52 (N.H. 1964)).
209 Alanias Opinion, at 136 (citing Boston, Concord & Montreal Railroad v. State, 60 N.H. 87,
96 (1880)).
2015 41
42 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 14, No. 1
boards "prepare[d] [their] own budget[s]" despite needing to meet state
minimum standards, which did not, in his view, deprive local authorities of
essential control. 2 10 He highlighted that "[t]he property tax, once collected, is
managed and expended by the municipality in accordance with their budget;
and the property tax does not become part of the State treasury."211 He did
not see the local property tax as having attributes of taxes, such as the
Business Profits Tax, which clearly were state taxes with the State being the
taxing district. 212 He wrote:
From the time that the citizens of each municipality vote on
the budget, through the process of assessment of local
property and the ultimate collection and disposition of
property tax revenue, the state has a limited role.
Accordingly, with reference to the first test for determining
the character of a tax, the mechanics of assessment,
collection, and disposition, of a tax, . . . the school tax is a
local tax.213
Judge Manias also saw the "the tax's origin and legislative history" as
supportive of the view that the tax was local.214 He relied upon "an expert
report on the origin and history of the school tax" offered by the State
(prepared by Professor Campbell) indicating "that the Legislature adopted a
system of local property taxation [beginning in 1919 with the Great School
Law] because it provides a stable and expandable revenue source, and also
provides school districts with significant control over their schools."215
Having thus deemed the tax to be local, Judge Manias quickly concluded
that the petitioners had presented no evidence to suggest "it [was]
disproportionate within the local taxing districts." 2 16  He denied the
petitioners relief as to their Count VI. 2 17
210 Id. at 136-37.
211 Id. at 139.
212 Id. at 141.
213 Id. (citing Boston, Concord & Montreal, 60 N.H. at 96).
214 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Manias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremontl), No. 91-E-306-B at 141(N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
215 id.
216 Id. at 142.
217 id
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v. The Superior Court Concluding Remarks
In concluding, Judge Manias observed that his decision "should not be
construed as a judicial endorsement of the current public school system, its
method of funding, or the operation of the Department of Education." 218 As
to these "serious issues . . . [they] must be addressed," but by "the
Legislature, the Governor and the people of the State," not the courts.219




In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners mounted a broad
challenge to Judge Manias's decision. 22 1 They generally claimed that he had
badly erred in failing to see the merits of their case, adopting a flawed
adequacy definition and refusing to place proper responsibility on the State
for established "adequacy" failings. 222  They attacked Judge Manias's
conclusion that the local property tax passed muster under Article 5.223 The
result to them: Judge Manias had left undisturbed an education system
fraught with constitutional flaws.224
In its brief on appeal, the State defended Judge Manias's decision, which
it asserted was fully supported by the evidence.225 Its overarching theme was
218 Id. at 142-43.
219 Id. at 143.
220 It is noted that among his rulings Judge Manias denied the State's contentions that the
petitioner Districts lacked standing or capacity, as "lesser units of government," or "agents of
the state"' to challenge the State's education system, and, among other things, the degree the
State directly funded education. Manias Opinion, at 169 (denying the State's Proposed
Findings, Part XXIV "Standing" Nos. 1, parts of No. 2, and No.4). The Supreme Court never
addressed this standing issue in Claremont II. For cases which have recognized the standing
of school districts to challenge claimed unconstitutional educational funding statutes. See
Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d. 1196, 1212-15 (Kan. 2014); Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove, 176
S.W.3d 746, 772-76 (Tex. 2005).
221 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 192.
222 Id. at 23-24.
223 Id. at 86.
224 Id. at 98-99.
225 See Brief for the State, supra note 26.
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that the petitioners had simply not proved their case.226  The State
underscored the claimed weakness of the petitioners' non-expert evidence,
even as supplemented with certain suspect expert testimony.227 It contended
that the petitioners had failed in any credible way, with use of proper, non-
biased scientific or expert evidence, to establish any entitlement to relief,
especially in the face of the strong defense it had advanced largely through
many nationally recognized experts.228
The State devoted only five pages of its 99-page brief to the petitioners'
Tax Count.22 9 Here, it averred that Judge Manias acted correctly in ruling
that the determination of "the characterization of a tax [is a] factual question
requiring review of the machinery of assessment and collection, the character
and situation, the disposition made of the tax when collected, and the
legislative history and policy considerations surrounding the tax;" 23 0 and it
contended that the Superior Court's factual determinations, resulting in the
conclusion that the property taxes for schools were "local taxes," merited
affirmance. It stated: "It is well established that the legislature has broad
authority to define the territorial limits of a taxing district . . . [and] by law
and by operation, the town is the taxing district for each school district." 231
The State conceded that the precise question as to the nature of the tax
had not yet "been squarely addressed by . . . [the] Court," but asserted that
"prior opinions ha[d] treated school taxes as local taxes."232 Though the
petitioners argued that the property tax must be deemed "effectively" a state
tax "because local districts, such as petitioner districts, cannot control the
manner in which the funds are spent," the State highlighted that Judge
Manias had expressly found to the contrary.233
b. The Majority Decision
On December 17, 1997, the Supreme Court issued Claremont II,
encompassing a majority decision and a dissent. 23 4 Speaking for himself and
226 Id. at 21.
227 Id. at 24.
228 Id. at 27.
229 Id. at 94-99.
230 Id. at 94-95.
231 See Brief for the State, supra note 26, at 95 (citation omitted).
232 Id. (citing not just the two cases Judge Manias raised but also Gilsum v. Monadnock Sch.
Dist., 202 A.2d 790 (N.H. 1964)).
233 Id. at 96.
234 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont,[l), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997).
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three of the other Justices,235 Chief Justice Brock stated at the outset, in very
strong terms, the majority's holding:
In this appeal, we hold that the present system of financing
elementary and secondary public education in New
Hampshire is unconstitutional. To hold otherwise would be
to effectively conclude that it is reasonable, in discharging a
State obligation, to tax property owners in one town or city
as much as four times the amount taxed to others similarly
situated in other towns or cities. This is precisely the kind of
taxation and fiscal mischief from which the framers of our
State Constitution took strong steps to protect our citizens. 236
While observing that Judge Manias, in "a detailed and thoughtful opinion,"
had ruled against the petitioners on all their counts, the majority announced
that, having decided the Article 5 issue, they "need not reach the plaintiffs'
other claims." 23 7
The pivotal question under Article 5 was whether the school property tax
was to be deemed a state or local one. As to this, the majority determined
that Judge Manias had erred in focusing too much on control of the
"mechanics of assessment and collection of local property taxes, including
the budgeting function," and in failing to place dispositive weight on the
purpose of the tax, which was "overwhelmingly a State purpose." 238
Claremont I here figured quite large-since, under that precedent, the State
had a duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable
child in the State, and to guarantee funding, it followed, according to the
majority, that the school tax effectuated a State purpose of support for public
schools and thus must be deemed a State tax under Article 5.239
The majority did not expressly discuss why the State could not delegate
to the localities, to some degree, this State education funding duty as it had
done in regard to the actual delivery of education. Nor did it discuss why it
235 The Chief Justice was joined by Associate Justices William R. Johnson, John T. Broderick
and retired Associate Justice William F. Batchelder, sitting by designation. Three of these
Justices had been appointed by Republican Governors, and one by a Democrat.
236 Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1354.
237 Id. at 1354.
238 Id. at 1355-56. The Majority thus rejected Judge Manias's view of the "character" of the
school tax, with his focus on how the tax was budgeted, assessed, collected, and expended and
on its legislative history and origin. See Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Afanias
Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), No. 91-E-306-B at 136-41 (N.H.
Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
239 Claremont II, 703 A. 2d at 1356.
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was permissible, for example, for the State to delegate, in part, health, safety,
and welfare functions and their funding to localities, and not do the same for
education. It did emphasize the special status of education in the State's
constitutional scheme, observing:
[P]ublic education differs from all other services of the State.
No other governmental service plays such a seminal role in
developing and maintaining a citizenry capable of furthering
the economic, political and social viability of the State.
Only in part II, article 83 is it declared a duty of the
legislature to "cherish" a service mandated by the State
Constitution.... That the State, through a complex statutory
framework, has shifted most of the responsibility for
supporting public schools to local school districts does not
diminish the State purpose of the school tax. Although the
taxes levied by local school districts are local in the sense
that they are levied upon property within the district, the
taxes are in fact State taxes that have been authorized by the
legislature to fulfill the requirements of the New Hampshire
Constitution.240
To support the conclusion that the school property tax must be deemed a
State tax for purposes of Article 5, the majority referenced some precedential
support, 24 1 but also observed that the issue was one "of first impression." 242
It did not deal with the precedent Judge Manias and the State had referenced
which treated the school tax, in various contexts, as being of a local
character.
Having deemed the school tax to be a State tax for purposes of Article 5,
the majority then had no difficulty finding it to be both disproportionate and
unreasonable. 243  Referencing the dramatically different equalized tax rates
the record revealed-showing, for example, that the tax rate in Pittsfield was
more than four times higher than the one in Moultonborough-it stated that it
did not need to "look further to hold that the school tax is [unconstitutionally]
disproportionate." 24 4  In regard to "reasonableness," which the majority
deemed to mean "just," it stated:
240 Id. (citation omitted).
241 Id. at 1356-57. See infra note 391 and accompanying text (explaining that this precedent
provides no real support for the majority's position).
242 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremontll), 703 A.2d 1353, 1355 (N.H. 1997).
243 Id. at 1354.
244 Id. at 1357-58.
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There is nothing fair or just about taxing a home or other real
estate in one town at four times the rate that similar property
is taxed in another town to fulfill the same purpose of
meeting the State's educational duty. Compelling taxpayers
from property-poor districts to pay higher tax rates and
thereby contribute disproportionate sums to fund education
is unreasonable. Children who live in poor and rich districts
have the same right to a constitutionally adequate
education245
The majority went on to state, though speaking against findings and
conclusions of Judge Manias that certainly also pertained to other counts,
that "[r]egardless of whether existing State educational standards meet the
test for constitutionally adequacy, the record demonstrates that a number of
plaintiff communities are unable to meet existing standards despite assessing
disproportionate and unreasonable taxes." 246 After repeating its holding that
"the varying property tax rates across the State" failed to pass constitutional
muster under Article 5, the majority explicitly directed: "To the extent that
the property tax is used in the future to fund the provision of an adequate
education, the tax must be administered in a manner that is equal in valuation
and uniform in rate throughout the State." 247
Though the majority had stated at the outset that it would not be reaching
Judge Manias's denial of relief as to the petitioners' other counts, it
proceeded nonetheless to make a number of other important pronouncements
concerning educational adequacy and the importance of education as a
constitutional right.2 48 It did this as dicta, that is, in statements outside the
245 Id. at 1357.
246 Id. In so finding, the majority spoke counter to Judge Manias's conclusion that "the
petitioners have failed to sustain their burden of proving that under the current system, the
State is not providing the petitioner school district students with an adequate education and
adequate educational funding." Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion),
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), No. 91-E-306-B at 142 (N.H. Super. Ct.
Dec. 6, 1996). See also id. at 160 (granting the State's proposed finding, Part XII
"Educational Adequacy" No. 8 that "[e]ach of the five petitioner districts has sufficient
educational inputs to successfully implement its educational programs").
247 Claremont II, 70 A.2d. at 1357.
248 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (ClaremontII), 703 A.2d 1353, 1357-60 (N.H. 1997).
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context of actually carrying out its appellate review of Judge Manias's
l*249rulings.
First, it opined that the definition of educational adequacy crafted by the
State Board of Education and adopted by Judge Manias "does not sufficiently
reflect the letter or the spirit of the State Constitution's
mandate . . . [inasmuch as] in the first instance, it is the legislature's
obligation, not that of the individual members of the board of education, to
establish educational standards that comply with constitutional
requirements." 25 0 The majority referenced and accepted "the seven criteria
articulated by the Supreme Court of Kentucky as establishing general
aspirational guidelines for defining educational adequacy . . . [fit to serve as]
benchmarks of a constitutionally adequate public education." 251 It expressed
its anticipation, "[w]ithout intending to intrude upon prerogatives of other
branches of government," 25 2 that these branches "will promptly develop and
adopt specific criteria implementing these guidelines."253 It noted in that
regard, quoting from an important Washington State Supreme Court opinion,
that the judiciary's role was "to construe and interpret the word 'education'
by providing broad constitutional guidelines," while it is for the legislature
"to give specific substantive content to the word and to the programs it
deems necessary to provide that 'education' within the broad guidelines." 25 4
The majority further indicated, lauding "local control" as having "a
valuable role in public education," that nothing in the majority's opinion
would "prevent the legislature from authorizing local school districts to
249 Put another way, dicta in an opinion are statements on issues which were not necessary to
the decision actually reached in the case. Unlike actual court holdings, dicta lacks binding
authority.
250 Id. at 1357-58.
251 Id. at 1359 (quoting from the influential case of Rose v. Councilfor Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)). These criteria are: "sufficient oral and written communication
skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii)
sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv)
sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v)
sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and
historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work
intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in
the job market." Id.
252 See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XXXVII.
253 ClaremontII, 703 A.2d at 1359.
254 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359-60 (N.H. 1997)
(quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cnty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978)).
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dedicate additional resources to their schools or to develop educational
programs beyond those required for a constitutionally adequate public
education."255 But, it insisted:
The State cannot use local control as a justification for
allowing the existence of educational services below the
level of constitutional adequacy; . . . [i]t is basic . . . that in
order to deliver a constitutionally adequate public education
to all children, comparable funding must be assured in order
that every school district will have the funds necessary to
provide such education.256
Second (and again by way of dicta) the majority declared "a State funded
constitutionally adequate public education" to be "a fundamental right,"
meaning: a right whose impingement is subject "to strict judicial review with
the result that there must be a compelling state interest to sustain the
legislation, . . . a right . . . not based on the exclusive needs of a particular
individual, but rather . . . [one] held by the public to enforce the State's
duty." 2 57  It explained this determination by observing that the "State
Constitution[, unlike the Federal Constitution,] specifically charges the
legislature with the duty to provide public education," and "[s]econd, and of
persuasive force, . . . even a minimalist view of educational adequacy
recognizes the role of education in preparing citizens to participate in the
exercise of voting and first amendment rights." 2 58
The majority observed that this fundamental right does not mean
"horizontal resource replication from school to school and district to district,"
but that it "may be achieved [variously] in different schools possessing, for
example, differing library resources, teacher-student ratios, computer
software, as well as the myriad tools and techniques that may be employed
by those in on-site control of the State's public elementary and secondary
school systems."2 59 Where, however, "an individual school or school district
offers something less than educational adequacy, the governmental action or
inaction will be examined by a standard of strict judicial scrutiny."260
While the majority agreed with the dissenting Justice Horton that "we
were not appointed to establish educational policy, nor to determine the
255 id.
256 Id. at 1360.
257 Id. at 1358-59 (citations omitted).
258 Id. (citations omitted).
259 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremontll), 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997).
260 id.
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proper way to finance its implementation"-matters left, "consistent with our
Constitution, to the two co-equal branches of government"-they stated:
"We disagree with [the dissent] that the taxation of property to support
education must reach the level of confiscation before a constitutional
threshold is crossed." 2 6 1
The majority concluded by observing, "The legislature has numerous
sources of expertise upon which it can draw in addressing educational
financing and adequacy including the experience of other States that have
faced and resolved similar issues;" it would not remand at that time, "but
instead stay all further proceedings until the end of the upcoming legislative
session and further order of this court to permit the legislature to address the
,,262issues involved in this case. It allowed "the [then] present funding
mechanism [to] remain in effect through the 1998 tax year" to enable "an
orderly transition to a new system," and announced its confidence that "the
Legislature and the Governor will act expeditiously to fulfill the State's duty
to provide for a constitutionally adequate public education and to guarantee
adequate funding in a manner that does not violate the State Constitution."263
c. The Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Horton took pains to indicate that he also saw "the
current financing matrix for education . . . [as] far from desirable," but he
stated that he felt it inappropriate for the Court to "involve . . . [itself] in
social engineering, no matter how worthy the cause, when the constitution
and the decisions of those charged with the obligation of forming social
policy are compatible." 2 64 Justice Horton differed with the majority both
with respect to its "definition of the standard" for the duty to provide a
constitutionally adequate education and with respect to its conclusion that the
present manner of funding education through local property taxes was
unconstitutional.265
Undertaking a "careful reading" of Article 83, Justice Horton concluded
that the duty it imposed for educational "adequacy" "would be satisfied if the
education provided [met] the minimum necessary to assure the preservation
of a free government," that is, it only need satisfy "the first three elements of
the Kentucky standard adopted by the majority but not necessarily the
balance (mental and physical wellness, arts, preparation for advanced
261 Id. at 1359-60.
262 Id. at 1360.
263 Id. at 1360-61 (citations omitted).
264 Id. at 1361.
265 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremontll), 703 A.2d 1353, 1361 (N.H. 1997).
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education or vocations)."2 66 His view was that these "first three elements"
formed the education "constitutional 'nut,"' and he stated that "[i]t is
conclusive from the factual findings below that this constitutional nut has
been provided by the school districts, well within their respective
resources."267
Turning expressly to "the definitive holding of the majority," the tax
ruling, Justice Horton opined that while Article 5 indeed requires that taxes
be levied in a proportional and reasonable manner, "the issue of
proportionality, in this case, is driven by a determination of the appropriate
taxing district," 268 and here the majority erred in "equating [a State] 'duty'
with [a local] 'purpose' and ignoring the fact that governmental duty can be
delegated to subdivisions." 2 69 For his part, he would "move from an analysis
of duty to an analysis of purpose, and hold that the purpose in education
taxation is a local purpose, the education of children of the school district."270
Justice Horton defended his position by pointing out that "[t]he State
delegates many of its constitutional duties to its political subdivisions and
provides for taxation to support satisfaction of the delegated duties at the
local level." 2 7 1 With this "determination of duty and delegation," Justice
Horton concluded that he "was driven to a holding that the constitutional
education nut is properly delegated and the purpose, for taxation purposes, is
demonstrably local [and that]":
Given the legislature's proper delegation, its clear
designation of the taxing district, the discerned purpose of
266 Id. at 1361-62 (citation omitted). See supra note 251 for a discussion of the Kentucky
Rose guidelines.
267 Claremont II, 70 A.2d. at 1362.
268 id
269 Id.
270 Id. (citation omitted).
271 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353, 1362-63 (N.H. 1997)
(citation omitted). He explained, in this regard, that, over the years, and to deal with "[t]he
general duties of the State, imposed by the Constitution, [such as the] provision for the general
good (pt. I, art. 1), protection of the people (pt. I, arts. 3, 12) provision for the general benefit
and welfare (pt. II, art. 5) and provision for government and ordering (pt. II, art. 5) [as well as
to deal with] more specific duties, such as the provision of a constitutionally adequate
education and a guarantee of adequate funding . . . provision of courts and legal remedies (pt.
I, art. 14; pt. II art. 4), provision of elections (pt. II, art. 5), and provision for the raising of
taxes (pt. II, art. 5), . . . [p]olitical subdivisions, at their own expense, [have] carr[ied] out State
duties on elections, fire and police protection, land use control, and other exercises of the
police power, provisions of highways, sanitation, and the structure and staffing of local
government [as well as provision of] facilities and some staffing for our court system," and, of
course, have been largely responsible to raise school funding. Id. at 1363 (citations omitted).
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the tax, and its obvious proportionality within the taxing
district, I would hold that the trial court was correct in
deciding, in the context of this case, that the part II, article 5
tests of reasonability and proportionality have been met by
the current tax system.272
As to reasonableness, Justice Horton stated that this "should be measured
against an objective standard . . . [and] where the taxing act becomes a taking
act, the tax is unreasonable." 2 73 Here, according to Justice Horton, "[f]ailure
of the school districts, the primary obligors, to provide funding for the
education nut by virtue of the unreasonability of their respective taxes, would
trigger the State's guarantee obligation, . . . [with] the State [then needing to]
step in and provide funding, or such part thereof as will reduce the tax burden
to a reasonable level." 27 4 Justice Horton found, however, that "[t]he test of
absolute reasonability is not developed in this case." 275
Justice Horton went on to state that while he did not "quarrel" with the
majority's "characterization" of "the right of the student to education" as
constituting a "fundamental" one, it was not made in the context of finding
an equal protection violation, and thus lacked "materiality." 2 76 For his part,
moreover, he saw the "record below [as] demonstrat[ing] that the
constitutional nut is provided to all students . . . ; the funding scheme is not
constitutionally infirm [and] there is no equal protection violation." 277
Justice Horton concluded: "Although I have some quarrels with aspects
of the decision below, none are the subject of this appeal, and I agree for the




Our evaluation of Claremont I hinges on whether the Supreme Court
rightly concluded that Article 83 actually imposes enforceable "adequacy"
duties, and whether the Court, in taking on the "adequacy" issues, acted in
accord with constitutional separation of power restraints. Our evaluation of
272 id




277 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont,[l), 703 A.2d 1353, 1364 (N.H. 1997)
278 id
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Claremont II hinges on whether the Court rightly decided the tax question,
and whether it otherwise properly carried out its appellate role.
1. ClaremontI
a. The Meaning of Article 83
Is the "cherish . . . public schools" language in Article 83 nothing more
than an aspirational, hortatory statement imposing no constraints on the
Legislature beyond what the voters may demand and require? Or is it, as the
Supreme Court determined in Claremont I, the expression of a real duty and
constitutional imperative to provide for, and assure the funding of,
"adequate" education for New Hampshire's public school students?
The text itself is phrased archaically. 279 Analogous education provisions
in the constitutions of other States offer, in some instances, somewhat more
concrete duty language.280 What's more, the "duty" to "cherish . . . public
schools" in the Article is only one of a number of enumerated "duties." 28 1
Article 83 also imposes "duties" on:
[T]he legislators and magistrates . . . to cherish the interest
of literature and the sciences and all seminaries . . . to
encourage private and public institutions, rewards and
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences,
commerce, trades, manufacturers, and natural history of the
country; to countenance and inculcate the principals of
humanity and general benevolence, public and private
charity, industry and economy, honesty and punctuality,
279 REBELL, supra note 54, at 18. Van Loan sees Article 83 to be much like Part I, Article 38,
which, among other things, confers upon citizens the "right to require" their elected officials to
do their jobs properly, and he asserts this is similarly hortatory, imposing no justiciable rights.
See Van Loan Letters, supra note 17, Letter No. 11 ("What Was The Original
Understanding?").
280 Eg. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("[T]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be
educated."); Ky. CONST. § 183 (provision of "an efficient system of common schools
throughout the State."); WASH. CONST. art IX, § 1 ("It is the paramount duty of the state to
make ample provision for the education of all children."); see generally Conn. Coalition for
Just. in Ed. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 228-232, n.27 (Conn. 2010) (discussing many
state constitutional education provisions, with varying "qualitative" language).
281 N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII.
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sincerity, sobriety, and all social affections, and generous
sentiments, among the people.282
Article 83 is also not contained in the Constitution's Bill of Rights Part (Part
I), but in that Part (Part II) dealing with government structure, 283 and its
expressed "duty" is directed to "the legislators and magistrates," not
precisely to the State or government institutions. 284
Yet, Article 83 plainly and straightforwardly imposes upon our
government officials (not as individuals but as persons bearing responsibility
in their official capacities for the operation of our government institutions)
the "duty . . . to cherish . . . public schools" in strong terms.285 It introduces
this "duty" by stressing the importance of the diffusion of knowledge and
learning "[for] the preservation of a free government"; and it characterizes
the provision of education across the State, in its "various parts," as "highly
conducive to promote this end." 28 6 It then describes the "duty" to "cherish"
as mandatory for all time ("it shall be the duty of the legislators and
magistrates, in all future periods of this government"). 28 7 Though derided by
some commentators as a tool for constitutional analysis,288 the dictionaries of
the 1780's defined "cherish" to have, as one of its common meanings, that of
actual support; and it was used that way by important personages of the time,
including John Adams. 289 Thus, by its terms, Article 83 requires the State's
282 id
283 Mosca, NH's Claremont Case, supra note 17, at 425-426 ("The structure of the
constitution .. . belies the assertion that Article 83 imposes any judicially enforceable duty on
state government to provide an adequate education. Part I, the Bill of Rights, specifically
enumerates limitations on governmental power. . . . Part II, the Form of Government, in
contrast, divides governmental powers between the three branches without specifically
enumerating how to exercise those powers."); Van Loan Letters, supra note 17, Letter No. 11
("What Was The Original Understanding?") ("[S]ince the Encouragement of Literature Clause
was not placed in the Bill of Rights section of the Constitution, one would have expected the
Claremont Court to have found this fact to be an impediment to its conclusion that it
established a right to education.").
284 See Van Loan Letters, supra note 17, Letter No. 11 (arguing that Article 83 was thus
"meant to inspire persons not to direct governments").
285 N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII.
286 id
287 Id. (emphasis added).
288 Eg., Van Loan letters, supra note 17, Letter No. 2 ("What the Constitution Actually Says")
(castigating the Claremont Court for engaging in a claimed dubious form of "dictionary
jurisprudence" to justify its reading of the term "cherish" as being more than a hortatory
expression directed just at individuals not institutions).
289 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1), 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993)
(observing that the 1780 T. Sheridan, A General Dictionary of the English Language, defined
"Cherish" to mean: "To support, to shelter, to nurse up"). See also McDuffy v. Sec'y of Exec.
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leaders to provide at all times a public education that is designed to enable all
of the State's children to become, through learning, productive citizens who
will assure "the preservation of a free government."
While the Article contains other "duties," this does not detract from the
importance it accords public education itself The nature of such other
"duties" needs to be assessed in their own contexts. 29 0 That Article 83 was
placed in Part II of the Constitution and not Part I may be seen as reflecting
its importance. Just as other structures of our republican government must be
maintained, so must the proper provision of education. 2 91 "The framers'
decision to place the provisions concerning education . . . [in Part II rather
than Part I] demonstrates that the framers conceived of education as
fundamentally related to the very existence of government." 292
Prior New Hampshire court precedent offers assistance in determining
the nature and breadth of the pertinent Article 83 duties. The precedent,
though not squarely on point, may be fairly read as being essentially
supportive of Claremont I. These cases recognized that Article 83 did
impose a duty or injunction to cherish education, something "more than a
mere sentimental interest," a duty "of paramount importance," 2 93 though it
Office of Educ., 615 N.E. 2d 516, 523-526 (Mass. 1993) (reviewing the dictionaries of the era
in more detail and observing that "[t]he term 'cherish' was used in the Eighteenth Century to
import a meaning which is no longer, or which is much less, in vogue today. . . . [that]
according to common usage in the late Eighteenth Century, a duty to cherish was an obligation
to support or nurture."). Mv~cDuffjy also referenced the writings of such important policy-
makers of the era as John Adams and John Hancock to show how "cherish" was used in the
"support" sense. Id. at 525-26.
290 MvlcDuffy, 615 N.E. 2d at 528 ("[A] sensible reading of the [pertinent] language is that each
object of the duty to cherish is to be cherished in accordance with its nature. 'Interests' are
unlike institutions, and so are 'cherished' in different ways from institutions. The 'university
at Cambridge' is different from 'public schools and grammar schools in the towns' and so is
cherished differently from them."). This point is not appreciated, for example, in Mosca,
Original Understanding, supra note 20, at 225, where it is stated: "There is nothing in the
[pertinent language of Article 83] that suggests that public schools should take priority over
the other objects of the duty to cherish."
291 Records of the pertinent Constitution Convention proceedings discuss the importance
accorded education. It was stated in regard to Article 83: "From the deepest impression of the
vast importance of literature in a free government, we have interwoven with and made its
protection and encouragement a part of the constitution itself." See Address of the Convention
for Framing a New Constitution or Form of Government for the State of New Hampshire,
Exeter, New Hampshire 14 (1782).
292 MvlcDuffy, 615 N.E. 2d at 527. While Article 83 accords the State broad power to control
and regulate education, it requires the State to use this power to provide a level or quality of
education fit to preserve our way of life. See State's Supp. Brief (Aug. 31, 1993), Claremont
Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont l), 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993).
293 E.g., In re Davis, 318 A.2d 151, 152 (N.H. 1974) ("Our State constitution imposes upon
government the duty of providing for the education of its citizens."); State v. Jackson, 53 A.
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also recognized the preeminence of the Legislature in regard to education
policy and manifested a strong unwillingness to limit legislative discretion or
second-guess legislative action in the area.294
A review of the State's actual provision of public education when Article
83 was enacted shows that while a school system then existed oriented to
have children learn, at a minimum, how to read and write, it had been "in
decline, principally because of the failure of local town officials to meet their
legal duty." 29 5 Moreover, many children lived outside the more populated
areas and did not have easy access, if at all, to schools.296 Yet, "the authors
of the Constitution enacted the Education Clause against this background of
1021, 1023 (N.H. 1902) ("[S]omething more than a mere sentimental interest was intended.");
Farnum's Petition, 51 N.H. 376, 379 (1871) ("[T]he constitution enjoins the duty, in very
general and comprehensive terms ... as one of paramount public importance.").
294 E.g. Coleman v Sch. Dist. of Rochester, 183 A. 586, 586 (N.H. 1936) (the scope of
legislative authority is broad in dealing with education, and the courts "may not declare acts of
the Legislature void on the sole issue whether they are 'wholesome and reasonable'); Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 137 (1817). Van Loan argues that Fogg v. Board
of Educ. of Union Sch. Dist. of Littleton, 82 A. 173 (N.H. 1912) supports the view that Article
83 did not provide rights to the public to enforce an education duty, but rather worked only to
serve the important purpose of "encourag[ing] the creation of an educated citizenry." See Van
Loan Letters, supra note 17, Letter No. 12 ("If There Are Education Rights, Whose Rights
Are They?"). Fogg involved a claim by parents of a right of transportation for their child who
otherwise had to walk several miles to get to the nearest school. In that context, and in ruling
in favor of the parents on statutory grounds, the Supreme Court characterized "[f]ree schooling
furnished by the state [as] not so much a right granted to the pupils [than] a duty imposed upon
them for the public good . . . [and stated that] the fundamental purpose of the public school
system is the protection and improvement of the state as a political entity." Fogg, 82 A. at
175. That this was stated in the context of that case hardly suggests that a defined floor of
education may not be deemed to be an enforceable State duty which may be insisted upon,
certainly, by affected or injured members of the public.
295 Hough Brief supra note 20, at 24; see also Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont
1), 635 A.2d 1375, 1380 (N.H. 1993) (quoting Governor Wentworth's message to the General
Assembly in late 1771 to the effect "that the local town officials had failed to meet their duties
under the prior laws and that corrective action was necessary by the State itself"); BUSH, supra
note 24, at 12-13 ("From the beginning of the 18th Century until near its close (1700s) there
was great apathy in the matter of maintaining schools, the law respecting education being but
partially enforced."); NATHANIEL BOUTON, THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE: A
DISCOURSE, DELIVERED BEFORE THE NEW HAMPSHIRE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, AT THEIR ANNUAL
MEETING IN CONCORD, JUNE 12, 1833 10-18 (Concord N.H., Marsh Capen and Lyon 1833)
(highlighting as causes for this education neglect "inhabitants exceedingly scattered," and the
tumult and discord of the period with much warfare).
296 Mosca, Original Understanding, supra note 20, at 234 ("[N]either universal public
education nor State funding for public education were required by law when Article 83 was
adopted. Rather, children in towns of under fifty families were not entitled to any public
education; children in towns of between fifty and one hundred families were entitled only to a
schoolmaster to teach reading and writing; and only children living in towns of one hundred or
more families were entitled to grammar schools.").
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widespread failure . . . and did so to assure public education by means of
positive constitutional duty." 297
As in Massachusetts, the importance of public education and public
schools in New Hampshire has been well articulated since colonial times
both in constitutional and policy pronouncements; and the State has
supported public education over the years, though, to be sure, imperfectly.298
Moreover, as the State moved from its Puritan beginnings to more modem
settings, the education the public schools offered did not remain static, but
evolved and expanded to meet new conditions; and it moved forward to offer
basic education in all regions. 2 99 During this time, the State continued to
exercise overall control, oversight and direction for public education, though
schools also very much remained subject to the control of the localities.3 00 In
short, while it is certainly possible to fault the education the State has
offered, the constitutional command to "cherish" education has been in place
since 1784 "as a cornerstone of our democratic system."301
To be sure, an attempt was made in the State's Constitutional Convention
of 1850 to move Article 83 to the Bill of Rights Part of the Constitution and
to add articles to the Form of Government Part (Proposed Articles 89 through
91) that would have explicitly required the Legislature to "make provision
for the establishment and maintenance of free common schools, at the public
expense," (proposed Article 89), constitutionally provide for a minimum
funding level for education to be raised "in the several towns and places in
this State," (same proposed Article), and establish for "[t]he supervision of
public instruction," the elected position of "State Superintendent" with "such
other officers as the Legislature shall direct" (proposed Articles 90 and
91).302 Some commentators contend that these proposals reflect that Article
83 was then not seen as establishing any mandatory, enforceable rights to
"adequacy" in education and to "adequate" funding.303 Yet in proposing
297 Hough Brief supra note 20, at 24-25; see also Claremont l, 635 A.2d at 1380.
298 See discussion supra Part I.1.a.
299 id.
300 id.
301 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont l), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
302 See JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE NOVEMBER 6, 1850 at 437 (State of New Hampshire, Secretary of State, 2005)
[hereinafter JOURNAL]. For a discussion of this Convention, see Mosca, Original
Understanding, supra note 20, at 236-37; Van Loan Letters, supra note 17, Letter No. 11;
Brief of Eugene M. Van Loan III as Amicus Curiae at 17-20, 23-25, Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor (ClaremontXI), 794 A.2d 744 (N.H. 2002) [hereinafter Van Loan Memorandum].
303 See, e.g., Mosca, Original Understanding, supra note 20, at 236-37 ("If Article 83 had
been understood to . . . [impose an adequacy and corresponding funding duty on the State] it
would have been pointless to have added proposed Article 89 . . . this 'very remarkable
assembly' believed that the sort of State control of public education that the Claremont
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these measures, the 1850 Convention, as reflected in reports issued by its
Standing Committee on Education, was focused upon achieving concrete
improvement of the then existing pre-Civil War education system and its
funding, and not upon the reach or breath of Article 83 itself.3 04
In regard to proposed Articles 90 and 91, creating the constitutional
office of State Superintendent, the Committee on Education opened its
Report by underscoring the importance of public education. It stated: "The
importance and necessity of popular education to the permanence and
security of our free institutions . . . [we] take for granted" and "free schools
are admitted by all to be indispensable to our security and prosperity as a
people.3 05 It went on to observe that its proposals for a constitutional State
Superintendent position and other State positions, though "not confer[ring]
new power upon the Legislature," would make "that permanent which is now
changeable; to make imperative which is now optional."3 0 6  Proposed
Articles 90 and 91 thus represented an attempt to have the State adopt, at the
constitutional level, a particular form of supervisory attention to foster
schools and education.
In regard to proposed Article 89, the Committee opined in another
Report that "the common or primary schools deserve the special
encouragement and support of the State, and that the duty of sustaining them
is imperative, both on legislators and on the people."3 07 It observed that
while, "[t]he legislators of New Hampshire have not been unobservant of that
excellent article of our constitution [Article 83], which enjoined upon
them . . . 'the cherishing of all seminaries and public schools'. . . . our
common schools are still far from being what they should be and might be"
and [to deal with the evident problems], that is, "to supply existing wants and
remedy existing defects more pecuniary means are needed . . . [to be ensured
decisions assert under Article 83 made mandatory was merely 'optional."'). See also Van
Loan Letters, supra note 17, Letter No. 11 (discussing the pertinent Convention Proposals and
asserting that "[w]hen combined with the proposal to move Article 83 to the Bill of Rights
section" they reflected that the Convention delegates did not see Article 83 as establishing
mandatory education rights); Van Loan Memorandum, supra note 302, at 18-19 (" [I]f the
conventional understanding of the Convention had been that the Judiciary was empowered by
Article 83 to itself determine the cost of an adequate education and to instruct the Legislature
to fund it, the delegates to the Convention of 1850 were engaging in an unnecessary act.").
304 See JOURNAL, supra note 302, at 54.
305 id
306 id
307 Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
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by an express] provision in the constitution authorizing and requiring the
legislature to grant them."3 08
Upon review of the above, to include the pertinent historical context, it
hardly appears that the 1850 Convention took any definite or clear position
concerning the breadth or reach of Article 83, or whether or to what degree
the Article, by itself, called for the Legislature to assure "adequate"
education, or whether, or to what degree the Judiciary could play any role in
assuring Article 83's dictates. Rather, the Convention recognized education
to be an imperative State "duty," and it sought to effect detailed education
reforms to improve the system in place and its funding.309 In any event, none
of the Convention's proposals were adopted-they were defeated for any
number of reasons.3 10
What is very significant in construing Article 83 is that its core language
originated with John Adams through his drafting of the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780.311 Adams was, without question, a strong proponent of
the importance of education and the imperative for the State to nurture and
support it to maintain our democratic way of life.
The writings of this central founding father plainly reflect that he did not
consider his "cherish" public education constitutional language to lack
teeth-to be something that could be ignored if the Legislature wished to do
so. Rather, they confirm his strong dedication to the essentiality of education
to the preservation of our republican form of government.
As was said by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the
McDuffy case, in discussing the significance of Adams: "There is substantial
evidence that John Adams believed that widespread public education was
integral to the very existence of a republican government." 3 12 Adams, for
example, wrote about education only three years before his drafting of the
Massachusetts Constitution in the following strong terms:
308 Id at 52-53 (emphasis added). The Committee specifically discussed the inequities then
evident in the provision of education across the State, stating that "[t]here is a need . . . of
increasing from time to time the percentage of appropriation that the children and youth in
every part of the State may enjoy as nearly as may be practicable, equal advantages in
education." Id.
309 See Backhoven, supra note 22, at 28 ("In effect, the Constitutional Convention of 1850 was
the opening skirmish in a battle over school-tax reform that did not climax until the Court
declared a winner in 1993.").
310 Id. at 27.
311 McDuffy v. Sec'y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E. 2d 516. 533 (Mass. 1993) ("John
Adams is generally regarded as the principal author of the draft Constitution.").
312 Id. at 535.
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The instruction of the people, in every kind of knowledge
that can be of use to them in the practice of their moral
duties, as men, citizens, and Christians, and of their political
and civil duties, as members of society and freemen, ought
to be the care of the public, and of all who have any share in
the conduct of its affairs, in a manner that never yet has been
practiced in any age or nation. The education here intended
is not merely that of the children of the rich and noble, but of
every rank and class of people down to the lowest and
poorest. It is not too much to say, that schools for the
education of all should be placed at convenient distances,
and maintained at the public expense. The revenues of the
state would be applied infinitely better, more charitably,
wisely, usefully, and therefore politically, in this way, than
even maintaining the poor. This would be the best way of
preventing the existence of the poor.3 13
He also wrote in 1785:
The whole people must take upon themselves the education
of the whole people and be willing to bear the expenses of it.
There should not be a district of one mile square, without a
school in it, not founded by a charitable individual, but
maintained at the public expense of the people themselves. 3 14
Adams' views were not only found nearly verbatim expression in our
1784 Constitution, they were echoed in important contemporaneous
pronouncements concerning education by major New Hampshire policy
makers such as Governor Gilman and members of the State Legislature with
whom this Governor worked.315 It is thus hard to delimit the meaning of
Article 83 as being only aspirational, without force or mandatory content.
Article 83, as drawn particularly from Adams, calls for education to be
"cherished" in real terms, as a "duty," continuously over time and during all
periods, to preserve our way of life.3 16 This is a fair description of its "basic
313 Id. at 536 n.54 (citing JOHN ADAMS, IN A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
(1787)).
314 See DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, Pre-Introduction (2014).
315 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont l), 635 A.2d 1375, 1380-81 (N.H. 1993).
316 N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII.
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purposes and values."3 17  A "pragmatic" method of constitutional
construction focused upon these "basic purposes and values"318 supports the
Supreme Court's view of Article 83 as imposing on our government the
requirement that our children be accorded the opportunity, at public expense,
to obtain education sufficient to enable them properly to function as citizens.
This construction, which sees a free K-12 public education as a very
important, if not fundamental right flowing from the expressed mandatory
positive duty in Article 83 (not as just a discretionary entitlement),3 1 9 also
recognizes that the duty to provide education must evolve to meet society's
needs. The constitutionally required education, whether called "adequate,"
or "sound basic education,"320 may have been little more than "the basics"
years ago, but today it certainly must constitute more than "mere reading,
writing and arithmetic." 3 21 It must suffice, to fulfill the purposes of the
Article, "to prepare citizens for their role as participants and as potential
competitors in today's market place of ideas."322
It is not "a display of stunning judicial imagination" 3 23 for the Court to
see in the "cherish" duty an obligation to provide a level of public education
fit for the times; nor is it creating a constitutional right "out of whole cloth"
or a form of "results oriented jurisprudence." 32 4  Though it speaks in
somewhat archaic terms, Article 83 is no less meaningful than such
317 See BREYER, supra note 102, at 76-87 (explaining that his "pragmatic" approach to
constitutional interpretation involves the discernment of a phrase's "basic purposes and
values.")
318 id
319 As is also discussed more infra, State Constitutions differ from the Federal Constitution in
that they do impose affirmative constitutional duties or obligations or "positive rights." See
REBELL, supra note 54, at 24-25 ("In contrast to the negative restraints of the federal
constitution, the structure of most state constitutions, especially in key areas of state
responsibility like education, incorporate 'positive rights' that require affirmative
governmental action-and implicitly call for judicial review if the other branches fail to take
that action.").
320 Id ("The term 'sound basic education' ... appears to describe most accurately the
midrange level of quality educational training in substantive skills that virtually all of the
courts have agreed is necessary for students to function productively in the twenty-first
century.").
321 ClaremontI, 635 A.2d at 1381.
322 id
323 This was an expression offered by a concurring Justice (Cowin, J) in Hancock v.
Commissioner of Education, in criticizing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's earlier
McDuffy decision for seeing in that State's constitutional "cherish" language the expression of
the criteria set forth in the Rose case for education. 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1160 (Mass. 2005); see
also Mosca, NH's Claremont Case, supra note 17, at 421.
324 Van Loan Letters, supra note 17, Letter No. 8.
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challenging constitutional terms as "due process," or "equal protection." Its
dictates are real and enforceable.
b. Separation of Powers Concerns
Did the Claremont I Court err in entering the education "adequacy" fray?
Is educational "adequacy" entirely within the province of the elected
branches, particularly the Legislature, or is there a role for the Judiciary to
assure Article 83 constitutional duties and rights upon proper court
challenge?
While historical arguments challenging the legitimacy of judicial review
in regard to the constitutionality of legislative or executive action certainly
exist,3 25 the train has left the station long ago on this issue, and it is now clear
beyond cavil that the courts, both federal and state, regularly exercise broad
judicial review and act to strike down or declare unconstitutional legislative
and executive acts.326 This sort of "judicial activism" is the norm, carried out
by both "liberal" and "conservative" judges.3 27 As Van Loan has conceded:
"[R]egardless of anyone's lingering doubts about judicial review's
legitimacy, we are where we are and judicial review is a fact of life in 21st
century America."328
Judicial review in the constitutional realm seems particularly appropriate
in disputes concerning the proper functioning of our democracy, where the
other branches have not been able or willing to be effective.3 29 Thus, the
Courts have acted in the post-World War II era in such important areas as the
325 Eugene Van Loan, Judicial Review and its Limits, 47 N.H.B.J. 52 (2006) [hereinafter Van
Loan, Judicial Review].
326 See, e.g., In re Below, 855 A.2d 459, 464-65 (N.H. 2004) ("It is the role of this court in our
co-equal, tripartite form of government to interpret the Constitution and to resolve disputes
arising under it. . . . We are the final arbiter of State constitutional disputes.") (quotations and
citations omitted).
327 See REBELL, supra note 54, at 4 (writing in 2009: "[1]f 'judicial activism' is defined in
terms of declaring legislative acts unconstitutional, the conservative Rehnquist Court was the
most activist in American history. . . . The Roberts Court appears to be continuing or even
accelerating this trend.").
328 See Van Loan, Judicial Review, supra note 325, at 63. See also Van Loan Letters, supra
note 17, Letter No. 11 (stating "[J]udicial review was only a fraction of the Court's work in
the eighteenth century. The regulatory state with its explosion of statutory and administrative
law is a creature of the twentieth century.").
329 See REBELL, supra note 54, at 50-51 (citing JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980)) (stating "judicial intervention is especially justified when there is substantial
malfunction in the democratic processes of one or both of the other political branches. Such a
democratic malfunction often occurs in decision making on educational finance and sound
basic education issues.").
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desegregation of schools,330 and voter apportionment,331 implementing and
following through on controversial and often far-reaching remedies. Indeed,
it has been an era of "public law litigation," 3 32 with the courts across the
country and in New Hampshire tackling a broad range of issues and matters,
to include prison reform,333 and the realization of community oriented
treatment and assistance for persons with serious mental illness. 334
Is there therefore any real basis to argue, when it comes to the guarantees
in our state constitutions associated with public education-positive
constitutional rights so important to the continued functioning of our
democracy and the perpetuation of our republican culture- 33 5 that the
Judiciary should play no role whatsoever particularly in the face of what may
be seen as long-standing failure of the other branches to assure the offering
330 See Brownv. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
331 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Westberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
332 See REBELL, supra note 54, at 4 ("The Supreme Court's second [school desegregation]
ruling, Brown II [349 U.S. 294 (1955)] . . . authorized the federal courts to oversee the
implementation of school desegregation by local school districts. In so doing, it initiated 'a
new model of public law litigation' in accordance with which both federal and state courts
have for the past half century issued broad remedial decrees that go beyond the traditional
judicial role of resolving private disputes between individuals and substantially affect the
implementation of public policy.").
333 Substantial prison litigation has occurred in New Hampshire resulting in reform and
improvement of conditions for prisoners since the comprehensive Consent Decree entered in
1978. See, e.g., Laamanv. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977); see Holliday v. Curry,
No. 04-E-0203 (Merrimack Cty. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2007) (dealing with enforcement of later
settlement agreements); Fiandaca v. Cunningham, No. C83-400-L (D.N.H. Jan. 13, 1987)
(finding equal protection rights of female inmates violated as to conditions of confinement,
programs and services, and ordering, among other things, the construction of a permanent
facility for female inmates), aff'd on the merits, 827 F.2d 825 (1987); Woods v. Comm'r, No.
217-2012-CV-0059 (Merrimack Cty. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2012) (currently being held in
abeyance pending construction of new prison for women). See generally Malcolm M. Feeley
and Van Swearingen, Prison Conditions Cases and the Bureaucratization of American
Corrections: Influences, Impacts, and Implementation, 24 PACE L. REv. 433 (2004)
(" [J]udicial intervention in prison conditions appears to be a distinct and singular success.").
334 See Class Action Settlement Agreement, Amanda D. v. Hassan, Civ. No. 1:12-cv-53-SM
(entered Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/nh-final-settlement.pdf.
This settlement works to provide, on a long term basis, a range of community mental health
services, including housing and employment initiatives, with continued court oversight. It is
expected to impact on thousands of people with serious mental illness.
335 As one commentator has stated in highlighting the importance of education today: "[T]he
vastly expanded electorate encompassing individuals of both genders and all classes, races,
and ethnic groups, combined with contemporary expectations that a citizen's role is to analyze
issues rationally and make individual electoral decisions, renders the link between effective
education and the maintenance of a viable democracy more important than ever." REBELL,
supra note 54, at 45.
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of proper education opportunity to all children? It is certainly provocative to
opine that "[t]he Constitution does not establish the Court as a panel of
philosopher-kings." 3 36 But New Hampshire's Constitution imposes on state
judges the responsibility to assure constitutional rights, including rights of a
positive nature.
This said, it is also true that certain disputes may be non-justiciable, or
not amenable to judicial treatment or involvement, and the doctrine of
separation of powers, as drawn from both the federal and state constitutions,
operates to keep the courts from insinuating themselves inappropriately in
certain matters. New Hampshire's separation of powers principles flow from
Part I, Article 37 of the State Constitution, and call for the powers of
government to be carried out by the three branches in such a manner that one
branch is prohibited from "encroach[ing] upon another branch's power as to
usurp from that branch its constitutionally defined function." 33 7  "The
nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the
separation of powers."338
A case raises a non-justiciable "political question" where there is:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 3 39
While a number of state supreme courts have dismissed claims challenging
education systems on this basis, or because of "separation of powers"
concerns, 34 0 the majority of state supreme courts that have dealt with these
336 See Van Loan Letters, supra note 17, Letter No. 9 ("Is Education Too Important To Be
Entrusted To The Politicians?").
337 See N.H. Health Care Assoc. v. Governor, 13 A.3d 145, 159-60 (N.H. 2011).
338 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
339 Id. at 217. See also In re Judicial Conduct Comm., 751 A.2d 514, 515-17 (N.H. 2000)
(using federal precedent to deal with the political question issue).
340 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618 (S.D. 2011); Coal. For Educ. Equity & Adequacy
v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 178-183 (Neb. 2007); Okla. Educ. Ass'n v. Oklahoma, 158
P.3d 1058, 1066 (Okla. 2007); Ex Parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 815-819 (Ala. 2002); Coal.
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cases have not taken this position.3 41 Like Judge Manias did explicitly
here3 4 2 and as the Supreme Court did implicitly, they have accepted the
notion that these suits raise serious justiciable constitutional issues
implicating the important matter of education, and that it would be, as the
Rose court put it, "a denigration of . . . constitutional duty" to not exercise
appropriate judicial review in regard to whether the Legislature was actually
meeting its constitutional responsibilities in regard to education. 43
As was discussed supra in Part II.1.a, Article 83 speaks in mandatory
terms, requiring the State (its Legislators and Magistrates) "to cherish [that
is, support] public schools."344 Language like this "both empowers and
obligates."34 5 While New Hampshire's Constitution particularly vests the
Legislature with the authority to fashion education policy for the state's
public schools and the responsibility to fund them,3 46 it does not contain any
language that the Judiciary should play no role in determining whether
constitutional compliance has been achieved. It contains no language saying
that public education is a matter left to the unreviewable discretion of the
Legislature, or to the two other branches.3 47 Rather, Article 83 sets forth
For Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996);
Comm. For Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996); Marrero v.
Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1999); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlum, 662 A.2d 40,
57 (R.I. 1995).
341 See generally Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 225-226 n.24 (Conn.
2010); REBELL, supra note 54, at 17, 134-35 n.12 (collecting cases).
342 See Order on Mot. to Dismiss (Manias Order), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont l), No. 91-E-0306-B at 2-5. (Merrimack Cty. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 1992).
343 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989).
344 N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. LXXXIII.
345 See Neeley v. W. Orange Cove, 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 (Tex. 2005) (quoting W. Orange-
Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 563 (Tex. 2003)).
346 See N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. XXVIII; pt. II, arts. II, V; pt. II, art. LVI; see also Coleman v.
Sch. Dist., 183 A. 586, 590 (N.H. 1936).
347 See Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 (Tex.
2005) (the Texas Supreme Court, in construing its state's constitutional mandate "to establish
and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public
education," stating: "If the framers had intended the Legislature's discretion to be absolute,
they need not have mandated that the public education be efficient and suitable; they could
instead have provided only that the Legislature provide whatever public education it deemed
appropriate."); see Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E. 2d 326, 351 (N.Y.
2003) (Smith, J. concurring) (discussing N.Y. CONST., art. XVII, §1 "The aid, care and support
of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state ... in such manner and by
such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine."). Though several attempts
have been made since the Claremont I and II decisions to amend the Constitution to at least
limit the Judiciary's role, these have not succeeded. See infra note 419 and accompanying
text.
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constitutional "dut[iles]" to support education from which flow corresponding
'jural correlative" rights.3 48
To be sure, in dealing with "adequacy," or like constitutional standards
in education, the state courts are not acting to enforce a limitation, or
negative restriction, on governmental power, but to assure positive rights.
This is seen by some commentators as inappropriate judicial policy-making
creating "entitlements."3 49  A mandatory, positive constitutional right,
however, is not the same thing as a discretionary entitlement. As one
commentator has explained:
[A] positive constitutional right imposes an affirmative
obligation on the state to 'realize and advance the objects
and purposes for which . . . powers have been
granted.' . . . Judicial review, in such a regime, must serve to
insure that the government is doing its job and moving
policy closer to the constitutionally prescribed end.350
The Washington State Supreme Court recently highlighted once again, as
it had more than thirty years before in an earlier education case,35 1 the
important "distinction between positive and negative constitutional rights."352
348 See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 247-248 (Wash. 2012) (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978)) (footnotes omitted) ("By imposing upon the
State a paramount duty to make ample provision for the education of all children residing
within the State's borders, the constitution has created a 'duty' that is supreme, preeminent or
dominant. Flowing from this constitutionally imposed 'duty' is its jural correlative, a
correspondent 'right' permitting control of another's conduct. Therefore, all children residing
within the borders of the State possess a 'right,' arising from the constitutionally imposed
'duty' of the State, to have the State make ample provision for their education. Further, since
the 'duty' is characterized as paramount the correlative 'right' has equal stature." (emphasis in
original)). While Van Loan questions the legitimacy of any corresponding rights associated
with any Article 83 "duty," it may not fairly be disputed that, rightly or wrongly, once the
mandatory positive constitutional duty arising from Article 83 was recognized, it followed
easily that associated rights existed for some to enjoy the benefits flowing from the duty and
for those affected or interested persons to be able to take effective steps, through court action,
to assure fulfillment of the duty. See Van Loan Letters, supra note 17, Letter No. 4 ("Not All
Duties Create Rights").
349 See, e.g., Van Loan Letters, supra note 17, Letter No 5 ("A Constitution Is Not a Menu of
Entitlements") (bemoaning the recognition of the Article 83 education duty, decrying the
establishment of constitutional "entitlements," and seeing this as the setting up of the State "as
a dispenser of benefits, as a redistributor of wealth and as an agency of social engineering.").
350 Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (1999).
351 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
352 McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248.
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As to "[t]he vast majority of constitutional provisions . . . framed as negative
restrictions on government action . . . the role of the court is to police the
outer limits of government power, relying on the constitutional enumeration
of negative rights to set the boundaries . .. [whereas] [p]ositive constitutional
rights do not restrain government action; they require it."3 53 In regard to such
rights, moreover, "federal limits on judicial review such as the political
question doctrine or rationality review are inappropriate . . . [i]nstead in a
positive right context we must ask whether the state action achieves or is
reasonably likely to achieve 'the constitutionally prescribed end."'
3 54
The question of "adequacy" may be a difficult one, but so are many
constitutional issues. The task has been made easier through the many cases
that have been decided across the country. These have established a "broad
consensus" as to this term's "core meaning," the nature of the education or
educational opportunity, it connotes.3 5 5 Indeed, "[v]irtually all of the courts
that have defined their constitutional language have agreed that a basic
education that meets contemporary needs is one that ensures that a student is
equipped to function capably as a citizen and to compete effectively in the
global labor market."3 56 The definition standards the Courts have adopted in
these cases are not "illusory" or so imprecise and constantly evolving as to be
immune from judicial review.357 Rather, they "define[] the contours of the
[constitutional] requirement, against which the facts of a case may then be
measured" though they "must [also] serve the future."358
The courts have now also been provided "practical tools for developing
judicially manageable approaches for dealing with complex educational
issues and implementing effective remedies," with the acceptance throughout
the country of "standards-based" education reform.3 59  Realized through
combined federal-state initiatives, 360 such reform has resulted, or is oriented
353 Id. (citation omitted).
354 Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
355 See REBELL, supra note 54, at 18.
356 id
357 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 349 (N.Y. 2003).
358 id
359 See REBELL, supra note 54, at 20.
360 The States have been prodded by federal laws, particularly the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2015) ("NCLB"), the latest overhaul of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act ("ESEA"), combined with actions of various Presidents and the
federal Department of Education, to establish high substantive academic or skills-set standards
and accountability mechanisms in schools. While "standards-based" reform has been going
on for some time, going back at least as far as 1983 and the publication then by the National
Commission on Excellence in Education of the landmark and disturbing "A Nation At Risk"
report, controversy presently exists concerning the acceptance of "Common Core" standards
across the country. These academic standards in English/language arts and math, arising from
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to produce, school systems operating with substantive content standards in all
major subject areas, set at levels so as to produce students with skills and
knowledge fit for the times. With these standards in place, all other aspects
of the system, and all educational inputs, need to function with "[t]he . .. aim
to create a coherent system of standards, resources, and assessments that will
result in significant improvements in achievement for all students."36 1
Such "standards-based" education reform operates to infuse "the concept
of educational opportunity . . . [with] substantive content," and also
"provide[s] judges with workable criteria for crafting practical remedies."3 62
It enables the courts to sensibly consider, with use of sophisticated fact-
finding approaches,363 whether a particular education system, or grouping of
schools, actually offers an approach to learning, with proper funding, that
may be deemed to meet such constitutional standards as "adequate," or
"sound basis education." 36 4
To find constitutional compliance in regard to "adequacy," the courts
will want to find:
[R]ational educational standards that set out what it is that
children should be expected to learn . . . standards [that]
should meet or exceed a constitutional floor of an adequate
a Common Core State Standards Initiative begun in 2009 by the Council of Chief State School
Officers and the National Governors Association, have been accepted by most states, but some
are now resisting them or abandoning them. This being said, in this age of marked inequality
in wealth and income, the standards-based education reform movement, operates, at its best, as
a progressive undertaking to extend and assure quality educational opportunity to all children.
It insists that all levels of government work together on an ongoing basis to realize the
education our children need. But see, DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR (Vintage Books 2013)
(powerful and scathing criticism of the contemporary education reform movement,
particularly its corporate, privatization and high stakes testing aspects).
361 See REBELL, supra note 54, at 20.
362 id.
363 The courts are quite capable of employing sophisticated fact-finding approaches, with
extensive use of expert evidence, in dealing with complex disputes. See, e.g., id. at 13
("Concerns about the courts' capacity to engage in sophisticated fact gathering and remedial
processes have . . . been muted by empirical investigations of what courts actually do in these
cases."). Indeed, "[t]he irony is that while ... pundits persist in arguing that the courts' new
role [that is, active judicial involvement in the social policy sphere] is usurping legislative
powers, Congress and the State legislatures themselves are continually asking the courts to
take on more of these policy-making activities by passing regulatory statutes that directly or
implicitly call for expanded judicial review. A prime example is the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act in which Congress set forth a detailed set of substantive and
procedural rights and explicitly established a new area of court jurisdiction for individual suits,
regardless of the amount in controversy." Id.
364 Id. at 21.
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base for children. Second . . . an adequate method of
assessing whether children are actually learning what is set
out in the standards. Third . . . adequate funding so as to
accord to schools the ability to provide instruction in the
standards. And fourth . . . adequate accountability and
oversight by the State over those school districts so as to
insure that the districts are fulfilling the State's constitutional
responsibility. 65
In carrying out this review, courts function best when they keep in mind
both their institutional strengths and weaknesses.366 They are not
institutionally well positioned to, and are indeed constitutionally constrained
from, micromanaging education or doing any "social engineering," but they
are especially effective, when constructively working with the other
branches, in undertaking constitutional review of the level of quality of
offered education, the associated funding, the assessments, and the
accountability mechanisms. In sum, they best act to meet their judicial
function in these cases when they articulate and insist on the pertinent
constitutional principles, dealing with determinations of constitutional
compliance, and, if necessary, remedies, through proper fact-finding
processes and procedures. A court may need to do this over an extended
period of time, confronting, as difficult as this may be, the complexity of the
task and its demands on judicial resources.3 6 7
Specific policy approaches to create proper learning standards in all
subject areas, to "cost-out" and devise education funding schemes, to provide
365 Id. at 38 (citing Moore v. State, Case No. 3AN-04-0756 (Alaska June 21, 2007)). Rebell
himself sees a court's task as ensuring: that the State adopts "challenging academic content
and performance standards that define in concrete terms the content of a sound education";
that the State require the actual determination of the "cost of providing all students the
opportunity for a sound education" with adoption of a funding system that provides the
requisite resources; that the State "develop and implement instructional programs and
accountability mechanisms that will provide all students with meaningful educational
opportunities"; and that the State adopt good measures to "assess the extent to which student
performance has improved as a result of ... reforms." Id. at 57.
366 REBELL, supra note 54, at 53-55 (discussing comparative institutional functional capacities
research he and a colleague conducted respecting the judicial, legislative and executive
branches and stating: "[t]he key conclusions we reached were that the rational-analytic
decision-making mode of the courts was effective for articulating fundamental principles,
while the legislature's mutual adjustment decision-making mode was better equipped to
develop specific policies through broad political compromises, and the administrative
agency's pragmatic-analytic decision-making approach was most useful for understanding and
reflecting grassroots implementation needs.").
367 See generally id at 56-105 (discussing a "successful remedies model").
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effective instruction and accountability, and to put in place student
assessment measures are best left to the other branches to develop, subject to
court review only for constitutionality. 36 8 An expectation of reasonableness
and good faith must serve as the lodestar to keep the courts within proper
bounds. The goal is not to have conflict among the branches, but to achieve
together the fulfillment of constitutional obligations owed to our children.369
As the Supreme Court of Texas stated in deeming its constitutional task
to assure the proper delivery of education as judicially manageable:
[We do not] agree . . . that the constitutional standards of
adequacy, efficiency and suitability are judicially
unmanageable. These standards import a wide spectrum of
considerations and are admittedly imprecise, but they are not
without content. At one extreme, no one would dispute that
a public education system limited to teaching first grade
reading would be inadequate, or that a system without
resources to accomplish its purposes would be inefficient
and unsuitable. At the other, few would insist that merely to
be adequate, public education must teach all students
multiple languages or nuclear biophysics, or that to be
efficient, available resources must be unlimited. In between,
there is much else on which reasonable minds should come
together, and much over which they may differ. The
judiciary is well-accustomed to applying substantive
standards the crux of which is reasonableness . . . [in
applying concepts of] due process of law, equal protection,
and many other constitutional provisions. 370
368 id.
369 Rebell suggests one way of showing deference is for the courts to look to see whether what
the legislature has put in place is "reasonably calculated" to achieve the desired result. Id. at
70. See also Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in
Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
83, 122 (2010) (discussing a "process-focused remedial role" for the courts, one where "the
judiciary play[s] a role more akin to a 'catalyst' or 'backstop' than 'dictator' in structural
reform litigation").
370 Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778-79 (Tex.
2005); see also Gannonv. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1233-38 (Kan. 2014) (agreeing with the view
of judicial manageability, observing that: "courts are frequently called upon, and adept at,
defining and applying various, perhaps imprecise, standards," and offering, as examples of
this, judicial determinations going to "whether a punishment is 'cruel and unusual' under the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution" or concerning the distinction, for
purposes of Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence, between "probable cause,"
and "reasonable suspicion").
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In late 2014, the Supreme Court of South Carolina wrestled with an
education adequacy review, and did this in a manner seeking to avoid getting
inappropriately enmeshed in specific education policy development and
management.3 71 Upon review of the evidence that had been presented at the
trial level concerning both measurable education "inputs" for the students
(i.e. available resources including funding) and "outputs" (i.e. indications of
student success), the Court's majority (it was a 3-2 decision) held that the
State failed to offer the requisite opportunity to acquire a minimally adequate
education in the plaintiff districts. 3 72  These districts were largely rural,
serving largely poor student populations. 37 3
The Abbeville majority, however, did not then impose its own detailed
remedy. Rather, it highlighted the limits of its role-its refusal to get stuck
in what it termed a "quagmire" of over-involvement with education-and
called upon the parties to develop a remedial plan per a timetable for the
Court's ultimate constitutional review.374  The majority referenced as
"instructive" certain cases from other jurisdictions where the State High
Courts had approached the crafting of remedies showing deference to the
other branches.3 75
In New Hampshire, the Supreme Court took pains in Claremont I,
Claremont II, and in subsequent opinions to avoid becoming overly
enmeshed in the management of our educational system. Recognizing its
limitations, and the constitutional and institutional inappropriateness of
engaging in day-to-day education micromanagement, the Court continuously
deferred to the other branches, or gave them time to act, in regard to such
matters as making funding reforms, developing accountability measures and
systems, and developing the specifics for substantive education "adequacy"
371 See Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 159 (S.C. 2014).
372 Id. at 164, 175.
373 Id. at 164.
74 Id at 178.
375 Id. at 176 (discussing favorably the New York Court of Appeals decision in Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, where, though affirming "the trial courts [liability] holding
that the State had denied New York City school children a sound basic education," the Court
of Appeals "stopped short" of endorsing the trial court's "sweeping" remedial directive, but
entered a more limited order going to having the State cost out the requisite required
education, and make structural reforms); Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P. 2d 1238
(Wyo. 1995) (outlining considerations and factors that needed to be integrated into the
remedy, but leaving it to the Legislature to fashion the specifics).
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standards.3 76 Yet, it did act to carry out what it saw as its core constitutional
duties.
Thus, when the legislature failed to meet the deadline announced in
Claremont II for achieving funding and education reform, the Court did not
grant a requested extension of time3 77 or allow for "phase-in's" of a new
system, 378 but literally forced the Legislature to enact a new state-wide tax
funding scheme to avoid a shut-down of the schools, or a constitutional
crisis. 37 9 Thereafter, going into 2008, the Court looked to the other branches,
with much forbearance, to carry out standards-based education reforms. It
sought to have "adequacy" in education sufficiently defined, the cost of it
determined, the proper funding of it achieved, and its delivery ensured
through good assessment and accountability mechanisms. 3 80
In both Massachusetts and Vermont, the courts experienced less
resistance from the other branches, and in both states substantial education
reforms were promptly enacted and implemented. 381 And when confronted
several years after McDuffy with further litigation presenting compelling
376 See e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997);
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont XI), 794 A.2d 744 (N.H. 2002); Londonderry
Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State (ClaremontXII), 907 A.2d 988 (N.H. 2006).
377 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont V), 725 A.2d 648, 648 (N.H. 1998).
378 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont VI1), 744 A.2d 1107, 1108-09 (N.H.
1999).
379 See Dunphy, supra note 31, at 25-28 (discussing the "scramble for a school funding
solution" that occurred at the last minute). The funding scheme the Legislature enacted, H.B.
117, called for $825 million for public schools in fiscal year 2000, constituting over 60% of
expenses, with more than one-half of these monies to be raised through a statewide education
property tax. The new tax was to be levied at a uniform rate of $6.60 per thousand. If a
district could cover its education costs with less than what was raised by the tax, the excess
was to go to the State to assist other more property-poor districts. This spawned a "donor-
donee" controversy. See Sirrell v. State (Claremont X), 780 A.2d 494 (N.H. 2001).
Moreover, the funding level the legislation established, though tied to a calculus of what
"adequacy" should cost, was seen by some as insufficient, resulting in an asserted shortfall of
many millions. Dunphy, supra note 31, at 28.
380 See Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State (ClaremontXI), 907 A.2d 988, 989 (N.H.
2006); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (ClaremontXI), 794 A.2d 744 (N.H. 2002).
381 In Massachusetts, the Legislature enacted the Education Reform Act of 1993, G.L. ch. 69-c
71, which, was described later by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the following
glowing terms: "[t]he act ... radically restructured the funding of public education across the
Commonwealth based on uniform criteria of need, and dramatically establish[ing], for the first
time, ... uniform, objective performance and accountability measures for every public school
student, teacher, administrator, school, and district in Massachusetts." See Hancock v.
Comm'r of Ed., 822 N.E. 2d 1134, 1138 (Mass. 2005). In Vermont, as Rebell notes, "within
months of the court's decision [in Brigham] the legislature enacted a dramatic set of sweeping
education finance reforms [Act 60, the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1997]." See
REBELL, supra note 54, at 28.
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evidence that constitutional compliance had still not been achieved for
students in low income, minority-populated school districts, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in the face of what a plurality of the
Court deemed the State's good faith actions in seeking to realize far-reaching
reforms, opted to terminate the litigation.382
In some other states, courts which have found constitutional education
deficiencies have met with a good deal more resistance. Much litigation has
occurred; some courts have backed off, 38 3 but others have resolutely
persevered to seek to achieve education reform.384 These latter courts have
382 See Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 1134, 1139-40; see also Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 784-85, 789-90 (Tex. 2005) (applying a deferential
"standard of arbitrariness" in concluding that the lower court had erred in ruling that the
State's structuring and funding of education was not meeting constitutional adequacy
requirements).
383 In Ohio, for example, " [iun 2002 the [Ohio Supreme Court] terminated its jurisdiction after
a new judge who was critical of the court's [earlier] adequacy ruling replaced a member of the
majority who had voted for the education finance reforms." See REBELL, supra note 54, at 146
n.8; see also State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 202-03 (Ohio 2003); DeRolph v. State, 780
N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ohio 2002). "In Alabama, after a change in its membership following an
election, the [Alabama Supreme Court] sua sponte reopened Alabama Coalition for Equity v.
Spiegelman, 713 So.2d 937 (Ala. 1997), a case it had decided for the plaintiffs in 1993, and
after soliciting arguments from the two sides, dismissed the case, citing separation of power
and justiciability concerns." REBELL, supra note 54, at 146 n.8. In Nebraska, the state
Supreme Court, in declining to find the case before it to be justiciable, commented at some
length on the extended litigations in other states and wrote: "The landscape is littered with
courts that have been bogged down in the legal quicksand of continuous litigation and
challenges to their states' school funding systems. Unlike those courts, we refuse to wade into
that Stygian swamp." Nebraska Coal. for Educ. Eq. and Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d
164, 182-83 (Neb. 2007).
384 For example, on March 7, 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court, in another of its education
decisions issued over several years, affirmed a lower court ruling that the State had failed to
meet education "equity" constitutional requirements in enacting and implementing certain
funding legislation, and remanded with instructions to the lower court to take enforcement
actions which could include the alteration or blocking of the pertinent funding legislation. See
Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1251-52 (Kan. 2014). The Gannon Court also remanded the
issue of "adequacy" for further review. Id. at 1252. This was not the first time the Kansas
Supreme Court had determined to take on the Legislature over education. See e.g., Montoy v.
State (M'ontoy IV), 138 P.3d 755 (Kan. 2006) (dismissing litigation concluding that the State
had substantially complied with the Court's remediation directives).
On September 11, 2014, the Washington State Supreme Court, after hearing, and as part of its
dealings with public education over time, held the State in contempt for failing to honor an
order to submit by a date certain in April 2014 "a complete plan for fully implementing its
program of basic education for each school year between now and the 2017-18 school year,"
to include "a phase-in schedule for fully funding each of the components of basic education."
McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7, 2014 Wash. LEXIS 898, at *1, *7 (Wash. Sept. 11, 2014).
The Washington Court called the contempt proceeding "the culmination of a long series of
events, not merely the result of a single violation." Id. at *5. In response to the State's
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generally approached their duties reluctantly, seeking the cooperation of the
other branches. "What is significant in these situations . . . is that, when the
courts in these states stood firm and insisted on constitutional compliance,
ultimately they have prevailed."385
It is true that a number of courts have recently manifested increased
discomfort particularly in dealing with what have been termed "second
generation" cases-that is, cases where the legislature has taken action,
usually court-compelled, to make education reforms, and the issue is whether
it has done enough, with funding often a focus.38 6 Indeed, as earlier stated,
some courts, such as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, have in
those circumstances essentially deferred to the legislature, only insisting
upon a showing of good faith, and are not willing to intervene in the absence
11387
of arbitrary legislative inaction or the "breakdown of the political process.
"suggestion" that the Court "may be approaching its constitutional bounds and entering into
political and policy matters reserved to the legislature," the Court stated it had no "wish to
dictate the means by which the legislature carries out its constitutional responsibility or
otherwise directly involve itself in the choices and trade-offs that are uniquely within the
legislature's province . . . [but it ] has fulfilled its constitutional role to determine whether the
State is violating constitutional commands and having held that it has . . . issued orders within
its authority directing the State to remedy its violation, deferring to the legislature to determine
the details." Id. at *4. The Court did not, however, impose immediate sanctions or other
remedies, but allowed the State the opportunity to purge the contempt during the 2015
legislative session. Id. at *6. By Order dated August 13, 2015, however, and with the State's
continued failure, even after special legislative sessions, to enact an acceptable compliance
plan, the Court imposed a "remedial penalty" of $100,000.00 per day, with the proviso that
"[s]hould the legislature hold a special session and during that session fully comply with the
court's order, the court will vacate any penalties accruing during that session." McCleary v.
State, No. 84362-7, at *9-10 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015). The Court observed that this action was
"less intrusive than any other available options, including directing the means the State must
use to come into compliance." Id. at *9.
385 REBELL, supra note 54, at 90-91. In New Jersey, the state Supreme Court has acted with
particular force, and with controversy, to impact on education financing and delivery.
Extended litigation has occurred (and continues) with a good deal of back and forth with the
Legislature. See, in particular, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions and orders in the
lines of cases from Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) and from Abbott v. Burke,
495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1978). Rebell observes, referencing Abbott v. Burke XIX, 960 A.2d 360,
363 (N.J. 2008), and Abbott v. Burke XV, 971 A.2d 989 (N.J. 2009): "The New Jersey
Supreme Court recently denominated its long remedial efforts as a 'success' in that 'children
in . .. Abbott districts .. . show measurable educational improvement."' REBELL, supra note
54, at 145 n.6. See also id. at 39-41 (discussing the Arkansas Supreme Court's decisions in
the Lake View Sch. District No. 25 v. Huckabee litigation, from 2002 through 2007, involving
use of special masters, and comprehensive review of education reform initiatives, with the
Court coming to highlight "a need for 'constant vigilance to ensure the constitutional goal is
met."' Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 257 S.W. 3d 879, 883(Ark. 2007)).
386 See Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 369, at 88-89.
387 Id. at 100-01.
CLAREMONT I AND H
It is also true that courts are legitimately loathe to fashion remedies that
involve compelling Legislatures to appropriate money particularly when
more money by itself may not be solely the answer.388 Yet, is such a degree
of deference, or arguable abdication of responsibility, appropriate in the face
of continued non-compliance with constitutional requirements?
The difficult challenge for the courts, whether the particular "adequacy"
litigation concerns the putting in place of education "adequacy" standards, or
assuring appropriate funding, or performing oversight of education
programming and accountability/assessment mechanisms, or carrying out
combinations of these, is to assure that the states are offering the requisite
education opportunity to all public education students, while not becoming
unduly enmeshed in education policy-making.
Again, it is certainly necessary for the courts in New Hampshire and
elsewhere to proceed in a manner consistent with separation of powers
principles. Education policy in New Hampshire and elsewhere is very much
vested in the other branches of government, particularly the Legislature, and
the courts should not be "social engineers," as Justice Horton expressed in
his dissent in Claremont HI. Yet, when it comes to public education in New
Hampshire, we are dealing with a mandatory positive duty (with
corresponding rights) enshrined in our Constitution for the purpose of
preserving the essence of our culture.
2. Claremont H
a. The Defensibility of the Tax Ruling
Did the Supreme Court rule correctly in Claremont H1 when it deemed the
funding of public education largely through local property taxes to be
violative of Article 5? The decision fails satisfactorily to explain why it was
not permissible for the State to delegate substantial funding responsibilities
to localities to meet their local educational needs, while remaining possessed
of the ultimate duty to assure that the funding mix, with reasonable taxation,
resulted in the provision of "adequate" support for all students.
388 See generally id. at 99. Simon-Kerr and Sturm suggest that to counter "mounting
resistance and fueled separation of powers fears," adequacy litigation strategists should
consider advocating for "nonmonetary remedies," such as early childhood programs, to obtain
court buy-in. Id. at 121. They raise as "one of the boldest proposals" seeking "a socio-
economically integrated education" as a remedy, referencing James E. Ryan, Schools, Race
and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 307 (1999-2000) and Adams, supra note 54. Simon-Kerr &
Sturm, supra note 369, at 121-22.
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The majority's tax ruling in Claremont II rested almost entirely on the
holding in Claremont I that the provision of a constitutionally adequate
education to all public school students was a State duty.389  It ignored that
Claremont I deemed the State's funding duty to be that of a "guarantor," not
that of the initial provider, a distinction without which Claremont I would not
have been a unanimous decision;390 and it did not squarely deal with Justice
Horton's dissenting views in regard to delegation.
The pre-Claremont New Hampshire precedent concerning the local
school tax provides scant support for the majority's position.3 9 1 Though the
Supreme Court had not before actually determined the character of the tax, it
had indicated in a number of decisions the view that it was of a "local"
nature .392
The funding scheme the Legislature had put in place certainly
contemplated that the localities would be the "principal source of revenue for
public schools, providing on average between seventy-four to eighty-nine
percent of total school revenue," with the State playing a much smaller back-
up role.393 The system reflected a strong ethos that schools should be very
much subject to "local control," both as to education delivery and funding.
389 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (ClaremontII), 703 A.2d 1353, 1356 (N.H. 1997).
390 See supra note 99.
391 See ClaremontII, 703 A.2d at 1356. The majority particularly cited Opinion ofthe Justices,
4 N.H. 565, 571 (1829), for the proposition that "[t]he taxes imposed by the legislature for the
support of schools . . . are, in their nature, state taxes." This opinion, however, referenced the
pre-1919 tax regime, which imposed a definite form of statewide tax, see discussion supra at
note 26, not a system in which local property taxes with varying rates were predominantly
featured. The majority also cited language from the Opinion of the Justices, 149 A. 321, 325
(N.H. 1930), saying that, with the 1829 Opinion of the Justices decision in mind, the
consequence is that "'[t]here is abundant justification in fact for taking this property out of the
class taxed locally, and taxing it at the average rate throughout the state."' Claremont II, 703
A.2d at 1356. The cited 1930 tax opinion language, however, concerned a proposed tax on the
property of public utilities. It was offered in the context of the Court deeming the proposed
tax to be a state one, where it was levied at the average state rate and collected by the state,
though the revenues were later to be differentially distributed to localities using local rates and
then used for local purposes. None of this easily relates to an evaluation of the character of
the school tax, and it certainly does not easily follow that the Claremont II decision reflected
"a reiteration of principles articulated in [these] two earlier cases." Laurie Reynolds,
Uniformity of Taxation and the Preservation of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1835, 1848 n.39 (2007).
392 See, e.g., Op. of the Justices, 287 A.2d 756, 758 (N.H. 1972); Gilsum v. Monadnock Sch.
Dist., 202 A.2d 790, 792-93 (N.H. 1964); Monadnock Sch. Dist. v. Fitzwilliam, 203 A.2d 46,
52 (N.H. 1964); Holt v. Antrim, 9 A. 389, 389-90 (N.H. 1886).
393 Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1354; see id at 1354-55 (discussing how the funding system
operated); see also Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch.
Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), No. 91-E-306-B at 91-92, 136-40 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6,
1996).
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The local property tax raised funds to be expended locally for the fulfillment
of local education.
Justice Horton underscored in his dissent the undeniable reality that in
New Hampshire "[t]he State delegates many of its constitutional duties to its
political subdivisions and provides for taxation to support satisfaction of the
delegated duties at the local level."3 94 He explained that while "[t]he State is
the seminal unit for all aspects of government . . . [t]he State has the power to
delegate these functions of government,"3 95 and this delegation may occur
with regard to a wide spectrum of duties, both specific and general, to
include "fire and police protection."3 96  He criticized the majority for
"equating 'duty' with 'purpose' in undertaking its analysis, ignoring the fact
that governmental duty can be delegated to its subdivisions." 39 7 He saw "the
purpose in education taxation . . . [to be] a local purpose, the education of
children in the school district." 398 He concluded by determining that the
financing system reflected a proper delegation of the education
responsibility, and that the tax had not been shown to be unreasonable in its
application within the petitioner districts.3 99
If a good part of the State's duty to keep us safe through police
protection may properly be delegated to the localities, along with funding
responsibility, why is it not also the case that a good part of the State's duties
respecting education, including funding, may properly be delegated to the
localities, with the local funding through local taxation then fulfilling a local
educational purpose? The majority simply does not answer this question. To
be sure, it does highlight education's importance to our continued well-being,
and the elevated constitutional nature of the State duty,400 but it avoids the
question of delegation. This constitutes a serious flaw in the decision.
The petitioners also argued that the school tax must, as a factual matter,
be deemed a state one because of the State's involvement in its
implementation, and because the local school districts lacked real budgetary
discretion due to the need to satisfy the State's minimum education
394 Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1363 (Horton, J., dissenting) (citing Wooster v. Plymouth, 62
N.H. 193 (1882)).




398 Id at 1362-63 (citing Holt v. Antrim, 9 A. 389, 389 (N.H. 1886)) ("Local education is a
local purpose for which legislative power may be delegated to towns.").
399 Id. at 1363.
400 Id. at 1356, 1358 (majority opinion).
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standards. 0 ' Judge Manias plainly did not share the petitioners' view as to
the significance of the State's involvement with the local property tax. His
analysis of the school tax issue, which included his examination of how it
actually worked, concluded that the tax was very much of a local character
and operated to foster real local control.402  He importantly found that the
school districts retained sufficient discretion in controlling their budgets.403
The Supreme Court majority, however, hardly took up these factual matters
on appellate review. Its focus was on what it deemed the clear purpose of the
school tax, described "to be overwhelmingly a State purpose and dispositive
of the issue of the character of the tax."4 0 4
Though the majority highlighted what it saw as the "unreasonableness"
of the widely disparate tax rates,4 0 5 it never actually discussed or squarely
dealt with Judge Manias's findings, whether right or wrong, to the effect that
though the tax rates widely differed, the petitioners had not established that
the actual tax burdens on the residents of the petitioner districts were
unreasonable compared to those of the residents in property-rich districts. 406
The majority also did not discuss or squarely deal with Judge Manias's
401 See Laconia Bd. of Educ. v. Laconia, 285 A.2d 793, 795 (N.H. 1971); Franklin v. Hinds,
143 A.2d 111, 112 (N.H. 1958) (stating that a city must appropriate for schools an amount
necessary to meet established state minimum standards).
402 Memorandum Decision and Judgment (Alanias Opinion), Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremontl), No. 91-E-306-B at 136-41 (N.H. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
403 Id. at 137 (finding that "the existence of the minimum standards does not demonstrate that
the petitioner school districts do not control their own budgets").
404 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremontll), 703 A.2d 1353, 1356 (N.H. 1997).
405 Id. at 1357.
406 Alanias Opinion, at 107-08. For a study that offers defenses to the use of property taxes
for education funding and seeks "to correct misconceptions regarding school funding and
property taxes," including the notion that "[p]roperty tax rates are a reasonable measure of
property tax burden," see Daphne A. Kenyon, The Property Tax-School Funding Dilemma,
Public Focus Report, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY (2007),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1308_Kenyon%20PFR%20Final.pdf. Yet, reliance on
local property taxes to fund education has been seen by many as problematic. Such a funding
approach prompted less concern in the nineteenth century when "many school funding
systems were created . . . to finance schools in predominantly rural communities . . . [and
where] population and property wealth were distributed more evenly." See Reynolds, supra
note 391, at 1840 n.12. This is not the case today, however, given the large and disturbing
"socioeconomic segregation of the populace." Id. at 1840. In this regard, it is worth noting
that the Washington Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that it does not deem local
property taxes as an appropriate funding mechanism in its state for education as it is "neither
dependable nor regular," that is, "subject to the whim of the electorate," and it is also "too
variable insofar as . . . [they] depend on the assessed valuation of taxable real property at the
local level." See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 252 (Wash. 2012).
CLAREMONT IANDII
findings that the aid the State provided made up a good portion of the
budgets of the petitioner districts. 4 0 7
In short, the majority's large avoidance of discussion of Judge Manias's
findings, combined with its failure to tackle the delegation position of Justice
Horton, left it open to the charge that it not only erred in its tax ruling but
was pursuing "social engineering." 408
b. The Defensibility of its Major Education Pronouncements
Although praising Judge Manias for his "detailed and thoughtful
opinion," 4 09 and going on to state that it would "not reach the petitioners'
other claims," 10 the Claremont II majority nonetheless proceeded to make a
number of major pronouncements, identified and discussed supra Part J.4.b.,
going to these other claims. In so doing, the majority was plainly seeking to
insist that the dictates of its Claremont I decision be honored and that the
other two branches proceed to fashion a better "standards-based" education
system attuned to the evolving "adequacy" needs of New Hampshire school
children. It claimed it understood that it was "not appointed to establish
education policy."4 1 1 Whatever one may think of these pronouncements, 412
407 Alanias Opinion, at 111.
408 It does not appear that any other state Supreme Court has sustained such a tax "uniformity"
challenge. See Reynolds supra note 391,, at 1847, 1847 n.37.
409 Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1354.
410 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (ClaremontII), 703 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.H. 1997).
411 Id. at 1360.
412 As to an "adequacy" definition, it is worth noting that the Rose aspirational guidelines for
education "adequacy" have been accepted by many courts. See Gannon v. Kansas, 319 P.3d
1196, 1227 (Kan. 2014). As to whether education constitutes an enforceable state
constitutional "fundamental right," see Doe v. Superintendent of Schools of Worcester, 653
N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass. 1995) (stating that "McDuffy should not be construed as holding
that the Massachusetts Constitution guarantees each individual student the fundamental right
to an education"). Yet, in New Hampshire, Claremont II announced, though in dicta, a
fundamental right to "a state funded constitutionally adequate education." 703 A.2d at 1359.
Further, this right was declared to be "not based on the exclusive needs of a particular
individual, but . . . a right held by the public to enforce the State's duty," and any citizen
would be entitled to obtain court relief "when an individual school or school district offers
something less than educational adequacy"-with "the governmental action or lack of action
that is the root cause of the disparity . . . examined by a standard of strict judicial scrutiny."
Id.; see also Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont 1), 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H.
1993) (stating that "[a]ny citizen has standing"). This "citizens" view of standing does not,
however, enjoy the support of recent cases. See Duncan v. New Hampshire, 102 A.3d 913,
924-25 (N.H. 2014) (amending the State's declaratory judgment statute allowing for taxpayer
actions without a showing of particularized injury declared unconstitutional; Part II, Article 74
of the State Constitution requires private parties to claim concrete personal injury to bring
suit); see also Baer v. N.H. Dep't of Educ., 8 A.3d 48, 52 (N.H. 2010) (stating that
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they would have been better made in the context of subjecting Judge
Manias's rulings to proper appellate review.
Unquestionably, the majority had serious problems with Judge Manias's
education-centered (other than Article 5) rulings. It disapproved of the
definition Judge Manias had used to evaluate adequacy; 4 13 it spoke against
his findings that the petitioner districts had adequate funding to deliver
adequate education;4 14 and it determined that Judge Manias had used the
wrong standard in regard to the petitioners' Equal Protection Count when it
declared education to be a fundamental right, not something less. 1  It is also
true that Judge Manias's determination to not hold the State responsible for
any inadequacy stemming from local district failings was open to
challenge. 1 6  Yet, by acting as it did, giving short shrift to Judge Manias's
detailed findings and legal conclusions and not squarely confronting them,
the majority again opened itself up to the charge of inappropriate "social
engineering."
As it turned out, in 2002 Claremont XI explicitly identified four essential
mandates to be derived from Claremont I and II: "define an adequate
education, determine the cost, fund it with constitutional taxes, and ensure its
delivery through accountability."417  These mandates were then used by the
Court in that decision, and later as well in Claremont XII, to review the
State's compliance with its constitutional education obligations.
Nonetheless, although the core holding of Claremont II was an important tax
decision, the Court's failure to address properly Judge Manias's non-tax
rulings is troublesome.
"Claremont did not create an exception to the statutory requirements of RSA 491:22 [the
declaratory judgment statute] . . . . The petitioners must still allege a present legal or equitable
right"). See generally Cochran, supra note 54 (discussing the challenges and hurdles that such
education suits would, in any event, face).
413 Claremont II, 703 A.2d at 1357.
414 Id. at 1357.
415 Id. at 1358-59.
416 For example, when faced with the argument that "[New York City] Board of Education
mismanagement" could serve to shield the State from education responsibility for New York
City schools, the New York Court of Appeals in Camp. for Fiscal Eq., Inc. v. New York, 801
N.E.2d 326, 343 (N.Y. 2003) (quotations and citations omitted), held: "[T]he Board of
Education and the City are 'creatures or agents of the State,' which delegated whatever
authority over education they wield. Thus, the State remains responsible when the failures of
its agents sabotage the measures by which it secures for its citizens their constitutionally
mandated rights."
417 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (ClaremontX1), 794 A.2d 744, 749 (N.H. 2002).
418 See id.; Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State (ClaremontXII), 907 A.2d 988, 990
(N.H. 2006); see also Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State (Claremont XIll), 958 A2d
930, 933 (N.H. 2008) (Broderick, C.J., dissenting) (stating that in Claremont II the Court
"made it clear that the State was responsible to [carry out the four mandates]").
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c. Its Other Difficulties
Without undertaking a detailed review of the less than warm reception
Claremont I received in some quarters in the State, suffice it to say that this
decision, more than Claremont I, roiled the New Hampshire political waters.
It was not easily accepted by the Governor and by many in the Legislature; it
inspired a multitude of proposed constitutional amendments; 4 19 it caused
difficult relations between the Governor and the Legislature; and it prompted
strong criticism of the Court. 420
Some saw Claremont II as judicial activism at its worst, the imposition
on the State of a centralized system of education to be financed by broad-
based taxes (perhaps an income tax) and run by non-elected judges-a
system much at variance with New Hampshire's tradition of local control,
local financing, and limited taxation, and slated to fail. 421 The decision
419 See Eugene Van Loan, Claremont Redux, 53 N.H.B.J. 38 (2013) ("In every session of the
legislature since Claremont II was decided in 1997, numerous constitutional amendments
dealing with educational funding have been proposed to the Legislature-but not a single one
has made it out of the Legislature to be put to the voters."); see also Molly A.K. Connors,
Lawmakers Likely to Make Another Run at Constitutional Funding Amendment, CONCORD
MONITOR, Nov. 24, 2012, http://concordmonitor.com/home/2973415-95/amendment-
education-funding-lawmakers?print=true ("The House has tried about 80 times to pass a
school funding amendment.").
420 E.g., Senator Judd Gregg stating right after the issuance of Claremont II "for a court to
usurp the legislative prerogative is to flirt with the threat of despotism that led to the Boston
Tea Party and a call for independence that began our nation." Judd Gregg, Supreme Court
Ruling Arrogant, Absurd', UNION LEADER, Dec. 19, 1997 at A18; Richard Lessner, NH
Can No Longer "Live Free or Die" If Ruled by Black-Robed Monarchs, UNION LEADER,
Dec. 19, 1997 at C1 ("Americans-Granite Staters-you no longer live in a free country.
You are ruled by monarchs in black robes, arrogant Hapsburgs elected by no one and
answerable to no one.").
421 E.g., Mosca, NH's Claremont Case, supra note 17, at 418 ("[T]he New Hampshire
Supreme Court's interpretation of Article 83 has made the provision of a homogeneous public
education through a centralized command-and-control system, which has the Supreme Court
at its helm, the constitutional law of New Hampshire."). Some have argued that Claremont-
type suits, along with many other well-meaning education reform initiatives, have resulted to
date in little more than throwing large sums of money at a very difficult challenge-the
improvement of student performance-with little discernible return on the investment. A
leading proponent in this camp, Eric Hanusek, of the Hoover Institute of Stanford University,
indeed testified along those lines as an expert witness for the State in the trial before Judge
Manias. See Transcript of Record Vol. 31 at 70-202, Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor
(Claremont II), 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997). Yet there now seems to be general agreement,
Hanusek included, "that 'money matters' [in achieving better education], so long as it is spent
efficiently on the appropriate resources." William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses, 109
MICH. L. REv. 923, 927 (2010). There is no agreement, however, on the appropriateness and
effectiveness of judicial intervention in the education fray. See generally id at 930-38. But
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constituted a direct challenge to the Legislature's control of taxes and
funding, something no legislature likes.
Claremont II also imposed significant restrictions upon the fashioning of
an appropriate funding mechanism. It mandated that only "state" taxes could
be utilized to fund constitutionally adequate education, and "[t]o the extent
that the property tax is used in the future . . . the tax must be administered in
a manner that is equal in valuation and uniform in rate throughout the
State."422
Thus, while it did not require the use of "a uniform expenditure per pupil
throughout the State . . . [recognizing that] the cost of a constitutionally
adequate education may not be the same in each school district,"423
Claremont I did not allow local property taxes, as such, with any degree of
varying rates, to be part of the funding mix to pay for the required education.
Local property taxes, for example, had been utilized in the "phased-in"
funding mix established in 1993 in Massachusetts to effect major education
reform there, though in a way that operated to limit a locality's contribution
with consideration accorded to its tax base.424
Claremont II was deemed to not permit the "ABC" program which
Governor Shaheen had quickly developed after Claremont II, where, along
with the enactment of a standards-based definition for "adequacy" and
accountability reforms, a state-wide property tax to fund adequate education
was to be put in place, qualified, however, by "special" abatements for
taxpayers in property-rich districts so that they would not need to directly
see Bruce D. Baker, Evaluating the Recession's Impact on State Financing Systems, 22 EDUC.
POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, no. 91, at 3 ("There exists an increasing body of evidence that
substantive and sustained school financing reforms [certainly prompted in part by the courts]
matter for improving both the level of and distribution of short term and long term student
outcomes.").
422 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (ClaremontII), 703 A.2d 1353, 1357 (N.H. 1997).
423 Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing System) (Claremont IX), 765
A.2d 673, 677 (N.H. 2000) (reiterating "core holdings from earlier Claremont decisions").
424 See Hancock v. Comm'r Educ., 822 N.E. 2d 1134, 1142 (Mass. 2005) (explaining the
utilized funding scheme, "phased in over seven years," as follows: "The act [the 1993
Education Reform Act] guarantees that each public school district receive its foundation
budget through a combination of Commonwealth and local funds. Where, before 1993, the
Legislature ceded to municipalities virtually unlimited control over school budgets, the act
now requires municipalities to provide a standardized contribution to education. A
municipality's required contribution to its foundation budget depends in large part on its
equalized property valuation. The Commonwealth provides the difference between
municipalities' mandatory funding obligations and their respective foundation budget
amounts. In practice, districts in wealthier communities with high property valuations receive
most of their funding from local property tax receipts, while districts serving communities
with less valuable property receive most of their funding from the Commonwealth.").
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finance property-poor districts.425 The decision was also deemed to not allow
"phase-in's" to a new state-wide property tax system, 426 or a financing
approach which utilized local taxes to some degree and was, to some degree,
focused on targeted aid.427
This tax stance, seen by some as an affront to legislative constitutional
prerogatives, and subversive of "local control," resulted in much acrimonious
litigation over tax schemes, and efforts to amend the Constitution. It
compelled the State to take on the full burden to fund "adequacy" even for
districts or areas which were wealthy and/or less in need of assistance.
While the Legislature finally enacted a state-wide property tax in 1999 with
no abatements and no "phase-in's" to avoid a school shut-down, it did so
only after the expiration of the deadline the Court had set, and with much
difficulty. It may have been an easier task to gain the cooperation of the two
other branches in the realization of "adequacy" education reform if the tax
debate produced by Claremont I had not been so divisive.
To be sure, in the face of later moves by the Legislature and Governor in
the mid-2000s to depart from the state-wide property tax, go to a more
"targeted" system, and eliminate "donor" and "donee" districts, 42 8 the
Justices, with some change in membership,42 9 and disagreement among
themselves, avoided paralyzing constitutional confrontations with the other
branches over Claremont requirements through 2008. Yet, at the same time,
and continuing through their Londonderry decision of 2006, the Justices
pushed the other branches-indeed threatened a variety of remedies-to
obtain further reforms, including those pertaining to funding.430
425 Opinion of the Justices (School Financing) (Claremont IV), 712 A.2d 1080, 1085 (N.H.
1998) (discussing "ABC" program).
426 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont VII), 744 A.2d 1107, 1112-13 (N.H. 1999).
427 Claremont X, 765 A.2d at 677; see also H.B. 616, 2005 Sess. (N.H. 2005) (enacted)
(amending N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76:3 and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§198:38-49 which
involved, in part, targeted aid and spawned a good deal of controversy and litigation). For
detailed discussions of HB 616, see Londonderry School District SAU # 12 v. New Hampshire
(Claremont XIV), No. 05-E-0406, 2006 WL 563120 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2006), and City
of Nashua v. New Hampshire, No. 05-E-0257, 2006 WL 563314 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 8,
2006).
428 See generally H.B. 616, 2005 Sess. (N.H. 2005) (enacted).
429 Justice Hicks, who wrote the majority opinions in Claremont XII in 2006 and Claremont
XIII in 2008, ascended to the Supreme Court in 2004, appointed by democratic Governor John
Lynch. Thus, he was not on the Court when it decided either Claremont I or Claremont II.
Other new Justices who handled Claremont XII and Claremont XII were Justices Linda S.
Dalianis, James E. Duggan, and Richard E. Galway. Justices Dalianis and Duggan were
appointed by Democratic Governor Shaheen, and Justice Galway by Republican Governor
Benson.
430 In 2006, in litigation challenging HB 616, see discussion supra note 428, the Court
affirmed the trial court's finding that the State had "failed to define a constitutionally adequate
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At present, the Court is not dealing with any Claremont-related litigation.
Yet, and partly due to this litigation, many changes in education have
occurred.
III. WHERE WE ARE WITH THE CLAREMONT MANDATES
The State has acted to meet each of the core Claremont mandates but
with delay and lingering questions as to whether full compliance has been
achieved. It has moved to define an "adequate" education, to ensure its
delivery through assessments and accountability mechanisms, to determine
its cost, and to fund it with constitutional taxes.43 '
1. Definition
Though not accomplished until 2007, the Legislature now has in place a
definition of the opportunity to acquire an adequate education that is not
limited to general aspirations, but is tied to much more specific standards and
explanations. The pertinent statute 4 32 not only contains the broad criteria for
an "adequate" education derived from the Kentucky Supreme Court's Rose
education." Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State (ClaremontXII), 907 A.2d 988, 989
(N.H. 2006). A majority (Justices Hicks, Chief Justice Broderick and Justice Dalianis) opted
to retain jurisdiction to allow the elected branches until the end of fiscal year 2007 to fashion
"with specificity the components of a constitutionally adequate education." Id. at 995. The
majority "urge [d] the legislature to act," warning that if it did not timely do so the Court would
"then be required to take further action to enforce the mandates of ... Article 83." Id. at 995-
96. Justice Duggan would have approached the case differently and would have remanded the
case immediately to the Superior Court for trial particularly on education funding issues. Id.
at 996 (Duggan, J., concurring). Justice Galway, would have affirmed the trial court's ruling
that HB 616, with its funding mechanism, was unconstitutional on its face, and he would not
have further retained the case. Id. at 998 (Galway, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). As it was, no further court action proved necessary, at least in the eyes of three of the
Justices (Justices Hicks, Dalianis and Galway). This majority of Justices declared the case
moot in 2008, over the dissents of the other two Justices (Chief Justice Broderick and Justice
Duggan), after the Legislature had enacted certain reforms, to include a more developed and
detailed "adequacy" definition and approaches "to determine the cost of and [to] fund a
constitutionally adequate education." See Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State
(Claremont XIll), 958 A.2d 930, 931, 933 (N.H. 2008). The Court's majority manifested a
definite reluctance to continue court action in the face of the steps the Legislature had taken to
move forward to fulfill the Claremont mandates.
431 We do not here discuss the State's use and funding of chartered public schools, see N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 194-B (2014), or Open Enrollment Schools, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
194-D (2014). We focus on the essentials associated with regular public schools.
432 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-E (2014).
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case; 433 it also explicitly establishes, as "Substantive Educational Content of
an Adequate Education," that schools meet specific school approval
standards established by regulation4 34 in a wide range of learning areas.
These school approval standards, moreover, must "clearly set forth the
opportunities to acquire the communication, analytical and research skills
and competencies, as well as the substantive knowledge expected to be
possessed by students at the various grade levels, including the credit
requirement necessary to earn a high school diploma"; must be reviewed,
revised and updated, as necessary by the Legislature at least every ten years
to "ensure that the high quality of the standards is maintained"; and must be
accompanied by good "curriculum frameworks for each area of
education. ,436
In July 2010, the State Board of Education moved to enhance the quality
and rigor of its standards by adopting the Common Core State Standards in
regard to mathematics and English language arts/literacy skills. 43 7  The
Federal Department of Education, in its dealings with the State concerning
NCLB, has recognized that the State has acceptable "college and career-
ready expectations for all students."438
2. Accountability/Assessment
a. Accountability Mechanisms
The federal NCLB law has very much impacted the State's
accountability and assessment initiatives for student achievement. Enacted
in early 2002,439 NCLB imposed some daunting challenges: it generally
433 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-E:2 (2014).
434 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-E:2-a, VI (2014).
435 That is, in English/language arts and reading, mathematics, science, social studies, arts
education, world languages, health education, and physical education. The State's
comprehensive Minimum Standards regulations are very much focused on students achieving
defined "competencies" in regard to multiple content areas, with promotions from grade to
grade dependent on such achievement. See, e.g., N.H. CODER. ED. § 306.141 (2015).
436 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-E:2-a, IV-V (2014).
437 See supra note 360.
438 See U.S. Dep't Ed., Opinion Letter on N.H. Request for Waiver from ESEA Requirements
(June 26, 2013) [hereinafter Duncan Waiver Letter],
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/eseaflex/secretary-letters/nh.html ("New Hampshire has . . .
demonstrated that it has college-and career-ready expectations for all students."); infra Part III,
2.A.
439 Congress is in the process of seeking to overhaul NCLB. This has not yet occurred as of
the cutoff date for this article, August 15, 2015. For further discussion of this proposed
overhaul. See infra notes 497-498 and accompanying text.
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required States, per a State Plan, and through a progression of "adequate
yearly progress" ("AYP") toward established "measurable objectives," to
succeed in having all its students meet the State's established "proficiency"
levels of academic achievement by 2014.440 The federal law also required
that the accountability features of the State's Plan allow for the identification
of schools and districts "for improvement" (generally because the school or
district has failed for two consecutive years to make AYP).4 4 1 In addition,
the law provided for effective follow-up, perhaps "corrective action"
strategies, and ultimately, if all else failed, substantial district/school
restructuring, closings, or takeovers of responsibilities. 442
Prior to 2012, the Legislature had enacted significant accountability
statutory requirements. School districts needed to annually report how they
were doing, "at the school and district level" in regard to many education
"indicators." 443 Schools needed to demonstrate that they were providing the
requisite opportunity for an adequate education through satisfaction of either
an input-based accountability approach tied to meeting specific school
approval standards, or via a performance-based approach having student
outcomes on tests as an important feature, along with other measures.4  The
NHDOE was accorded oversight responsibility for accountability, and the
power to deal with struggling districts and schools over time, but not to
actually take over a district or school.
Further, in a chapter entitled "School Performance and
Accountability,"446 and prompted in part by NCLB, the Legislature specified
that:
"[o]n or before the 2013-2014 school year, schools shall
ensure that all pupils are performing at the basic level or
above on the statewide assessment as established in RSA
193-C";447
440 See generally No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U. S.C. § 6311(2015).
441 id
442 See generally id. at § 6316. The specified accountability follow-up progression in this
section of NCLB for identified struggling schools covers only those receiving Title I ESEA
funding. Most New Hampshire schools fit that category.
443 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-E:3, 1 (2014). The NHDOE publishes on its website detailed
information "on the condition of education statewide and on a district-by-district and school-
by-school basis." Id § 193-E:3, III (2014).
444 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-E:3-b to E:3-e (2014).
445 id
446 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-H (prior to September 22, 2013).
447 Id. at H:2. It is noted that this stated goal fails to talk in terms of "proficiency," as required
by NCLB. In recent years, the State's assessment tests, the NECAP tests discussed above,
have not graded students using "basic" as one of the its achievement levels.
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* schools meet statewide performance targets as initially
approved by a Legislative Oversight Committee;4 4" and
* the Commissioner of Education follow through with
annually identified "schools [and districts] that are not
meeting the statewide performance targets," ("designated as
in need of improvement") through implementation of local
improvement plans or corrective action plans-but with no
allowance for an actual takeover of the "daily operations of
any local public school."449
With this statutory framework in place, and acting to meet certain NCLB
requirements, the State, through the NHDOE, established annual
performance targets for student achievement in reading and mathematics,
together with state targets for student testing participation, attendance, and
high school graduation. These all figured in determining annually whether a
school or district was making requisite AYP. Moreover, the NHDOE issued
and publicized annually, beginning in 2003 and going into 2012, AYP
reports which identified struggling districts and schools and provided
information on the corrective steps that were being taken.450
Yet, over time many districts and schools failed to meet AYP in whole or
in part. They were labeled as failing. The numbers of such districts and
schools became alarming.4 5
On April 3, 2012, when the NHDOE released that year's Adequate
Yearly Progress Reports showing that over seventy percent of schools were
failing to meet AYP goals in one or more ways, 452 the Commissioner of
448 id.
449 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-H:3-5 (prior to September 22, 2013).
450 See N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS UPDATES AND RESULTS
http://www.education.nh.gov/instruction/accountability/ayp/index.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2015) [hereinafter AYP REPORTS]. It is clear that full congruence between the state and
federal accountability systems has never been achieved. Indeed, in its ESEA Flexibility
Waiver Request, discussed more fully infra, the NHDOE stated "the federal accountability
system ... does not support either the input-based or proficiency-based components specified
by state law." N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., NEW HAMPSHIRE ESEA FLEXIBILITY WAIVER REQUEST at
20 (June 5, 2013), http://education.nh.gov/accountability-system/documents/flexibility-
waiver-request20 1 3 0 6 0 5 .pdf [hereinafter FLEXIBILITY WAIVER REQUEST].
451 See generally AYP REPORTS, supra note 450.
452 Press Release, N.H. Department of Education (Apr. 3, 2012). It was announced: "One
hundred and twenty-one (26%) schools made AYP in all areas measured and 332 (71%)
schools did not. . . . [T]hirty schools are identified as new SINIs [Schools in Need of
Improvement] .... Of the 161 AYP district reports issued, fifty-two (32%) districts made AYP
and 107 (66%) did not. . . . Sixteen new districts are preliminarily identified as in need of
improvement, increasing the number of [such] districts to 101 (62%)."
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Education, Virginia M. Barry, spoke out strongly against the NCLB means of
accountability. She characterized the disheartening results to be "ample
evidence that the accountability system is broken, not that the vast majority
of schools in New Hampshire are failing." 453  She continued: "In New
Hampshire we need an accountability system that rewards the great schools
and accurately identifies those schools and districts that need our support."4 4
On June 23, 2013, the NHDOE succeeded in obtaining for the State a
two-year NCLB waiver from the federal Department of Education.5 5 This
waiver excused compliance with several NCLB requirements concerning
student performance and school success, to include compliance with the 2014
"proficiency" requirements and the strict continuation of the AYP
456
accountability system. 6 The waiver allowed the State to focus its resources
in ways it considered more attuned to its needs, with better chance of
success. It could concentrate on integrating its assessments and its
accountability mechanisms into the new common core scenario, working
453 id
454 Id. Indeed, in utilizing its alternative "input/performance-based" approaches established in
RSA 193-3-b through RSA 193-E: 3-e, the NHDOE has issued a number of Adequacy
Reports, with the latest one showing that in 2014 all New Hampshire schools were satisfying
at least one of the two approaches and were thus all deemed to be offering the opportunity for
an adequate education. See N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., 2014 ADEQUACY REPORT 8 (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.education.nh.gov/instruction/school improve/documents/adequacy-reportl4.pdf.
However, it obviously should be concerning if a school is deemed to provide the opportunity
for an adequate education through the input approach, but its students, or a good number of
them, are not performing well enough for it to satisfy the performance-based approach. The
2014 Adequacy Report indicates that 48 schools (or over 10%) did not meet the performance-
based standards. Id Among these are a number from the petitioner school districts in the
Claremont litigation: Stevens High School from the Claremont District; the Paul A. Smith
School from the Franklin District; and the Pittsfield Middle School from the Pittsfield District.
See 2013-14 School Profile: Stevens High School, N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://my.doe.nh.gov/profiles/profile.aspx?s=20140&year=2014&tab=accountability (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015); 2013-14 School Profile: Paul A. Smith School, N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://my.doe.nh.gov/profiles/profile.aspx?s=20650&year=2014&tab=accountability (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015); 2013-14 School Profile: Pittsfield Middle School, N.H. DEP'T OF
EDUC., http://my.doe.nh.gov/profiles/profile.aspx?s=26550&year=2014&tab=accountability
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
455 See FLEXIBILITY WAIVER REQUEST, supra note 450. Over forty States have similarly
obtained waivers. On August 6, 2015, the State received a one-year renewal of its waiver.
See Press Release, U.S. Department of Education Approves ESEA Flexibility Renewal for
New Hampshire (Aug. 7, 2015), http://education.nh.gov/news/esea-waiver-renewal.htm; N.H.
DEP'T OF EDUC., NEW HAMPSHIRE ESEA FLEXIBILITY REQUEST FOR RENEWAL SUBMISSION
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://education.nh.gov/accountability-system/documents/flexibility-waiver-
request-renewal.pdf [hereinafter WAIVER RENEWAL REQUEST] (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
456 See FLEXBILITY WAIVER REQUEST, supra note 450, at 8 (setting forth the specifics of the
waiver request that ultimately was obtained).
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with districts in regard to teacher development and evaluation, and being
particularly supportive of certain identified struggling schools.
With this waiver in place, the Legislature enacted amendments to RSA
193-H and 193-C in late 2013. These amendments accorded particular
attention and assistance to "focus" and "priority" schools, defined generally
as low performing schools that receive federal ESEA funds.58 They call for
"local education improvement plans" to remedy "identified problems," in
these particular schools, 459 for the NHDOE to respond to "requests" for
assistance, and for the NHDOE to otherwise provide assistance and
monitoring-though neither it nor the Board of Education may "take control
of the daily operations of any local public school."
The pertinent Waiver documents the NHDOE has submitted reflect a
462
move away from what has been termed a "shaming by naming" system
overly-dependent on standardized testing. The expressed goal is to realize a
system that insists on "ambitious but achievable annual measurable
objectives," 463 uses a "balanced system of assessments ,,464 and enjoys the
availability of a "broad set of supports" to deal with the differential learning
challenges schools and students present. 6 The NHDOE seeks to achieve the
bringing together of all available resources from leveraged, accessible and
multi-layered networks of expertise and assistance, to enable schools and
466
well-qualified, supported teachers to provide a more personalized,
457 See generally id.; see also generally WAIVER RENEWAL REQUEST, supra note 455. The
Waiver Renewal Request, as approved, presents as two major new features: (1) a Performance
for Competency Education (PACE) Pilot program through which four school districts, (with
more to follow), will utilize performance-based assessments in their schools, with a move
away from standardized assessment tests; and (2) the use of the College Board's SAT as the
test assessment at the 11th grade level. FLEXIBILITY WAIVER REQUEST, supra note 450, at 16.
For further discussion of assessments, see infra Part JJJ.2.b. .
458 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-H:3 (2014). In its FLEXIBILITY WAIVER REQUEST, supra note
450, at 69-87, the NHDOE discussed in detail its manner of identifying, the State's "focus"
and "priority" schools, and its strategies and plans to help these schools improve and succeed.
See also WAIVER RENEWAL REQUEST, supra note 455, at 70-87. Of the approximate 230 Title
I schools in New Hampshire, forty are presently so designated. Id at 71-72, 83-84.
459 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-H:4 (2014). The more generalized requirement for "local
improvement plans" for schools considered "in need of improvement," was eliminated by
legislative amendments in 2013.
460 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-H:4, I(b) (2014).
461 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-H:4, II to III (2014).; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-H:5 (2014).
462 See FLEXIBILITY WAIVER REQUEST, supra note 450, at 21.
463 Id. at 22.
464 id
465 id
466 The waiver and the waiver Renewal Request both express the State's commitment to the
use of evidence of student growth as a determinant in the evaluations of teachers "at a weight
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competency-based education experience that succeeds in affording each
student the knowledge, skills and work habits he/she will need to succeed in
the challenges of life.467
The State remains firmly committed to having an efficient, locally-
oriented standards-based education system, focused on the attainment of
competencies, where accountability constitutes an essential feature. It has, in
its latest waiver renewal request, adopted as a major "continued" goal the
reduction of "gap[s] of [proficiency] achievement" for each measured
subgroup of students by "half [in six years] based on assessments
administered."4 68
The above said, the future of the NCLB Waiver approach is presently in
considerable jeopardy. In July 2015, both the United State Senate and the
House of Representatives passed differing overhauls of NCLB. The bills
now are being submitted to a conference committee to resolve differences.469
Any overhaul of NCLB that gets finally enacted and becomes law will
undoubtedly result in the elimination of any compulsion to continue to meet
the dictates of waivers concerned with, and arising from, a replaced law.
of at least twenty percent." FLEXIBILITY WAIVER REQUEST, supra note 450, at 114; WAIVER
RENEWAL REQUEST, supra note 455, at 112; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189:1-a, III
(2008) (stating that school boards need to "adopt a teacher performance evaluation system,
with the involvement of teachers and principals, for use in the school district").
467 See generally FLEXIBILITY WAIVER REQUEST, supra note 450, at 47-98.
468 WAIVER RENEWAL REQUEST, supra note 455, at 22, 62. The NHDOE has not reported
annual measurable objective ("AMO") progress on a statewide basis but, beginning with
2013-14, has offered AMO information for districts and schools. If one focuses just on the
five petitioner districts in the Claremont litigation, the 2013-14 district-wide AMO reports
show each one of these districts broadly falling into status categories ("3" and, at best, "2")
that reflect that no discernible progress has yet been made in realizing the objectives. 2013-14
District Profile: Allenstown, N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://my.doe.nh.gov/profiles/profile.aspx?d=9&year=2014&tab=accountability (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015); 2013-14 District Profile: Claremont, N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://my.doe.nh.gov/profiles/profile.aspx?oid=&s=&d=101&year=2014&tab=accountability
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015); 2013-14 District Profile: Franklin, N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://my.doe.nh.gov/profiles/profile.aspx?d= 185&year=20 14&tab=accountability (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015); 2013-14 District Profile: Lisbon Regional, N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://my.doe.nh.gov/profiles/profile.aspx?d=306&year-2014&tab=accountability (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015); 2013-14 District Profile: Pittsfield, N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
http://my.doe.nh.gov/profiles/profile.aspx?d=43 9&year=20 14&tab=accountability (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015).
469 For a review of how the Senate and the house bills differ, see Alyson Klein, Revising the
No Child Left Behind Act: Issue by Issue, EDUC. WEEK: POLITICS K-12 (July 16, 2015, 4:42
PM),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2015/07/revisingtheno_childleftbeh.html,
and Lauren Camera, Red Flags on the Road to ESEA Rewrite, EDUC. WEEK (Aug. 3, 2015),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/08/05/red-flags-on-the-road-to-esea-rewrite.html.
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Both the Senate and House bills, though to different degrees, would operate
to alter federal law and accord to the States considerably more authority
and/or flexibility in carrying out accountability and other education
initiatives.470
b. Assessment Results
The Statewide Education Improvement and Assessment Program
requires, consistent with NCLB, that student assessment testing be
administered in grades three through eight and in one grade in high school,
and the State has accomplished this in recent years through the New England
Common Assessment Program ("NECAP"), together with Rhode Island,
Vermont, and, in part, Maine.472 In 2015, however, the State transitioned out
of the NECAP assessment rubric to a new testing/assessment program tied to
its new common core state standards-but, to repeat, with a move away from
too much reliance on standardized testing. 47 3
No attempt is here made to present an in-depth review as to how well
New Hampshire's public school system is doing in educating its students. To
be sure, the "Nation's Report Card," developed through the federal National
Assessment of Education Progress ("NAEP") program, reports New
Hampshire students to be performing at or near the top of the country in
mathematics and reading at grades four, eight, and twelve.7 Moreover,
470 Klein, supra note 469.
471 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-C:6 (2014).
472 New England Common Assessment Program (NECAP), NEW HAMPSHIRE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION (2012), http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/necap/index.htm.
473 Indeed, the new PACE pilot program, discussed supra note 457, manifests the NHDOE's
commitment to greater use of more locally managed performance-based assessments
integrated in a student's actual schooling to evaluate whether the student has achieved
requisite competencies and skills. This pilot program has gained the approval of the Federal
Department of Education. See Press Release, Governor Hassan, Department of Education
Announce Federal Approval of New Hampshire's Pilot Competency-Based Assessment
Program First-In-The-Nation Accountability Strategy Offers Reduced Level of Standardized
Testing with Locally Managed Assessments (Mar. 5, 2015),
http://education.nh.gov/news/pace.htm.
474 N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013: GRADE FOUR MATHEMATICS,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/snapshot_gr4_mathl3.pdf (last
visited Nov. 21, 2014); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013: GRADE
FOUR READING,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/snapshot gr4_readingl3.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013: GRADE
EIGHT MATHEMATICS,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/snapshotgr8_mathl3.pdf (last
visited Nov. 21, 2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013: GRADE
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fourth grade and eighth grade NAEP proficiency in both mathematics and
reading showed definite improvement from 2003 to 2013.'" Yet, the NAEP
results also show that in both mathematics and reading, at all the tested grade
levels, large numbers of New Hampshire students have not attained full
proficiency levels.7 For example, while New Hampshire twelfth graders
did well in comparison to the performance of twelfth graders in other states,
less than one-third of them scored at the fully proficient level in mathematics,
and less than one-half of them did so in reading.7 Further, the test results
show that fourth and eighth grade students eligible for free or reduced school
lunch ("FRL students"), an indicator of difficult economic circumstances,
EIGHT READING,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/snapshot_gr8_reading13.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013: GRADE
TWELVE MATHEMATICS,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/snapshot_gr12_mathl3.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013: GRADE
TWELVE READING,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/snapshot_gr12_readingl3.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
475 See N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., GRADE 4 MATHEMATICS RESULTS TREND ANALYSIS,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/mathgr4 trendanalysis20 13 .p
df (last visited Nov. 21, 2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., GRADE 8 MATHEMATICS RESULTS TREND
ANALYSIS,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/mathgr8 trendanalysis20 13 .p
df (last visited Nov. 21, 2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., GRADE 4 READING RESULTS TREND
ANALYSIS,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/readinggr4 trend analysis201
3.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., GRADE 8 READING RESULTS TREND
ANALYSIS,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/readinggr8 trend analysis201
3.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2015) (showing, respectively, for fourth and eighth grade, a 16 %
and 12% proficiency jump in mathematics, and a 5% and 4% jump in reading).
476 See, e.g., N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013: GRADE TWELVE
MATHEMATICS,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/snapshot_gr12_mathl3.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
477 Id. Ravitch, however, asserts that to score "Basic" on the NEAP exams reflects "probably
a B or C student," while to attain "Proficient" "reflects solid achievement . . . a solid A and not
less than a strong B+." See RAVITCH, supra note 314, at 47. If one accepts this, and measures
the extent that New Hampshire students scored "Basic" or better, the picture is much better.
For example, 74% of twelfth graders scored "Basic" or better in mathematics in 2013, and
81% scored "Basic," or better in reading. STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013: GRADE TWELVE
MATHEMATICS, supra note 476; STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013: GRADE TWELVE READING,
http://education.nh.gov/instruction/assessment/naep/documents/snapshot_gr12_readingl3.pdf
(last visited Nov. 21, 2015).
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averaged significantly lower than non-FRL students, with the gap remaining
4781fairly much the same over several years.
The 2013-2014 statewide NECAP assessment results also show
substantial percentages of students scoring less than fully proficient at all
tested grade levels and in all tested subject areas (reading, writing,
mathematics, and science): 47 9
* In reading, 23% of students statewide scored below fully
proficient;
* in writing, 42% of students;
* in mathematics, 35% of students; and
* in science, 67% tested this low. 4 0
Like those in NEAP, the NECAP results are more concerning when one
considers the test achievement gaps that continue to exist between students
from affluent circumstances and those from economically disadvantaged
backgrounds.4S As examples:
* In mathematics, from 2007 to 2013 economically
disadvantaged fourth grade students went from 47% to 55%
478 For example, for Fourth graders in mathematics and reading, the FRL students had average
scores, respectively, 19 and 22 points lower than non-FRL students, with the gaps not
significantly different than those that existed in 2003. See STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013:
GRADE FOUR MATHEMATICS, supra note 476; STATE SNAPSHOT REPORT FOR 2013: GRADE
FOUR READING, supra note 474.
479 See N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., NECAP STATE SUMMARY REPORT 2013-2014: READING,
MATHEMATICS, WRITING,
http://reporting.measuredprogress.org/nhprofile/reports.aspx?view=45 (last visited Nov. 22,
2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., NECAP STATE SUMMARY REPORT 2013-2014: SCIENCE,
http://reporting.measuredprogress.org/nhprofile/reports.aspx?view=45 (last visited Nov. 22,
2015).
480 NECAP STATE SUMMARY REPORTS 2013-2014, supra note 479. Between 2007 and 2013,
however, proficiency improvement generally occurred for students in mathematics and
reading (though not at all in grade three and not in grade seven in reading). N.H. DEP'T OF
EDUC., NECAP LONGITUDINAL REPORT 1, 21 (2014)
http://www.education.nh.gov/longitudinalreports/documents/grdcmprnh.pdf. For example, at
the grade eleven level, proficiency in mathematics went from 28% to 36%, and in reading
from 67% to 77%. Id.
481 For a recent study that considers in detail these achievement gaps, and, as well,
racial/ethnic ones and others, particularly with regard to the City of Manchester, New
Hampshire, see generally Daniel Barrick, Manchester's Education Benchmarks: Using data to
map a pathway to success (N.H. Ctr. For Public Policy Studies, Sept. 22, 2014) (accessed at
www.nhpolicy.org. We do not discuss here in our quick assessment review existing test
achievement gaps based on race/ethnicity or on disability status.
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proficiency while non economically disadvantaged students
in that grade went from 73% to 80% proficient; and
in reading the former group went from 55% to 59%
proficiency while the latter went from 79% to 81%. 482
Furthermore, four of the five petitioner districts in the Claremont
litigation (Allenstown, Claremont, Franklin and Pittsfield) showed NECAP
scores in 2013-2014 for reading, mathematics and writing markedly lower
411than the respective state averages.483 Claremont, for example, had an average
of 65% proficient or better in reading, compared to the state average of 77%,
55% in mathematics compared to 6 5%, and 4 2 % in writing compared to
58 %.414 The Oyster River Cooperative School District, in contrast, had
2013-2014 NECAP test scores in the three areas that bettered the state
average in each category by a large margin-86% to 77% in reading, 80% to
65% in mathematics, and 7 4 % to 58% in writing.485
An assessment of student performance or of schools themselves should
not rest solely on test results and, to repeat, nothing here purports to offer a
refined analysis of student achievement. However, the highlighted test
results here suggest that education challenges lie ahead.
3. Funding
It is open to question whether the State has properly determined the cost
of the delivery of an "adequate" education and put in place requisite funding.
In 2007, again with court prodding, the Legislature passed legislation
committing it to "use the definition of the opportunity for an adequate
education in RSA 193-E:2-a to determine the resources necessary to provide
essential programs, considering educational needs;"48 6 and, to further this,
482 NECAP LONGITUDINAL REPORT, supra note 480, at 4-5, 24-25.
483 Compare NECAP STATE SUMMARY REPORTS 2013-2014, supra note 479, with N.H. DEP'T
OF EDUC., NECAP DISTRICT SUMMARY REPORTS 2013-2014, READING, MATHEMATICS,
WRITING: ALLENSTOWN (2014), N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., NECAP DISTRICT SUMMARY REPORTS
2013-2014, READING, MATHEMATICS, WRITING: CLAREMONT (2014), N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
NECAP DISTRICT SUMMARY REPORTS 2013-2014, READING, MATHEMATICS, WRITING:
FRANKLIN (2014), and N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., NECAP DISTRICT SUMMARY REPORTS 2013-
2014, READING, MATHEMATICS, WRITING: PITTSFIELD (2014). All reports are accessible at
http://reporting.measuredprogress.org/nhprofile/reports.aspx?view=45.
484 NECAP STATE SUMMARY REPORTS 2013-2014, supra note 479.
485 Compare NECAP STATE SUMMARY REPORTS 2013-2014, supra note 479, with N.H. DEP'T
OF EDUC., NECAP DISTRICT SUMMARY REPORTS, READING, MATHEMATICS, WRITING: OYSTER
RIVER COOP (2014).
486 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-E:2-b (2014); see also Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v.
State (ClaremontXII), 907 A.2d 988 (N.H. 2006) (dealing with HB 616).
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and for many months in 2007 going into 2008, a Joint Legislative Oversight
Committee on Costing an Adequate Education ("the Committee") studied the
cost issue in great depth.4 8 7
In a final report issued on February 1, 2008, the Committee set forth its
process and conclusions.4 8  Adopting what it termed a "legislative cost
analysis model" 48 9 to determine the "adequacy" cost, and working with the
previously established statutory definition of an "opportunity for an adequate
education," it concluded that "[t]he universal cost of providing the
opportunity for an adequate education as defined by RSA 193-E:2-
a ... equals $3,456 per pupil." 490
The Committee also concluded that substantial, additional differentiated
aid for at-risk students with greater education needs had to be provided.49 '
The "universal cost" plainly did not suffice for English language learners
("ELL"), special education students, and those from economically
disadvantaged circumstances i.e. students eligible for the federal free and
reduced lunch program ("FRL"').
Moreover, the additional cost exigencies for these categories of at-risk
students varied considerably. For example, to educate a special education
student in a self-contained program as opposed to a less restrictive
environment such as a modified regular classroom involved considerably
492 te~
greater expense. And the best costing approach for economically
disadvantaged students required focus not just on each student individually
487 The Committee was composed of ten official members coming from both political parties.
It held hearings across the State, met many times, studied a vast amount of educational data,
and obtained the assistance of many education experts. See J. LEGIS. OVERSIGHT COMM. ON
COSTING AN ADEQUATE EDUC., FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO 2007 LAWS CHAPTER 270, at 6-10 (N.H. 2008)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
488 See generally id
489 Id. at 12. This is one of a number of "costing" approaches that have been employed by
courts, and legislatures. See id. at 11. While some commentators are quite critical of these
"costing" methodologies, others deem them to be workable tools. Compare ERIC A. HANUSEK
& ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE
FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 178 (2009) (arguing that the
expert methodology to design and "cost-out" in the education finance area does no more than
"give the illusion of providing valid, useful and reliable information"), with REBELL, supra
note 54, at 64-67 (seeing their utility though acknowledging they are imperfect). See also
William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 923, 926, 939-41 (2010).
490 FINAL REPORT, supra note 487, at 24. The Committee's calculations took into account
certain salary/benefit changes as well as certain costs associated with instructional materials,
technology, teacher professional development, facilities operation/maintenance, and
transportation. Id. at 18-24.
491 Id. at 27-33.
492 Id. at 28-29.
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but also on the total needs of all students in a high poverty school. This was
so because, as the Committee determined based on its research, "[a] high
concentration of low-income students in a school has negative effects on all
students and the school as a whole." 4 93
The differentiated aid the Committee suggested involved substantial
sums:
* For each ELL student, $675.00;
* for each special education student "educated in a modified
regular classroom and/or a resource room," $1,789.00; and
* for each special education student "educated in a self-
contained program or other restrictive placement,"
$3,6 10.00. 49 4
Further, while the Committee did not lay out "a specific formula" for
FRL students, it did determine that in schools with the highest concentrations
of free or reduced lunch eligibility, students need additional differentiated aid
in an amount that is equal to the universal cost of providing an adequate
education so that, combined, the universal cost and differentiated aid will
equal twice the universal amount.4 95
While the State's present4 9 6 "adequacy" funding structure is based very
much on the Committee's report, it does not incorporate, or continue, all its
key differentiated aid recommendations.497 To be sure, and after a consumer
price index adjustment in 2013, a "base per pupil cost" of $3,498.00 is now
in place, as well as such differentiated aid amounts as $684.00 for each ELL
493 Id. at 31.
494 Id. at 28-29.
495 FINAL REPORT, supra note 487, at 31. The Committee also recommended: use of "a
school-based allocation and accounting formula in calculating the cost of adequacy, including
differentiated aid, transitional assistance to districts without kindergarten programs to help
them put these in place, and the adoption of "a method to periodically recalculate the cost [for
the opportunity for an adequate education] based on current data or an appropriate index for
inflation." Id. at 33-36.
496 This article's coverage does not extend beyond August 15, 2015. As of that date, and
following the Governor's late June 2015 veto of the Legislature's proposed budget, the State
still does not have an operating budget in place for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 (running from
July through June). In its just-ended session, however, the Legislature did not pass any law
altering the State's core adequacy aid funding statutes for regular public schools, and
" [e]ducation funding details were not part of the difference of opinion between the Governor
and legislature." See New Hampshire School Boards Association Legislative Bulletin, (June
26, 2015)
http://archive.constantcontact.com/fsl27/110218977731 1/archive/1121486974021.html;
Interview of Dean Michener, NHSBA Dir. of Gov't Aff., July 19, 2015 [hereinafter Michener
Interview].
497 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 198:38, etseq. (2012).
CLAREMONT IAND II
student, and (though not part of the Committee's original recommendations)
$684.00 for each third grade student who had not tested at the proficient level
for reading and was not otherwise eligible for any differentiated aid. The
"two-tiered" approach for special education, however, was never adopted,
only a single aid number per student which is now $1,882.00.498
Furthermore, the present law only provides a single aid number for each FRL
student (now $1,749.00) with no school-denominated assistance.
The differentiated aid that is now in effect is thus a good deal less than
what the Committee originally suggested or intended. Indeed, the original
bill the Committee presented to the Legislature in 2008 contained an
adequacy aid package which could have resulted in a particularly
disadvantaged student receiving over $11,000.00 for the opportunity for an
adequate education; 499 yet under present law, by contrast, such a particularly
disadvantaged student can obtain a funding allocation of about $7,800.00.500
The present law covers the calculated adequacy-related cost through a
Statewide Education Property Tax (SWEPT) which is geared to raise about
363 million dollars by means of a rather low state-wide tax rate, 0 ' and by
education/stabilization grants. These latter grants are oriented both to make
up the difference, if any, between the calculated amount of due adequacy
monies and what is provided through SWEPT and to not permit disruptive
variance in state aid for a municipality from one year to the next.50 2 As
498 This change was at least in part prompted to not provide "any sort of incentive for more
restrictive placement." See S.B.539-FN-L (Apr. 21, 2008) (statement of Rep. Rous, Chair, H.
Educ. Comm.).
499 See S.B. 539, 2008 Sess. (N.H. 2008) (as originally introduced) [hereinafter SB 539]. The
bill allowed for "two-tiered" assistance for special education, so that a special education
student in a self-contained program would be allotted an additional $3610.00 beyond the base
cost; further, since this proposed law also offered a graduated aid formula for poverty schools,
if this special education student went to a school with 48% or more of its students receiving
RFL, he/she would be accorded an additional $3,450.00, together with an additional $675.00 if
eligible for EEL assistance. Together with the base $3,450.00 the total is $11,185.00.
500 Such a student would be accorded the universal or base amount of $3,498.00 plus
$1,749.00 (RFL), $684.00 (ELL), and $1,882.00 (special education) for a total of $7,813.00.
See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 198:40-a (2012); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 198:40-d
(2012).
501 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 76:3, 76:8 (2012); see generally, New Hampshire School
Boards Association: At Your Fingertips, Basics of State Support for Education-Fiscal Year
2015 [hereinafter NHSBA Summary].
502 In this regard, RSA 198:41 also specifies certain caps on education grants going from one
fiscal year to the next, as well as certain stabilization grants so as to not allow a municipality
to see its state education aid fall. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 198:41, III, IV (2012). The
caps, which presently do not allow a district to receive more than 108 percent of what it had
received in "adequacy" aid the previous year, certainly operate to disadvantage districts that
have seen increases in their student population (or ADMA), and they have caused a number of
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earlier observed, present law also calls for consumer price index adjustments
in regard to "adequacy" aid monies each biennium beginning July 1, 2013.503
Though the State has thus accomplished a "costing" study for
"adequacy" and has enacted legislation which employs the results of this
study to go about the process of raising the state revenues to fund an
opportunity for an adequate education, it is debatable whether this "costing"
and the subsequent funding legislation, has actually resulted, in real terms, in
providing New Hampshire schools, through state monies, with the resources
requisite to actually deliver on the "adequacy" promise.
Education funding statistics offer grounds to argue that the Claremont-
mandated state funding for an "adequate" education may not be occurring.
Since the 2004-2005 school year, the State average cost to educate a child
has exceeded $10,000.00, and for the 2013-2014 school year it rose to
$15,458.93.504 The school districts thus spend a good deal more than
$3498.00 to educate a child. Indeed, they spend a good deal more per
districts to not receive full "adequacy" funding-a problem in and of itself. Further, the most
property poor and income poor towns had been accorded additional assistance in the original
2008 legislative enactment, SB 539, through "Fiscal Capacity Disparity Aid," but this ceased
in 2011. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 198:40-c (2012), repealed by 2011 N.H. Laws 258:9.
503 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 198:40-d (2012). Originally, the adjustments were supposed
to occur as of July 1, 2011, but this was altered in 2011. See 2011 N.H. LAWS 258:8.
504 N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPIL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES 2013-
2014, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/avepupill3_14.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPIL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
2012-2013, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/avepupill2_13.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPIL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
2011-2012, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/avepupilll_12.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
2010-2011, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/avepupilI0_11.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
2009-2010, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/avepupil09_10.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
2008-2009, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/avepupilO8 09.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
2007-2008, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/avepupil07 08.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
2006-2007, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/avepupil06 07.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
2005-2006, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/avepupil05 06.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2015); N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES
2004-2005, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/avepupil04 05.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2015). The cost numbers include operating expenses, tuition costs (excluding inter-district
transfers) and transportation. They do not include facilities, capital expenses and expenses not
part of elementary and secondary schools. They are based on district operated schools only.
See, e.g., STATE AVERAGE COST PER PUPIL AND TOTAL EXPENDITURES 2013-2014, supra.
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student even with actually granted differential aid factored in. How may
these disparities be explained?
Besides the fact that the Legislature did not provide the differentiated aid
the "costing" committee had recommended, many school districts offer
schooling that exceeds the minimum standards by, for example, having
smaller class sizes, with smaller teacher-student ratios. 50 Moreover, certain
school costs were simply left out of the calculation of "universal cost," such
as those for school nurses/health services, teacher aides, and central
administrative staff.506 Salary estimates for teachers were also arguably
pegged well below the State average. 07 If the core assumptions underlying
the "costing" of education were altered, then the "universal cost" estimate
would change quite dramatically. 08
What's more, the State's "adequacy" funding is subject, as previously
mentioned, to consumer price index adjustments, but these adjustments only
began as of July 1, 2013.509 Education spending, however, has been
increasing at an average annual rate of approximately 2% between the 2005-
2006 and 2013-2014 school years, and at a much higher rate for several
years before.i0





508 Id at 7 (showing that if "a few additional costs that the vast majority of schools must fund
in order to operate as they currently do" are factored in-that is, costs for school nurses,
superintendents, and administrative central support, with teacher salaries set at the average-
then "the total per pupil universal cost ... [would go up] 27% over the Costing Committee's
estimate used in the legislation"). It should also be said that one can strongly question not
merely the student-teacher/principal/guidance counselor ratios the Committee used (which
arguably appeared not in sync with New Hampshire's actual experience, and not reflective of
the fact that many of New Hampshire's schools are small) but also the salary levels the
Committee adopted, and its cost estimates for many items such as special education, and
maintenance/operations, among others. See Hearing on SB. 539 before the S Comm. on
Educ., 2008 Sess. (N.H. 2008) (statements of Rick Trombley, Dir. of Public Affairs, NEA-NH
and Nathan S. Greenberg, Superintendent of SAU # 12 (Londonderry)) (criticizing the
proposed bill for not utilizing real numbers in a number of ways when coming up with its cost
estimates for "adequacy"); see also Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State (Claremont
XIll), 958 A.2d 930, 937 (N.H. 2008) (Duggan, J., dissenting) (highlighting the substantial
criticisms the Court had received as to the State's "costing" of "adequacy").
509 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 198:40-d (2012).
510 Compare N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SUMMARY REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES OF SCHOOL
DISTRICTS: 2013-2014, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/summrevl3_14.pdf (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015) (showing total expenditures of $3,057,576,438), with N.H. DEP'T OF
EDUC., STATE SUMMARY REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS: 2005-2006,
http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/summrev05_06.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015)
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All of this raises questions as to the "adequacy" of the "adequacy"
funding the Legislature provides.
The State has also reverted back to a larger dependence on the local
property tax for education. For the 2013-2014 school year, local property
taxes constituted 57.7% of total education revenues.5 11 To be sure, this is not
on the order of magnitude that existed pre-Claremont when the localities
raised in the area of 75% to 89% of the revenues, but it is a rising percentage.
In the 2000-2001 school year, for example, local taxes accounted for 40.4%
of the sources of revenue.512
Of note: markedly differing local property tax rates, something that so
concerned the Court in Claremont II, exist today. For example,
* Rye's local education tax rate per thousand of equalized valuation
($3.99) is over four times less than that for Allenstown ($16.03);
* Moultonborough's ($2.01) is almost ten times less than
Pittsfield's ($19.55); and
* Lebanon's ($11.55) is about 60% that of Claremont ($19.08).513
As to per pupil spending equity, another major concern of the Claremont
Court, the school districts are spending markedly different amounts per
student. In regard to per student spending for elementary students in the
2013-2014 school year, for example, and looking just at the five Claremont
petitioner districts (Allenstown, Claremont, Franklin, Lisbon, and Pittsfield)
compared to the "comp" districts in the case (Rye, Lebanon, Guilford,
Lincoln-Woodstock, and Moultonborough), the "comp" districts are
spending a good deal more per student in each case, ranging from a low
(showing total expenditures of $2,583,962,721); see also DOUG HALL, SCHOOL FINANCE
REFORM: BACK TO WHERE WE STARTED 2 (2007) [hereinafter HALL 11]
http://www.nhpolicy.org/UploadedFiles/Reports/ptnl4 backtostart.pdf (showing that between
the 1998-1999 school year, and the 2004-2005 school year, the compound annual rate of
increase was 7.9%).
511 STATE SUMMARY REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS: 2013-2014, supra
note 510.
512 N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE SUMMARY REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES OF SCHOOL
DISTRICTS: 2001-2002, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/summrev00_01.pdf (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015). Of course, the state-wide property tax is considered here to be a state
tax.
513 N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., VALUATIONS, PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS AND TAX RATES OF
SCHOOL DISTRICTS: 2013-2014, http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/values2013.pdf (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015).
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differential of $330.94 (Allenstown/Rye), to a high of $10,480.04
(Franklin/Gilford).
Moreover, the State has not been meeting certain school funding needs in
other important ways."9 Beyond the artificial "cap" placed on "adequacy"
aid discussed supra,1 a long term moratorium barring funding for new
building projects, going back to 2010, remains in place;517 special education
funding is only being funded to approximately 70 to 75% of eligible
entitlements;518 and vocational education tuition and transportation aid is
only meeting approximately 70 to 75% of eligible entitlements.519
It may thus be asked: Is the State meeting the funding mandates of
Claremont, or is it failing to realistically "cost out" what is needed for the
opportunity to receive an adequate education, and broadly failing to pay for
such education per the dictates of Claremont 1l?
CONCLUSION
Claremont I and II stand as landmark decisions in which the New
Hampshire Supreme Court boldly entered into the public education arena.
Together, the two decisions constitute strong expressions that the State of
New Hampshire must, by constitutional imperative, provide its public school
514 N.H. DEP'T OF EDUC., COST PER PuPIL By DISTRICT: 2013-2014,
http://education.nh.gov/data/documents/costpupl3_14.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). The
data shows that Claremont spent $4,549.70 less per elementary student than Lebanon, and
Pittsfield spent $5,738.84 less than Moultonborough. See also HALL II, supra note 5100, at 9
(concluding at that time that "[t]he school finance reform that followed the Claremont II
decision by the NH Supreme Court did not result in any change toward greater student
equity").
515 See generally NHSBA Summary, supra note 501.
516 Id.; supra note 502. We note that in its session ending June 30, 2015, the Legislature
passed a proposed budget that did not alter for the 2016 fiscal year either the 108% cap or the
stabilization grants for communities receiving them. Michener Interview, supra note 496. For
fiscal year 2017, however, the cap was slated to be raised to 160% and a phase-out of
stabilization grants was to begin. Id. It was contemplated also that in fiscal year 2018, the cap
would be entirely repealed with continuation of the phase-out of stabilization grants. Id
517 NHSBA Summary, supra note 501; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 198:15-a (2012). The
Legislature's proposed budget for the next two fiscal years did not seek to end the moratorium.
Michener Interview, supra note 496.
518 NHSBA Summary, supra note 501; Michener Interview, supra note 496; see also N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C:18 (2011).
519 NHSBA Summary, supra note 501; see also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 188-E:7 to :9 (2008);
N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ED § 1405.01. The Legislature's proposed budget for the next two
fiscal years did not call for better funding either with regard to special education eligible
entitlements or vocational education tuition and transportation aid. Michener Interview, supra
note 496.
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children an education that prepares them to be capable citizens in our modem
political and economic setting, and that the State needs to do this via a
funding mechanism that does not depend on local property values but rather
the wealth of the State as a whole.
The decisions are neither as irresponsible as their critics contend, nor as
free from fair criticism as their defenders suggest. There is no simple answer
to whether they were correctly decided.
In our opinion, the Claremont I Court correctly held that the
"cherish ... public schools" language of Article 83 imposes upon the State
enforceable duties to provide an "adequate" education, with assurance of
"adequate" funding, for New Hampshire's school children. In so ruling, the
Court did not engage in judicial activism, but rather legitimately acted to
carry out its judicial function of resolving disputed constitutional issues.
Nor did the Court err in Claremont I (or, for that matter in Claremont II)
by describing the nature of an "adequate" education as more than just the
bare minimum or something forever fixed in time. It was quite defensible for
the Court to view the State's education duty as being of an evolving nature-
obligating the State to provide New Hampshire's children with schooling that
prepares them to be both informed citizens and effective competitors for
good work opportunities in our modem and changing world.
It was also appropriate for the Court to leave to the Legislature and
Governor, at least in the first instance, the task of fleshing out the specifics of
a constitutionally adequate education and the proper means for its provision.
In so doing, the Court exhibited both regard for the limits of its authority and
ability and due respect for the legislative and executive branches.
The core tax ruling in Claremont II, however, rests on much less solid
ground. It failed to explain why the State was not entitled to at all delegate to
the localities its constitutional educational funding function (defined in
Claremont I as a "guarantee" function); it did not grapple with the trial
court's conclusion that the petitioners had failed to establish that the large
variances in the local property tax rates actually resulted in unreasonable
differential tax burdens; it did not deal with the trial court's findings that the
local property tax remained a "local" tax, notwithstanding the State's
involvement with the administration and collection of the tax, and/or the
school districts' need to satisfy State-imposed minimum standards; and it
constituted a major departure from the State's long history of "local control"
in the delivery of public school education with local property taxes serving as
the main funding mechanism.
To many, the tax ruling appeared to be an unjustified extension of the
application of Article 5-a direct judicial challenge, clothed in constitutional
garb, to the State's culture of limited government, limited taxation and local
control; and it turned the focus of the litigation away from a consideration of
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whether the State was required to provide New Hampshire school children
with an "adequate" education and toward a controversy over taxes. If this
tax ruling was wrong, then the corresponding remedy (left initially to the
elected branches)-the restructuring of school financing with the provision
of a constitutionally adequate education through an acceptable state tax
scheme under Article 5-does not follow.
The Claremont H1 majority's handling of the Superior Court's dismissal
of the petitioners' other contentions (their challenges to the adequacy,
funding and equity of the system under Article 83 and under equal
protection) is also troubling. The majority determined that the right to "a
State-funded constitutionally adequate education" was a fundamental right,
that the Superior Court had adopted an inappropriate "adequacy" definition,
and that the record established that at least some of the petitioner districts
were not meeting acceptable education standards due to funding
difficulties-yet it made these pronouncements while not actually subjecting
any of the underlying and largely contrary pertinent lower court rulings to
standard appellate review. It also made no comment concerning Judge
Manias's discounting, because of "prior inconsistent statements," the
testimony of certain school officials to the effect that in many respects the
education in the petitioner districts was inadequate; nor did it grapple with
Judge Manias's refusal to deem the State responsible for education
deficiencies that strongly implicated failings at the local level and not, in his
view, the State "system."
Despite what was otherwise said in the opinion, the only new holding in
Claremont H1 was a controversial tax determination, a decision perhaps more
difficult for the Legislature and Governor to accept and respond to in a
cooperative manner than would have been a decision which squarely dealt
with the trial court's treatment of the petitioners' other, more education-
oriented, claims.
Yet, and in significant part because of these decisions, the State's
education system is both different and better than what previously existed,
though it continues to operate with real funding issues. The system now
seeks in a measurable way to provide the opportunity for an adequate
education state-wide, for property-rich districts and for property-poor
districts, and for children of all backgrounds, with less reliance on local
funding than was the case pre-Claremont.
The system operates, with federal involvement, on the basis of specific
state-wide standards for defining the opportunity for an adequate education,
with evolving assessments and accountability mechanisms, and with an
"adequacy" funding approach drawn from a legislative "costing" study. It is
moving to deliver quality education, getting beyond high-stakes testing and
federal standardization, and allowing strong local governance and individual
2015 103
104 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 14, No. 1
teacher discretion. The goal in short: to adopt supportive education
approaches that work.
Poverty and other challenges certainly affect the State's ability to
succeed in educating all New Hampshire's students so that they graduate
able to function as good citizens and productive workers in our times.520 Yet,
as New Hampshire strives to educate its school children better, the
Claremont I and II decisions serve to orient the State in a good direction.
520 Among the biggest challenges is the poverty situation of many students. Poverty
unquestionably affects student achievement and it needs to be addressed along with school
reform. See RAVITCH, supra note 314, at 93 ("Poverty matters. Poverty affects children's
health and well-being. It affects their emotional lives and their attention spans, their
attendance and their academic performance. Poverty affects their motivation and their ability
to concentrate on anything other than day-to-day survival. In a society of abundance, poverty
is degrading and humiliating.").
In 2012, the nation's child poverty rate was a shocking 22%, "higher than in any
advanced nation." Id. at 94 (noting that "[i]n Finland, which has an excellent school system, 5
percent of the nation's children live in poverty . . . the U.S. rate . . . is about double the rate
found in such countries as the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia . . triple
the rate in Germany, Austria, and France . . . [and] quadruple the rate of such nations as
Denmark, Slovenia, Norway, the Netherlands, Cyprus ... and Iceland."). In New Hampshire,
which for years has been a leader among the States in keeping child poverty down, the rate is
still about 110%. NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHLDREN IN POVERTY: NEW HAMPSHIRE PROFILE,
http://www.nccp.org/profiles/NH_profile_7.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); KIDS COUNT
DATA CENTER: NEW HAMPSHIRE CHILDREN IN POVERTY,
http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/43-children-in-poverty-100-percent-
poverty?loc=3 1&1oct=2#detailed/2/3 1/false/869,36,868,867,133/any/321,322 (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015). Moreover, it is clear that a family needs income of about twice the federal
poverty rate to meet basic needs, and 28% of New Hampshire's children (a rate still well
below the national one of 44%, but nonetheless high) live in such low-income homes.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY: NEW HAMPSHIRE LOw-INCOME CHLDREN,
http://www.nccp.org/profiles/NH_profile_6.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); KIDS COUNT
DATA CENTER: NEW HAMPSHIRE CHILDREN BELOW 200% POVERTY LEVEL,
http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/47-children-below-200-percent-
poverty?loc=3 1&1oct=2#detailed/2/3 1/false/869,36,868,867,133/any/329,330 (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015); see also Research Bulletin, Southern Education Foundation, A New Majority,
Low Income Students Now in Majority in the Nation's Public Schools (Jan. 2015),
http://www.southerneducation.org/Our-Strategies/Research-and-Publications/New-Majority-
Diverse-Majority-Report-Series/A-New-Majority-2015-Update-Low-Income-Students-
Now.aspx (showing that in 2013, 51% of the students in the public schools were low income,
that is, eligible for free or reduced lunches, with New Hampshire being the State having the
lowest percentage of such students-27%). For a probing description and analysis of the
widening class-based opportunity gap among children in this country stemming from income
and wealth inequality-a study which underscores the enormous obstacles children from less
affluent circumstances face to achieve any improvement in economic and social status, see
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, OUR KIDS, THE AMERICAN DREAM IN CRISIS (2015).
